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Abstract
Why do wars happen, and what do societies ght over? Why are internatioal
relations sometimes fearful and aggressive and other times harmonious? I show that
these questions can be fruitfully explored by importing some basic economic theory
into the existing bargaining theory of war. A separate essay analyzes the interactions
between the United States and countries that may be pursuing nuclear weapons.
\Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War" posits a new explanation
for war: sometimes peace is more costly (in the sense of leaving both sides worse o
in expectation) than war. This means that some wars improve overall welfare relative
to peace. I develop models for three common sources of costly peace tailored to
particular wars and analyze them to expose the common underlying logic for war.
The costs of: arming explain the Iraq War; imposition explain the civil conicts
within Iraq after the earlier Gulf War; and predation explain the American War of
Independence.
\The Modern Economic Peace" develops a theory of the origins of international
disputes, in which the economic conict of interests between two states is deter-
mined by the benets and costs of transferring wealth from one state's economy to
the other's. Whether such a transfer happens depends on the military situation be-
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tween the two states and also the characteristics of their economies and governments.
Nations with sensitive, integrated (\modern") economies of comparable size and rep-
resentative governments have little to ght over. This might explain not only the
puzzling comity of the West, but also long-run global patterns in organized violence,
economic liberalization, and democratization.
\A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention" is co-authored with Muhammet
Bas. We develop a formal model of bargaining between two states, where one can
invest in developing nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its eorts and
progress over time, and use it to analyze the occurrence of proliferation and war, the
viability of non-proliferation agreements, and the role of intelligence-gathering and
estimates. The model explains some of the complex phenomena that occur in these
interactions, such as mistaken wars, cyclical crises, and the failure of non-proliferation
deals.Contents
Title Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Costly Peace and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Cheap Peace and the Ineciency Puzzle of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
When Costly Peace Leads to War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Implications of Costly Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Arming and the Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A Model of the US-Iraq Interaction after the Gulf War . . . . . . . . 23
Calibration and Analysis of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
An Analytic Narrative of the Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Imposition and Civil Conict in Post-Gulf War Iraq . . . . . . . . . . 62
A Model of Imposition and Civil Conict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Analysis of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Sanctions and Revolt in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5 Predation and the American War of Independence . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A Model of Predation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Analysis of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Stylized Facts of British-Colonial Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Explaining the War Itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.6 Developing the New Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
How to Distinguish War due to Costly Peace Empirically . . . . . . . 103
Other Wars due to Costly Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
vContents vi
3 The Modern Economic Peace 107
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.2 The Puzzle of Deep Interstate Comity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Stylized Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Existing Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Diering Conicts of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.3 A Simple Model of Economic Conicts of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.4 The Political Economy of Coercion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Empirical Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.5 Some Implications of the Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Redux) . . . . . . 158
The Long-Run Prevalence of Violent Conict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
The Liberalization of the International Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Material Interests and Moral Sentiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4 A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet
Bas 165
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.2 Setup of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.3 Proliferation and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
B Has Obtained Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
B Is Known to Be in Second Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
B Is not Known to Be in Second Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.4 Non-Proliferation Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
B Is Known to Be in Second Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
B Is not Known to Be in Second Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
4.5 Conclusion and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Bibliography 215Acknowledgments
I oer thanks to my advisors Robert Powell, Dustin Tingley, and especially
my chair, Jery Frieden, for their counsel on intellectual and professional matters.
Thanks also to my collaborators, who were essential not only to the papers we au-
thored together, but also to those on which only my name appears: Muhammet Bas,
Adam Glynn, Victor Utgo, and Jane Vaynman. Contributors to individual papers
are thanked in each chapter, but I wish to single out two. Robert Powell's blunt
criticism of my papers and wry commentary on the discipline I wished to join were
invaluable. James Fearon gave me the most detailed and comprehensive set of com-
ments I've ever received on a paper, which led to a far better version of my job market
paper. I am also grateful to the Program on Global Society and Security and the
Weatherhead Center for International Aairs at Harvard for their administrative and
nancial support, and for their provision of a stimulating environment in which to
work.
Finally, I oer heartfelt gratitude to those classmates at Harvard who kindly
endured the many long conversations and abstruse drafts that preceded this disserta-
tion, and who contributed heavily to whatever eloquence or insight it possesses and
whatever success it brings me. These include Amy Catalinac, Richard Nielsen, Iain
Osgood, Jonathan Renshon, Jane Vaynman, and especially Jennifer Larson.
viiChapter 1
Introduction
Why do wars happen, and what do societies ght over? Why are relations among
some states in some eras fearful and aggressive, while other states enjoy harmonious
relations, without any threat of violence? Until recently, the body of scientic knowl-
edge about why wars occur consisted solely of a number of observed patterns in the
historical record (e.g., violence has decreased over time) and an assortment of infor-
mal theories that don't really crystallize the reasons for war or for these patterns in
its occurrence. A new line of theorizing asserts that, under certain conditions, nego-
tiations between two political entities over their opposed interests will fail, and the
two will instead resort to violence to settle their dierences. Unlike previous theories,
this \bargaining theory of war" is logically precise and yields clear, testable empirical
predictions; perhaps as a result, it has swiftly risen to preeminence among political
scientists and economists studying war. However, at present it has severe limitations:
it simply takes for granted that any two relevant political entities will have opposed
interests, and it treats war and peace as absolutes|there is either all-out savagery or
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live and let live. Obviously, neither assumption is realistic.
At least two additions are essential to furthering our understanding of the origins
of war. First, the bargaining theory must be broadened to include not just war,
but also the many other responses to the failure of negotiation that political entities
sometimes employ: arms races, sanctions, the extraction of tribute, proxy conicts.
Second, it must be joined by a theory of the origins of conicts of interest among
political entities: for some nations, the weight of common interests mean that war is
unthinkable, while for others with severely opposed interests, the risk of war is ever-
present. The rst two of the papers presented below constitute a start on these tasks.
\Costly Peace and War" oers a game-theoretic analysis of three alternatives to war
for responding to failures of negotiation, thereby generating new insights into the
origins of several historical wars. \The Modern Economic Peace" develops a model of
the incentives for political entities to coerce one another and how these are aected
by the characteristics of their governments and economies; in so doing, it oers a new
explanation for the recent deep comity of international relations within \the West."
The common thread between these papers is their reliance on essentially economic
arguments, and it is from this that the dissertation's title arises. Respectively, the
choice of war versus another response to negotiation failure is due to a certain kind of
cost-eectiveness, while the presence or absence of opposed interests has to do with
whether one political entity's prosperity, broadly dened, comes at the expense of
another. The nal, coauthored paper oered below analyzes the interactions between
the United States and countries that may be pursuing nuclear weapons and explains
some of the complex phenomena that occur in these interactions, such as mistakenChapter 1: Introduction 3
wars, cyclical crises, and the failure of non-proliferation deals.
An implicit conviction behind all three of the papers presented below is that the
best way to advance the bargaining theory of war is to try to apply it to individual
cases of war or peace. When the extant versions of the theory fail to explain certain
cases, as they do for the cases studied in these papers, then the search for the simplest
revision that does yield a plausible explanation also reveals promising avenues for
improving the theory more generally. So, each of these papers begins with a certain
set of mysterious cases, proceeds to develop a bargaining model that incorporates
new features that are specic to the cases, and applies this model to explaining these
cases. In so doing, each illuminates gaps in the existing theory that are potentially
relevant to all cases.
A second animating conviction of this research is that there are gains to be had
from taking economics seriously in the study of international conict. The bargaining
theory of war takes as its point of departure the economic notion of an \ineciency
puzzle" of war: why actors choose a costly means (war) of implementing a settle-
ment, when the same settlement could have been agreed peacefully and implemented
without the costs, leaving both sides better o. But it is otherwise economically con-
tentless. The essays \Costly Peace" and \The Modern Economic Peace" incorporate
the economic notions of opportunity costs, private goods, and taxation into otherwise
standard bargaining models. This additional economic content enables the theory to
speak to the possibility of multiple costly means of resolving disputes (e.g., arming,
imposition, and predation, in addition to war), to the specic stakes over which dis-
putes arise (e.g., the disposition of private goods), and to the means of altering theChapter 1: Introduction 4
status quo (e.g., taxation for the purpose of transferring wealth from one side to the
other). It also renders a number of previously confusing empirical cases explicable
within the rationalist framework: the Iraq War, the civil conict within Iraq, the
American Revolution, and the deep comity among certain nations in recent decades.
On a more personal level, these three papers analyze empirical phenomena that I
have been trying to understand for a long time; almost a decade in the case of nuclear
proliferation and prevention. These papers stem in no small part from the dissonance
between the intuitive understanding of international aairs I acquired while working
in the US defense community, and the academic body of knowledge on these aairs
I have absorbed while a graduate student. I saw in the academic literature no clear
explanation for why the Iraq War had occurred, at least not one that squared with
the discussions I heard among policy advisors in Washington in the run-up to the war.
The explanations the various rationalist theories suggested for why the US and its
allies get on so well also struck me as wrong: bargaining ecacy and the costs of war,
in my mind, had nothing to do with the way US policy-makers think about the other
countries of the West. Finally, the available statistical and game-theoretic analyses of
nuclear proliferation and preventive war seemed too simple to render comprehensible
the drawn-out, roller-coaster character of the interactions between the US and Iraq,
North Korea, and Iran. These essays are, at some level, an attempt to make these
two bodies of knowledge, based on policy intuition and academic rigor, consonant.
The rst essay, \Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War," argues
that scholars of war have neglected a theoretically and empirically important explana-
tion for war, namely that sometimes peace is more costly (in the sense of leaving bothChapter 1: Introduction 5
sides worse o in expectation) than war. This explanation is theoretically important
because it implies that some wars improve welfare relative to peace. It is empirically
important because it provides sounder accounts of some historical wars than other
explanations. I identify three empirically common sources of costs in peace: arm-
ing (costly attempts to shift the balance of power), imposition (sanctions imposed
or rewards oered for certain policies), and predation (the extraction of tribute, in
whatever form). For each, I develop a simple model that is tailored to a particular
empirical case of war and whose analysis exposes the common underlying logic of
why war happens. The costs of arming explain the Iraq War; the costs of imposition
explain the civil conicts within Iraq after the earlier Gulf War; and the costs of
predation explain the American War of Independence.
The second essay, \The Modern Economic Peace," argues that rationalist theories
of interstate conict do a poor job of explaining some international relationships,
especially those in which peace seems most comprehensive, such as recent relations
among the countries of the West. This is because these theories have little to say
about a factor they nonetheless identify as central to war and peace: the presence
and magnitude of underlying conicts of interest. I begin to develop a theory of the
origins of disputes among nations, based on the idea that the economic conict of
interests between two states is determined by the benets and costs of transferring
wealth (by whatever means) from one state's economy to the other's. Whether such
a transfer happens in equilibrium depends not only on the military situation between
the two states, but also on the characteristics of their economies and governments.
Nations that have very sensitive, highly integrated economies|what are commonlyChapter 1: Introduction 6
referred to as \modern" economies|of comparable size and that are ruled by highly
representative governments have little to ght or coerce one another over. If this
theory is correct, it could potentially explain not only the warmth of relations among
such nations, but also the very-long-run decline in organized violence and the rapid
global economic liberalization and political democratization of the past two centuries.
It also suggests a previously unrecognized link between nations' material interests and
their moral sentiments about the proper way for nations to behave.
These rst two essays can be thought of as two sides of the same coin. On one side,
there are a whole range of costly behaviors in international relations: not just war,
but also arms races, proxy conicts, taris, restrictions on foreign investment, and
so on. All these things are the result of underlying commitment problems and asym-
metric information of varying severity, and they are all partial substitutes for each
other; war occurs only when it is the most cost-eective option. So the mechanisms
for bargaining failure that rationalist scholars thought were explanations for war are
only partially so|we also need to know why war was chosen over other costly be-
haviors. More deeply, many of the behaviors scholars of international relations think
of as interesting are costly, and these are all explicable with the bargaining failures
framework and an appreciation of the substitutability of each. This is a deep equiv-
alence between international political economy (IPE) and international security (IS),
two bodies of scholarship that until now have developed largely separately. On the
other side of the coin, there are some dyads which seem to manifest almost none of
these costly behaviors. But it's not that the underlying commitment problems and
asymmetric information aren't there, it's that these don't matter because there isChapter 1: Introduction 7
nothing really to bargain over. This is peace, not in the sense of the absence of war,
but peace in the sense of the absence of conict altogether, at least at the level of
national governments. The theory I oer builds another bridge between IPE and IS:
now both sides have a common framework for exploring the origins of conicts of
interest.
Turning to the nal essay, the spread of nuclear weapons has been one of the
most powerful sources of international conict since the second world war. Analysts
of nuclear proliferation have long recognized and catalogued the complexity of the
strategic interactions among states that might seek nuclear weapons and others that
wish to prevent them from doing so. However, there is considerable confusion about
how to parse these interactions. Suppose, for instance, that the United States acquired
military capabilities that lessened the cost of a war to prevent proliferation. It is
understood that this would lessen the incentives for other states to pursue nuclear
weapons, thus decreasing the likelihood of proliferation or war, and also decrease the
willingness of the US to oer inducements in exchange for a state's agreement to
accept inspections and abandon its nuclear programs, thus increasing the chance of
proliferation or war. But extant theories have no ability to determine which eect
would dominate, and so cannot oer rm predictions for how any given interaction
will turn out or prescriptions for how to change the likely outcome.
\A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention," which was written with Muham-
met Bas, is the latest of a series of papers we've written that seeks to build a rigorous
theory of these interactions and thereby dispel the confusion. We develop a formal
model of bargaining between two states, where one can invest in developing nuclearChapter 1: Introduction 8
weapons and the other imperfectly observes its eorts and progress over time, and use
it to analyze the occurrence of proliferation and war, the viability of non-proliferation
agreements, and the role of intelligence-gathering and estimates. We show that \sur-
prise" proliferation, sporadic crises over the uncertain progress of a proliferant's ef-
forts, and \mistaken" preventive wars can all arise endogenously in the model. We
nd that much of the variation in behavior over time is driven, not by exogenous fac-
tors like the costs of war and the eects of proliferation, but by stochastic elements
such as when the proliferant's program will make progress and when the other state
will discover this. Moreover, while exogenous factors do inuence the probabilities
of war, proliferation, and non-proliferation, their eects are often counter-intuitive
and non-monotonic. We also nd that non-proliferation can be undermined by the
possibility of a \better deal" once the proliferant's program has made progress, sug-
gesting that some states invest in a program as much to secure a more favorable
non-proliferation deal as to actually get nuclear weapons. The analytical discipline
provided by our model enables us to assess competing eects like those in the above
example, so that we can answer some questions that previous theories could not.
However, it also reveals that some widely-agreed intuitive answers to other questions
are in fact wrong, or at least only right under certain conditions. It is our hope that
this work will spur further reexamination of the conventional wisdom about nuclear
proliferation and how the United States and other nations should respond to it.
Note that the proofs for all propositions stated in the three essays, as well as a
description of the algorithm employed in the nal essay, are given in an appendix
that is available, on request, from the author.Chapter 2
Costly Peace: A New Rationalist
Explanation for War
Abstract:1 I argue that scholars of war have neglected an important rationalist
explanation for war: sometimes peace is more costly than war. This explanation is
important because it provides sounder accounts of some historical wars than other
explanations. To demonstrate this, I identify three empirically common sources of
costs in peace: arming, imposition, and predation. For each, I provide a simple model
that demonstrates the conditions under which war can occur and show that these wars
are not due to other rationalist explanations. I then oer analytic narratives of the
Iraq War, the civil conicts in Iraq after the Gulf War, and the American Revolution
based on these models, and argue that these accounts t the facts better than other
1Please do not cite or distribute this paper without permission from the author. I am grateful
to Robert Powell for a series of conversations that inspired this line of thinking. Obviously, he
should not be held responsible for its realization here. I also thank James Fearon, Jery Frieden,
Robert Powell, Dustin Tingley, and the participants in various workshops at Harvard University for
comments on earlier versions of this essay.
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rationalist accounts.
2.1 Introduction
Why do wars happen? Since wars are destructive, it is not obvious why they
would be chosen over peaceful bargaining as a means of resolving contested interests
between rational actors. The bargaining theory of war therefore focuses on explaining
why peaceful bargaining might fail and thereby lead to costly violence. This increas-
ingly inuential and wide-ranging body of scholarship focuses on two main causes of
war: shifts in the balance of power between two disputants, which can lead a side
that fears decline to attack the other in order to forestall its rise; and asymmetric
information about a side's willingness or ability to resolve an issue through war, which
may motivate one side to risk war in order to call the other's possible blu. These
two rationalist explanations have been applied to particular wars, whole classes of
wars, and even specic aspects of war and international relations more generally.2
They are becoming pervasive in the study of conict by both political scientists and
economists, to the exclusion of many alternative explanations for war (Jackson and
Morelli, 2009a).
This essay is intended to convince you that a third rationalist explanation for
war|costly peace|is of comparable importance to the other two, despite its relative
neglect by scholars. The essence of this explanation is that the anticipated costs of
peace may exceed those of war. Rational actors will then make demands of each other
that cannot be mutually satised, because the total value of any feasible peace is less
2For recent reviews, see Jackson and Morelli (2009a); Powell (2002); Reiter (2003).Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 11
than that of war. Thus, bargaining will fail and war will occur, even in the absence
of any shift in power or asymmetry in information.
This is not merely a theoretical possibility. There are several empirically common
sources of costs in peace, and this essay will argue that there are historical wars that
are more cogently explained by costly peace than by the other rationalist explanations.
Thus, this explanation is important because it is relevant to understanding the origins
of empirical wars.
This essay explores three sources of costly peace, termed arming, imposition, and
predation. For each, a simple model is provided that exposes the way in which this
source can make peace costly and lead to war. Each model is then used to construct
an analytic narrative of an empirical war, and evidence is presented that these wars
derive from the costs of peace introduced by each source.3
First, actors may take expensive measures, most commonly arming, in order to
defend their claims to disputed stakes. If this costs enough over the longer term,
they may prefer to ght immediately in order to avoid paying these costs. It will be
argued that the US-Iraq War that began in 2003 arose from the costs of maintaining
the balance of power between the belligerents. More generally, wars of consolidation,
secession, and succession may derive substantially from the costs of arming.
Second, peace may mean the imposition of penalties on, or removal of rewards
from, two potential adversaries by outside actors. If these are severe enough, war
may result as actors ght to obtain these external gains. It will be argued that the
civil conicts in Iraq that followed the Gulf War of 1990{91 arose from the sanctions
3For more on the method of analytic narratives, see Bates et al. (1998).Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 12
imposed by the international community in the aftermath of the war. More generally,
powerful countries often impose sanctions or oer rewards explicitly aimed at inciting
regime change, violently if necessary.
Finally, peace sometimes entails the transfer of resources or the exaction of trib-
ute from one side by another. This predation undermines incentives for productive
activity, and so is costly. If the costs are high enough, war may occur as one side
tries to lessen the other's predation and the other asserts control. It will be argued
that the American War of Independence was fought because Britain had begun to
prey on the thirteen colonies, and the colonists expected more. More generally, wars
from ancient Rome through to 19th century America were fought to discourage or
eliminate piracy and raiding.
To be clear, theorists of war have known of this third rationalist explanation
for some time. Powell (2006) points out the possibility that the costs of arming
might alone suce to cause war. Powell (1993, 1999) analyze models of arming in
which the costs of arming might cause war. McBride and Skaperdas (2007) uses
this mechanism to explain why conict happens in low-income countries, McBride
and Skaperdas (2009) tests it in a laboratory experiment, and McBride, Milante and
Skaperdas (2011) explores how good institutions might mitigate it. Fearon (2011b)
uses this mechanism to provide a theory of the democratic peace. Slantchev (2010)
models a related mechanism, whereby the need in peacetime to repay debt taken on
to increase military strength can lead to war. Bas and Coe (2012b) analyzes nuclear
proliferation, showing that wars over the spread of nuclear weapons are most likely
to arise from the costs of containment. And nally, Powell (2011) shows that theChapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 13
imposition of outside benets for decisive outcomes can also cause war.4
What is missing from this body of research on costly peace is a demonstration of
its ability to explain real wars. The primary contributions of this essay are to provide
three models of war due to costly peace that are tailored to explaining why specic
historical instances of war happened, and to show that these accounts t the facts
better than others. It also oers analyses of the three models that are designed to
expose the underlying common logic of war due to costly peace, and identies and
analyzes predation, a source of costly peace that has not previously appeared in the
literature. Finally, it oers suggestions intended to help researchers in applying this
explanation to other wars.
The next section explains costly peace and its relationship to war, situating it
within the bargaining theory of war and explaining some previously unnoticed im-
plications of costly peace for the broader understanding of war. Section 3 presents a
model of war due to the costs of arming that is tailored to the context of the interac-
tion between the United States and Iraq after the rst Gulf War. It then constructs
an analytic narrative of the Iraq War based on the model, and evaluates the perfor-
mance of this model against other explanations for the war. Section 4 does the same
for imposition and the civil conicts that took place in Iraq between the Gulf War
and the Iraq War. Section 5 does the same for predation and the American War of
Independence. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for how to determine if the costs
of peace could have caused a particular war, and points out additional candidates for
such wars.
4A line of work following Hirshleifer (1991) analyzes the distortionary eects of predation, but
does not make the connection to war and the failure of peaceful bargaining explicit.Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 14
2.2 Costly Peace and War
It is helpful to begin by explicating the quintessential elements of the bargaining
theory of war and its way of framing war as an \ineciency puzzle." With these
elements in hand, I will explain what costly peace is and how it can lead to war. I
then examine its relation to the other rationalist explanations for war.
Cheap Peace and the Ineciency Puzzle of War
The bargaining theory of war models a situation in which two rational actors have
opposed interests over some stake, whatever it might be, and may attempt to revise
its extant disposition.5 They have just two means of doing so: they can bargain in
an attempt to come to a revision that is implemented by mutual agreement, or they
can ght to impose a revision unilaterally. Bargained revision (peace) is assumed to
be free; violent revision (war) is assumed to be costly.
From this perspective, war is mysterious. Why would war ever occur, when
the participants could simply peacefully implement the expected outcome of a war,
thereby avoiding its costs and doing strictly better? When the actors are risk-neutral
over the contested stake, as is usually assumed, any peacefully agreed outcome is e-
cient, while war is inecient because it imposes costs. Thus, the \ineciency puzzle"
of war is why actors would choose an inecient means of resolving a dispute when an
ecient means is available. Even if actors are allowed to be risk-averse, then peace
may not be ecient, but it is still always \cheaper" overall than war.
The crux of this framing is that peace is cheaper than war, not because of some
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deep empirical law, but by construction. The seminal models of the theory are de-
signed so that ghting is the only thing that imposes costs on the players: there is
nothing else they can do, and nothing else that can happen to them, that will destroy
value. This probably explains why costly peace was initially missed as a rationalist
explanation for war. With a very few exceptions, even the many extensions of the
seminal models, dealing with domestic politics, intra-war bargaining, diplomacy, and
many other aspects, nonetheless retain this property.6
This construction has been very useful in advancing the theory, but it is impor-
tantly awed. As subsequent sections will demonstrate, there are several empirically
important sources of costs in peace. Each of the models presented there makes use of
a simple property of costly peace: when the costs of peace are higher than those of
war, then war must occur. To see why this is true, we rst need to talk about what
costly peace is.
When Costly Peace Leads to War
Peace is costly if it involves one or both actors taking measures other than war
that nonetheless destroy some of the value|whether wealth or any other desirable
thing|that could otherwise be realized by the two. Arming is one such measure:
it destroys value because resources that could be consumed and enjoyed are instead
devoted solely to protecting one actor's share of the total value or taking more of the
other's. Another is that one actor might not agree to a settlement that would bring
in external rewards; by doing so, he imposes the loss of these rewards on both. And
6The exceptions will be discussed in subsequent sections.Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 16
nally, if one actor produces less because the other will prey on the fruits of his labor,
then there will be less goods and service to consume.
War might lead to a reduction in these various costs. For instance, if one actor
is vanquished, the other will no longer have to arm against him to protect his share
of the value. In the case of imposition, if the truculent actor is defeated, the other
can freely implement a settlement that would reap the external rewards. And if the
predator is eliminated, then there is no more discouragement to production and so
no loss of consumption. Of course, war is itself costly in that it also destroys some of
the value available to the players. So the costs of war can be thought of as including
both the direct cost of ghting, and also any costs of peace that will remain after the
war.
If the anticipated costs of peace are greater than the anticipated costs of war,
then ghting would be expected to leave more value for the surviving actor(s) to
enjoy than the two combined would take from peace. That is, war would increase the
value available to the actors over what they could realize from peace. When this is
true, there is no peaceful deal that both actors would prefer to war. Any deal that
gave one actor as much value as he would expect to get from war would leave the
other actor short of his own war value. Because of this, there is no way to divide up
the value of peace so that both actors are satised.
If, by contrast, the anticipated costs of peace are less than those of war, then
ghting would be expected to leave less value to the actors than settlement. That
is, war would decrease the value available to the actors relative to peace. When this
is true, there are settlements that would divide up the value of peace so that bothChapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 17
actors got at least their war values. This does not guarantee the actors would not
ght, as costly peace is not the only rational cause of war, and if peace is costly, then
it might exacerbate another cause of war. But it does mean that, when this condition
holds, the costs of peace alone do not suce to cause war.
Thus, costly peace is sucient to cause war if and only if the costs of peace exceed
the costs of war. This fact is true, but vacuous, for the seminal models of the bar-
gaining theory of war. In those models, as in all the models to be presented here, the
costs of war are always positive because war entails destruction. But with the typi-
cal assumption of risk-neutrality, the costs of peace are always zero by construction,
because in these games there is nothing the players can do that destroys value other
than ght. Even if risk-aversion is allowed, the costs of peace are always strictly less
than those of war, because the latter then entails not only destruction but also costly
uncertainty. Thus, the costs of war exceed those of peace, and war can never happen
due to costly peace in these models.
It is enlightening to to restate this fact in terms of eciency: costly peace leads
to war because it means that peace is even more inecient than war. From this
perspective, the ineciency puzzle of war also applies to costly peace.7 If the actors
could simply not take the measures that make peace inecient, then peace would be
ecient and thus yield more value than both costly peace and war. But then there
is a way to divide the value of peace so that both actors would get more value from
this division than from costly peace or war. If this is true, why would actors choose
either to make peace costly or to ght?
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The answers are just the same as those used in the bargaining theory of war:
commitment problems (CP) and asymmetric information (AI). At root, the rational-
ist explanations for war oered by Fearon (1995) are actually rationalist causes of
ineciency, whether it comes in the form of war or of costly peace.8 If one of these
causes is present, then the occurrence of costly peace or war simply depends on the
availability and costs of each.
One might then conclude that, theoretically speaking, there is nothing new here.
If CP and AI cause costly peace, just as they cause war, then what have we learned?
One implication of taking costly peace into account is that, while CP or AI might be
necessary causes for war to occur, their presence alone does not suce. If there are
costly measures other than war that the actors could take in response to CP and AI,
then the presence of these causes might lead only to costly peace. War will happen
only if these measures are ineective or too costly. The seminal bargaining models of
war missed this because they rule out such measures by assumption.9
Implications of Costly Peace
Empirically, there are in fact often costly measures other than war that actors
can employ in response to deal with both CP and AI. In some cases, these are suf-
ciently cheap and eective so that war can be avoided; in others, war is cheaper.
An immediate implication is that, to fully explain an actual case of war, one needs
8Fearon (1995) oered not only commitment problems and asymmetric information as rationalist
explanations for war, but also issue indivisibility. However, Powell (2006) shows that this last
explanation in fact relies on a commitment problem.
9Of course, these models were designed to pose the ineciency puzzle of war in the starkest
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not only to determine the ultimate source of ineciency (whether CP or AI or both),
but also why costly measures other than war were not employed instead. A second
implication is that, to the extent that applications of the seminal models are used to
make predictions, these will be biased toward predicting war, because the possibility
of other costly measures to address the underlying CP and AI is ignored.
A third, and more unsettling, implication is that in some cases wars may actually
improve the welfare of the belligerents relative to what would happen if they remained
at peace. If, in the absence of war, the actors would take costly measures to address
underlying issues of CP and AI, then peace will be costly. If it is more costly than
war, then war would improve their social welfare, and so preventing war between
these actors might actually make them worse o. This is radically dierent from the
implications that follow from models of war where peace is always ecient, and so
bears some explanation.
In the absence of costly peace, there is necessarily more value to go around before
a war than after. Thus, there is always at least one actor who is made worse o by
war in expectation and so regrets the war the moment it starts|because of this, war
without costly peace can never be a Pareto improvement. To illustrate with the three
causes of war from Fearon (1995), in the case of shifting power, the regretful player is
the one who expects to gain advantage in the future. With asymmetric information,
the regretful player is the one who is surprised by an unexpectedly strong adversary.
With issue indivisibility, there is always one player who would receive more than his
war value in peace, and this player has reason to regret a war.
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to the actors, at least one of them must be left strictly better o by war. It is even
possible that, in expectation, both actors will do strictly better from war.
The crux of this dierence is that wars in the absence of costly peace are entirely
about one actor's willingness to pay to prevent a too-generous portion of the total
value from being allocated to the other. Thus, regardless of who wins, these wars
merely shift value between actors. The problem is that this shift comes at a cost:
the total value is reduced because the war is costlier than peace. This is why at least
one actor must be left worse o. Before the war, the expected allocation favors one
player, who would like to prevent war but cannot because of budget, credibility, or
divisibility constraints, and who thus regrets the war. In contrast, wars due to costly
peace are not about altering the allocation of value, but about increasing the total
value available. It is this increase in value that makes a Pareto improvement from
war possible.
This property of wars due to costly peace calls for a fundamental re-examination
of the policy advice that typically follows from bargaining models of war. It implies
that there may be some wars|those due to costly peace|that are in the actors',
and possibly the world's, best interest. Thus, unlike wars in the absence of costly
peace, it may not always be true that wars due to costly peace should be prevented
or stopped.
Developing this implication is beyond the scope of this paper, but I can give one
example to substantiate the claim that a re-examination is needed. With wars in the
absence of costly peace, it is always true that increasing the costs of war by enough
will cause the actors to forego war and thus leave them better o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the costs of war by too little just means that war still happens but is more costly for
the participants, making them worse o.) Thus, the application of sanctions, pressure
for a ceasere and mediation, and introduction of peace-keeping forces are all steps
that, if they are strong enough to prevent or stop a war, should be taken. However,
with wars due to costly peace, increasing the costs of war enough to take war out of
equilibrium can actually leave the participants worse o if it does not also decrease the
costs of peace enough. This implies that an ability to distinguish whether a particular
ongoing war was primarily due to costly peace would be extremely valuable for policy-
makers. I'll return to this problem in the nal section of the essay, as it is also relevant
for scholars looking to make use of costly peace in explaining historical wars.
The subsequent sections of this essay will substantiate the empirical relevance
of these ideas. Three historical wars will be examined using models that explicitly
incorporate costly measures that actors can take in response to CP and AI. I will
argue that in all three cases, the available measures would have eectively eliminated
the diculties associated with CP and AI in these contexts. And I will endeavor to
show that these measures were abandoned in favor of war because they were more
expensive than war.
2.3 Arming and the Iraq War
The rst, and perhaps most obvious, empirical source of costs in peace is arming:
expensive measures taken by either actor to improve its prospects in war or under-
mine its opponent's. It is well-known to bargaining theorists that if the anticipated
costs of future arming exceed those of war, then actors will choose war because it isChapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 22
cheaper than sustained arming (Powell, 1999, 2006; McBride and Skaperdas, 2007,
2009; McBride, Milante and Skaperdas, 2011; Slantchev, 2010; Bas and Coe, 2012b;
Fearon, 2011b). But it is not known whether this explanation for war is empirically
relevant: is there a historical war that is plausibly due to the costs of arming?
In this section, I will resolve this question by giving an analytic narrative of
the 2003 US-Iraq War (henceforth, the \Iraq War"). The narrative is based on a
model of war and arming (in this case, containment) that is tailored specically to
the interaction between the United States and Iraq prior to the war. To apply this
model, a set of assumptions must be made that calibrate the model to the empirical
circumstances that pertained during the decade of US containment of Iraq. From
these assumptions, a single relationship is derived that governs whether war occurs:
if the costs of containment come to be perceived as exceeding the costs of war, then
there will be war. The analysis of the model yields a new account of the Iraq War|
based on costly peace|that is quite dierent from existing accounts and that more
closely ts the empirical record of what happened. It thereby demonstrates that the
costs of arming is an empirically important explanation for war.
Since I will argue that the model applies directly to an actual war, the empiri-
cal accuracy, or at least theoretical innocuousness, of its features must be carefully
described and defended. After doing this, I will state the calibrating assumptions to
be used, and defend their empirical validity. There follows a proposition that char-
acterizes the equilibrium outcome under these assumptions, which is proved in the
appendix. We will discuss the intuition for this result: why costs arise in peacetime,
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these costs. And nally, I will give a narrative of the Iraq War based on this analysis
and compare it to existing accounts.10
A Model of the US-Iraq Interaction after the Gulf War
To begin constructing the model, suppose there are two players, the US and Iraq.
Given the totalitarian rule Saddam Hussein exerted over Iraq, modeling the country
as a unitary actor in this way is not a bad approximation. In the US case, there
were of course many dierent inuential actors involved in decision-making over Iraq,
but in the end most executive ocials, majorities of both houses of Congress, and a
large majority of the American public supported the strategy the Bush administration
pursued, so that the US can be taken as, in practice, acting unitarily.
The two players have conicting interests over a set of issues, represented by
the unit interval [0;1], which they must somehow divide between them over time.
These issues include inuence over other states in the region, control over regional oil
reserves, relations with regional terrorist organizations, the treatment of the people of
Iraq, and perhaps others. Any settlement of these issues is a point in [0;1]; assume for
convenience that the US favors settlements closer to one, while Iraq favors settlements
closer to zero. Further, assume for simplicity's sake that both players are risk-neutral
over these issues, and that both discount payos over time at a constant rate  2
10There are a great many non-rationalist (or at least, not formally rationalist) accounts of the
war, in terms of the personal characteristics of key decision-makers, the conuence of key ideas
among important elites, dysfunctional bureaucracies, concerns over re-election, special interests,
and misperceptions (Flibbert, 2006). While these accounts elucidate the many issues over which the
US and Iraq had conicting interests, they do not crystallize why the two states could not nd a
peaceful settlement that both would prefer to war. By contrast, the few existing rationalist accounts
of the war, to be cited and described below, focus on explaining the failure of peaceful negotiation.
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(0;1).11 Thus, the utility of a sequence of payos from settlements, with qt the
implemented settlement at time t 2 N, is UUS =
P1
i=0 iqi for the US and UIR =
P1
i=0 i(1   qi) for Iraq.
The rst period of the game can be thought of as the period immediately after the
end of the Gulf War of 1990{1991. It begins with the US choosing whether to engage
in containment, an action to be discussed momentarily. The US then chooses either
to go to war against Iraq or to make a peaceful oer of a settlement for that period.
Iraq can then accept the US oer, in which case it is implemented for that round, or
reject it and go to war.12 If Iraq accepts the US oer, then it can also choose whether
or not to try to acquire nuclear weapons. If a peaceful settlement is agreed, then
in every subsequent round, Nature moves rst and determines whether Iraq's eort
in the previous period to acquire nuclear weapons is successful, and whether the US
detects this eort. If it is successful, then Iraq is assumed to have nuclear weapons
for that and all future peaceful periods. If it is not, then Iraq must try again to have
a chance of getting nuclear weapons in the next period. After Nature's move, the
choices described above repeat. War is treated as a game-ending costly lottery, to be
described shortly.
I am assuming here that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is an inherently un-
11These assumptions are standard in the bargaining theory of war, but it is worth noting the eects
of relaxing them. None of the qualitative results derived here will change if I allow the players to be
risk-averse, or to discount future payos at diering rates, so long as the discount is always positive
and grows over time. Allowing the players to be risk-acceptant generates the possibility that war
occurs purely due to the desirability of gambles, but the costs of arming that are the focus here
would still contribute to the incentives for war.
12Here, for expositional simplicity, the US is modeled as making take-it-or-leave-it oers to Iraq.
The choice of bargaining protocol will not aect the results, as they do not depend on the allocation
of the bargaining surplus, but only on whether a surplus exists.Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 25
certain endeavor. Many technologically-sophisticated inputs are required to produce
a nuclear weapon, and successful mastery of each of these inputs takes an uncertain
amount of time. Additionally, both containment and the attempt to acquire nuclear
weapons are represented as binary choices|the US cannot choose how much to con-
tain Iraq, and Iraq cannot choose how hard to try to get nuclear weapons. Allowing
for continuous choices here would complicate the analysis considerably, but would
not change the conclusions presented below, because the problem that leads to war
does not derive from the inability of the US or Iraq to choose just the right degree
of weapons development or containment. I also assume that the US cannot react
instantly to Iraq's eorts to acquire nuclear weapons|if Iraq tries to get them, there
is some probability it will be successful before the US can launch a war. Even if
the US instantly and accurately observed Iraq's eorts, it would take some time to
mobilize itself for war, during which Iraq might be successful.
Most importantly, I will assume that the probability that governs Iraq's develop-
ment eorts depends only on whether the US elects to contain or not|it cannot, for
example, rise over time as Iraq keeps trying and masters various inputs to nuclear
weapons. Allowing for this to occur when the US does not contain would strengthen
the conclusions, because it would increase the incentives for both containment and
war, but it is important for the results that the probability be bounded above when
the US does engage in containment. This restriction can be defended on empirical
grounds: even strident advocates in the US for war believed that Iraq's eorts could
be held in check so long as the US did what was necessary to uphold the sanctions
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so that any progress it made could be detected and reversed. It can also be defended
on theoretical grounds: Bas and Coe (2012b) models this interaction and shows that
the US can eectively cap the probability that Iraq's eorts are successful over time.
Since Iraq has the ability to credibly reveal its progress at any given time by easing
access for inspectors, and the US becomes willing to go to war if its estimate of the
progress (and thus, the likelihood of a subsequent shift in the balance of power) gets
too high, it is always in Iraq's interest to avoid war by opening up to inspectors
and reassuring the US that the probability remains low.13 The model presented here
abstracts away from these aspects in order to focus on the costs of containment.
War is assumed to have only two possible outcomes: a complete US victory over
Iraq and a (much less probable) complete Iraqi victory over the US. Allowing for
a larger range of possible outcomes would not qualitative alter the results, so long
as there remains a substantial probability of a complete US victory that would be
expected to eliminate the costs of containment. The expected outcome of a war
started in a given period, as well as the probabilities that in the next period Iraq will
obtain nuclear weapons and that its eorts will be detected, depend only on whether
the US engaged in containment in the given period and whether Iraq had previously
acquired nuclear weapons. First suppose that Iraq does not have nuclear weapons. If
the US does not contain, then the probability of US victory in war is p, the costs of
13Some accounts of the war argue that Saddam's need to maintain ambiguity about his weapons
programs, especially about his ability to deploy chemical and biological weapons, in order to deter
foreign enemies such as Iran and domestic insurrection, impeded his ability to signal clearly to the
US that he had abandoned these programs (Baliga and Sj ostr om, 2008; Lake, 2010). However, it
seems clear that Saddam would prefer ghting Iran or an Iraqi opposition to ghting the US, given
the overwhelming military advantages of the US. So, given a choice between certain war with the
US in order to maintain ambiguity about his weapons programs, and possible revolt or war with
Iran upon revealing the absence of such capabilities, he would choose the latter. As I will explain
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war for the players are dUS;dIR > 014, the probability that Iraq will obtain nuclear
weapons in the next period if it tries to get them is  > 0, and the probability that
the US will detect Iraq's eorts is  > 0.15
Containment, as the US and its allies practiced it after the rst Gulf War, was a
strategy designed to ensure that Iraq was unable to threaten or coerce its neighbors,
that Saddam was unable to inict massacres on the Shi'i in the south or the Kurds
in the north, and that Saddam's regime was unable to reconstitute and expand its
once-formidable pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.16
It consisted of a comprehensive package of measures to achieve these ends. General
economic sanctions were placed on Iraq to starve the regime of hard currency to re-
build its military, including restrictions on Iraq's ability to sell its oil, and US forces
were stationed at bases near Iraq to ensure a rapid response to any new provocation.
The net eect of these measures was to increase the chance that the US would be
successful in a new war against Iraq to pc > p and to lower the cost of ghting such
a war to dc
US < dUS. They also lowered the costs of war for Iraq to dc
IR < dIR, since
they ensured that the next war would be quick and entail minimal destruction of
Iraqi resources in the form of rebuilt military forces. Additionally, the enforcement
of no-y zones in the south and north of Iraq to protect the minorities living there,
including suppression of Iraq's air defenses, further increased the US advantage over
14For mathematical convenience, all war costs are taken to be per-period costs, so that, e.g., the
total cost of war for the US is dUS=(1   ).
15For simplicity, I ignore the possibility of a \false positive": US detection of cheating when none
is taking place. Allowing for a small probability of this occurring would not qualitatively change the
results.
16I rely here on the discussion of the objectives, elements, and eects of containment in Pollack
(2002), chapters 2 and 3, and the assessment of their e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Iraq and lessened the costs should war recur. Finally, intrusive monitoring of Iraq's
military, including repeated inspections of any sites suspected of WMD-relevant ac-
tivity, and limited strikes as necessary to convince Iraq's regime of the seriousness
of US concerns at particular junctions and compel its compliance with inspections,
lessened the probability that Iraq would obtain nuclear weapons in the near future
to c <  and increased the chance that the US would detect such eorts to c > .
Finally, these measures were themselves costly, so that in each period containment
imposes costs of cUS;cIR > 0 on the players.
Now suppose instead that, at some period after the start of the game, Iraq obtains
nuclear weapons. Clearly, this would increase Iraq's chance of prevailing in a new
war, and also increase the anticipated costs of such a war for both players. With
a nuclear-armed Iraq, the US chance of victory would be pn < p < pc, and the
costs would be dn
US > dUS and dn
IR > dIR. Note here that I am abstracting away
from the possibility of containment after Iraq had obtained nuclear weapons. It is
certainly possible that the US would continue some of the pre-nuclear measures, such
as the stationing of forces nearby, and perhaps even add some, such as bolstering the
missile defenses of its allies in the region, but others might be ended, as Iraq would be
unlikely to tolerate limited strikes intended to protect its minorities or compel access
for inspectors. Regardless, so long as Iraq would continue to want nuclear weapons
even if it realized the US would try to contain it after it acquired them, relaxing this
assumption and allowing for costly containment after Iraq got nuclear weapons would
only strengthen the conclusions presented below.
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it is not and the US is not engaging in containment, and prefers both to war when
the US is engaging in containment. That is, 1 pn dn
IR > 1 p dIR > 1 pc dc
IR.
Analogously, the US is assumed to prefer war under containment to war without
containment, and to prefer both to war when Iraq is nuclear-armed, or pc   dc
US >
p   dUS > pn   dn
US. I will also assume that, if Iraq has not gotten nuclear weapons
and the US intends to go to war, then it is worthwhile for the US to engage in
containment prior to starting the war in order to gain the concomitant advantages:
pc dc
US
1    cUS 
p dUS
1  .
Finally, all of the parameters of the game are assumed to be common knowledge.
Before turning to the analysis of the game, it is worth remarking on three implicit
features. First, I ignore the question of Iraq's other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD): biological and chemical weapons. Whatever the uncertainties surrounding
them, the shift in expectations about war outcomes due to these weapons was small,
because the US military was, especially by the 2000s, perfectly capable of winning a
war against Iraq under chemical and/or biological attack (Cordesman, 2002; Pollack,
2002, pp. 33{37 and ch. 11). Second, there is no incomplete information about
the two sides' preferences. Both sides had had plenty of time to learn each other's
interests by 2002; there was no uncertainty about Saddam's desire to obtain nuclear
weapons, or the US's willingness to bear substantial costs to minimize the chance of
his success (Director of Central Intelligence, 2002).
Third, there is no terrorism in the model. Iraq's support for regional terrorist
organizations might be regarded as increasing the costs of peace between the US and
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WMD or relevant expertise to terrorists, but despite the Bush administration's pub-
lic assertions, the intelligence community placed low probability on this occurring,
except perhaps if Iraq's survival was directly threatened (Director of Central Intelli-
gence, 2002). Perhaps the most well-informed advocate of the war, Kenneth Pollack,
supported this assessment and also regarded terrorism as the least of the threats posed
by Iraq (2002, pp. 153{158, 178{180). Moreover, there were good reasons to believe
Iraq would otherwise be deterred from doing so by the danger of US retaliation for
any terrorist WMD attack (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003; Pollack, 2002). We will
return to these issues when we consider alternative accounts of the war.
Calibration and Analysis of the Model
To derive a precise prediction from the model, it is necessary to make four cal-
ibrating assumptions that narrow what can happen in equilibrium. Though they
are stated verbally to ease understanding, each is equivalent to a certain relation-
ship among the various parameters of the model. These assumptions imply that the
equilibrium outcome of the game turns on a simple comparison between the costs of
containment and the costs of war. After discussing what the assumptions mean and
defending their empirical validity, I will state a proposition that characterizes equi-
librium, and then discuss the intuition for this result. The proposition is proved in
the appendix, and the translation of each assumption into a condition on the model
parameters is performed therein.
Calibrating Assumptions:
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prior to its acquisition of them, then Iraq would try to get them and would not
start a war.
2. The US would be better o going to war than allowing Iraq to freely pursue
nuclear weapons, even if it gave Iraq no concessions at all prior to its acquisition
of nuclear weapons.
3. Absent containment, Iraq would covertly pursue nuclear weapons under any US-
oered deal.
4. Containment would decrease the probability of Iraq getting nuclear weapons
enough that the US would be able to hold Iraq to its war value.
Intuitively, the rst assumption means that Iraq would choose to wait until it ac-
quired nuclear weapons to challenge the US, even if in the meantime the US conceded
absolutely nothing to its interests, so long as the US did not engage in containment.
This is crucial to the rest of the analysis: it ensures that Iraq anticipates substan-
tial gains from trying to get the weapons. In the appendix it is shown that this
assumption is equivalent to the following inequality:
1   p   dIR 

1   
(p   p
n + dIR   d
n
IR) (2.1)
The left side of the inequality is how Iraq would expect to do in a war, absent
containment. The right side is the total future benet for Iraq of having nuclear
weapons, relative to what it would get without the weapons if the US oered it just
enough to avoid war, weighted by the probability that its eorts to get them are
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Empirically, this condition surely held. Judging from the earlier Gulf War, the
US military was far superior to Iraq's even prior to containment, and the costs of
war for Iraq were substantial, so that the left side would be close to zero. Both the
US and Iraq believed that Iraq's acquisition of nuclear weapons would substantially
improve its ability to extract concessions from the US.17 Moreover, Iraq was very
close to mastering the technology by the time of the earlier Gulf War, so that the
probability of success in developing them was high. Even after the war and the
years of containment following it, the knowledge remained and the program could be
reconstituted in the absence of containment (Duelfer, 2002b).
The second assumption means that the US would prefer war to just ignoring Iraq,
even if that meant making no concessions to Iraq prior to its acquisition of weapons. It
is equivalent to a complicated condition given in the appendix, but if the US is taken
to be fairly patient (  1), as seems likely, then the condition simplies to roughly
dc
US + dn
IR < pc   pn. The left side of the inequality is the surplus from avoiding war
that the US would gain by tolerating Iraq's nuclear program and conceding nothing
to it, and the right side is the shift in the balance of power from Iraq getting nuclear
weapons. I have already argued that containment greatly enhanced the already-large
military superiority of the US over Iraq, and reduced the anticipated costs of war, so
that pc was close to 1 and dc
US was small. Moreover, for Iraq to perceive substantial
17For evidence that Saddam saw nuclear weapons as giving him more than just a guarantee of
survival, see Pollack (2002, pp. 175{178). Some have argued that such \oensive" gains cannot be
acquired with nuclear weapons, even for an aggressive leader like Saddam (Mearsheimer and Walt,
2003). However, it is widely believed within the US policy community that the spread of nuclear
weapons, especially to potential adversaries, erodes US power and inuence|one need only look at
any edition of the National Security Strategy of the United States from the Clinton or Bush (Jr.)
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gains from nuclear weapons, as assumed and justied above, it must be that pn is
substantially less than pc (the balance of power shifts in Iraq's favor) and dn
IR is not
too large (Iraq can aord to assert the advantages deriving from its nuclear weapons).
Thus it is plausible that the inequality held true empirically.
Some observers argued before the war that toleration (and deterring Iraq once it
got nuclear weapons) would be better for the US than war (Mearsheimer and Walt,
2003). Having seen the ex post costs of the war, many more would agree with this
assessment now. However, the US had previously proven willing to run at least the
risk of war to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, though it ultimately
failed (Mazarr, 1995, Chapter 8). Thus it seems reasonable to assume that, given a
stark choice between tolerating Iraq's pursuit of nuclear weapons and ghting a war
to stop it, the US would decide on the latter.
The second assumption ensures that the US will be willing to bear at least some
cost to try to prevent Iraq's program from being successful. This cost could come in
the form of war or containment, which would make the equilibrium inecient because
each destroys value, or a concession oered to Iraq in exchange for abandoning its
nuclear program, which would be ecient because it simply transfers value from one
player to another.
The third assumption means that the last option won't work: there is no way to
avoid Iraq pursuing nuclear weapons without containment or war. If the US oered
the most generous concession to Iraq that the US could tolerate in exchange for Iraq
abandoning its program, and threatened Iraq with war if it was caught cheating, then
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unwilling to oer any such deal. From the appendix, this assumption is equivalent
to:
(1   )

dc
US + dc
IR
1   
+ cUS + cIR

< 

pc   pn   dc
US   dn
IR
1   
  cUS

(2.2)
The left side is the surplus from avoiding containment and war that would be lost
if Iraq was caught cheating on the deal, weighted by the probability that its covert
eort was both unsuccessful and detected. The right side is the gain to Iraq from
obtaining nuclear weapons, relative to the generous concession oered by the US to
secure the deal, weighted by the probability that its covert eort succeeded. When
the inequality holds, Iraq will discount the threat of US punishment, because it is
unlikely to get caught before it gets the weapons, and even if it did, the punishment
is not so bad.
Empirically, this condition very probably held. No serious analyst doubted that
Iraq would reconstitute its nuclear program if containment lapsed, and throughout
the era of containment there was little discussion of a deal of the kind considered here.
Looking at the condition from the model, it is easy to see why. As already argued,
the rst and second assumptions imply that Iraq's chance of getting nuclear weapons
absent containment () was high, and that the bracketed term on the right side is
positive. Containment's reduction of the costs of war (as described earlier) implies
that the bracketed term on the left is not too large, but the most important factor
there is , the chance that Iraq would get caught in the absence of containment.
There was every reason to believe that this probability was quite small. Iraq had
come close to acquiring nuclear weapons before the earlier Gulf War without the
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forced and intrusive monitoring, inspectors were unaware of major elements of Iraq's
WMD programs, and only discovered them upon the chance defection of the director
of these programs, a member of Saddam's family (Duelfer, 2002a).18
Finally, the fourth assumption means that containment works well enough that
Iraq has relatively little to gain from pursuing nuclear weapons under it, because
this eort is so unlikely to succeed. Thus, to avoid Iraq starting a war, the US
may have to make a (small) concession to Iraq's interests to make up for the fact
that the advantages Iraq would get from acquiring nuclear weapons are unlikely to
be realized any time soon. It also means that, under containment, the US is not
interested in oering Iraq additional concessions in exchange for a promise to abandon
its nuclear program. Any deal that was generous enough to win Iraq's compliance
would be strictly preferred by Iraq because of the additional concession it entailed,
but because containment works so well, it would not lessen the probability that Iraq
would eventually get nuclear weapons enough to make it worthwhile for the US to
oer this concession. In terms of the model, this assumption is equivalent to:
W
c
IR 
 cIR + cV n
IR
1   (1   c)
(2.3)
The left side is Iraq's expected value from war under containment; the right side is
the value to Iraq of trying to get nuclear weapons under containment while being
given nothing by the US. The lower Iraq's chance of success under containment (c),
the smaller the right side will be relative to the left.
18As Pollack (2002, pp. 75{76) explains, this defection was not motivated by any foreign entice-
ment, but rather by an improbable quarrel within Saddam's family that threatened the personal
safety of the director. Thus, this highly unlikely revelation should not be considered as indicating
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The evidence available as of the early 2000s suggested that c was very low. After
all, starting from 1991, when it had been very close to getting the weapons, a decade
had passed under containment and Iraq still did not have nuclear weapons. Moreover,
many believed this was not for lack of trying|throughout the 1990s, the intelligence
community had reporting from human sources that Iraq's program was continuing
(Iraq Intelligence Commission, 2005, pp. 53{55). While this turned out to be false, it
would nonetheless surely have contributed to a US perception that c was quite low.
Even in 2002, when Iraq had had four years without inspections to make progress,
and the erosion of international sanctions had increased the resources available for
pursuing nuclear weapons, the US intelligence community estimated that Iraq was
still ve to seven years away from getting a weapon (Director of Central Intelligence,
2002).
In reality, Iraq's ability to reconstitute its nuclear program decayed steadily after
containment began, so that c moved toward zero, in part because of Iraq's decision to
temporarily abandon WMD in order to motivate the lifting of sanctions (Iraq Survey
Group, 2004, Key Findings). But the bottom line is that the US had every reason
to believe that containment had greatly reduced Iraq's ability to develop nuclear
weapons, as indeed it did, and the fourth assumption thus held true.
Together, these assumptions imply that the equilibrium outcome must be either
containment or war. The fourth assumption means that Iraq is indierent between
these; either way, it just gets its war value. Because of this, if war gives the higher
total value for both players then both would prefer it to containment, and vice versa.
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occur. More formally, we have:
Proposition 2.1. Under the calibrating assumptions, war is the unique equilibrium
outcome if and only if the costs of containment exceed the costs of war. If the costs
of containment are less than the costs of war, the unique equilibrium outcome has the
US engaging in containment and Iraq pursuing nuclear weapons.
Remarkably, the proposition implies that the equilibrium outcome is costly (that
is, inecient), whether it is peaceful or not.19 The US and Iraq would do better
overall if they neither fought a war nor engaged in containment. It is important
to understand what causes this ineciency, and why war occurs under the stated
condition. There are three features of the model that are necessary for ineciency to
occur. First, Iraq cannot commit not to take advantage of nuclear weapons to obtain
a more favorable settlement from the US once it has them. Second, the US cannot
perfectly and costlessly police Iraq's pursuit of nuclear weapons. And third, absent
costly containment by the US, Iraq cannot commit not to pursue the weapons.
The rst commitment problem is exactly the same as the problem that leads to
war in the standard models of shifting power (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). If Iraq
could commit not to take advantage of newly-acquired nuclear weapons, and did so,
then the US would not care whether Iraq pursued nuclear weapons or not, and there
would be no reason to engage in containment or ght a war. And if Iraq could commit,
then it would certainly do so in equilibrium, because the US would be able and willing
to entice it to do so by oering it part of the surplus gained from avoiding the costs
19The statement of the proposition ignores the knife-edge case where the costs are equal, in which
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of containment or war. Play would thus be ecient.
Since Iraq cannot commit not to take advantage of nuclear weapons if it gets
them, the US does care whether Iraq tries to develop them. If the US were able
to perfectly and costlessly monitor Iraq's eorts, and able to react instantly to the
initiation of such eorts, then it could threaten to react to Iraq's eorts with war or
containment. Faced with this threat, Iraq would be deterred from pursuing nuclear
weapons, because the instant it did so, the US would detect it and take action to stop
it|there would be no chance for Iraq's eorts to bear fruit, and thus nothing to gain
from them. So, with perfect monitoring and instantaneous reaction, the commitment
problem described above could be avoided, because Iraq would not pursue nuclear
weapons and thus no shift in power could occur. Then, neither war nor containment
would be needed and play would be ecient. Unfortunately, this possibility is ruled
out in the model because, without containment, it is too easy for Iraq to conceal its
eorts and takes too long for the US to react to them once detected.
Even imperfect monitoring and delayed reaction on the part of the US would
not matter were it not for the second commitment problem. If Iraq could commit
not to pursue nuclear weapons, and did so, then US monitoring of and reaction to
Iraq's eorts would be irrelevant, as would be Iraq's inability to commit to not taking
advantage of the weapons once it had them, and there would again be no reason to
engage in containment or go to war. Once again, Iraq would make this commitment
in equilibrium, because the US would entice it do so with a share of the surplus from
avoiding the costs of containment or war, and play would be ecient.
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them, the US cannot perfectly and costlessly police Iraq's nuclear eorts, and Iraq
cannot commit not to pursue the weapons, the US is willing to employ costly measures
to stop it from trying and being successful. This ensures that the equilibrium will
be inecient: the only issue is whether it is peaceful (containment) or not (war).
Containment is costly, but it lessens the probability that Iraq's nuclear program
will be successful to the point that the US no longer expects it to happen, and so
renders moot both the US inability to perfectly police Iraq's nuclear eorts and Iraq's
commitment problems. In eect, the availability of containment ensures that neither
shifting power nor asymmetric information are sucient to cause war in equilibrium.
Similarly, war is also costly, and also renders irrelevant the inability to police and
the commitment problems. If the US wins, then it can govern Iraq itself or install
leaders with preferences similar to its own; either way, the dispute is ended and there
is no more need to worry about Iraq's pursuit of nuclear weapons. If Iraq wins, then
the US is (presumably) rendered unable to interfere further in Iraq's aairs, so that
Iraq gets its way on the disputed issues and freely develops nuclear weapons if it so
desires.20
The only reason that war would be chosen over containment is that the latter
would be so costly that going to war would give the players a higher overall value.
From the US perspective, going to war and \solving" the Iraq problem once and for
all might be preferred to the indenite continuation of expensive containment. Thus,
in the model, war happens due to costly peace. To summarize, equilibrium is costly
20Note that given the overwhelming superiority of US forces relative to Iraq's, the probability of
Iraq's victory might be approximately zero, so that assumptions about what would happen if Iraq
won are essentially without loss of generality. It was widely believed that the US would surely win
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because of the commitment problems and inability to perfectly police, but it is only
violent if the best candidate for peace|containment|is too costly.
An Analytic Narrative of the Iraq War
The reason the Iraq War happened is that the costs of containment grew rapidly
through the 1990s and into the early 2000s, and were set to escalate further, while
the anticipated costs of war steadily declined through the same period. Eventually,
the costs of containment came to be perceived as exceeding those of war, and so, as
Proposition 2.1 predicts, the US went to war. To substantiate this explanation, I will
rst describe the components of the costs of containment, and how each changed over
time. After doing the same for the anticipated costs of war, I will review the available
quantitative estimates of the costs of war and of containment. I will then consider
why the war happened in 2003, in particular, and how the war was sold domestically.
Finally, I will discuss some other explanations for the Iraq War and the evidence for
them.
The Increasing Costs of Containing Iraq
The many costs of the US strategy of containment are described in Table 2.1. The
table is divided into six components of the total cost: military, economic, humani-
tarian, diplomatic, political, and security costs. For each component, the principal
costs are listed. To the left of each component is a symbol that indicates whether
it generally rose (+), fell ( ), or was approximately constant (0) over the course of
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the costs of containment described across many sources, but relies heavily on Pollack
(2002).21 However, the trends specied for each component of costs deserve further
explanation.
Trend Component Specic Costs
+ Military committing forces to region; operations to enforce sanctions;
strikes to compel compliance with inspections; enforcement of
no-y-zones; sporadic mobilizations to respond to Iraqi mobi-
lization; exposure of troops to terrorist attack
+ Economic trade and investment opportunities lost due to sanctions, in-
cluding access to oil; loss of market share to defectors from
sanctions; contraction of Iraqi economy
+ Humanitarian impoverishment of Iraqi people; repression of Iraqi people; de-
terioration of Iraqi civil society; casualties inicted by strikes
+ Diplomatic recurring negotiations to maintain sanctions; coordinating re-
sponses to lack of compliance
+ Political unpopularity and perceived illegitimacy of sanctions; appear-
ing to persecute Muslims; corruption of UN bureaucracy by
oil-for-food program; deterioration of relations with defectors
from sanctions; domestic unpopularity of basing troops in hos-
tile areas; inducement of terrorism by US military presence in
holy lands
+ Security of Iraq's support for terrorism; of foregone opportunity for
catalyzing regional liberalization; of potential for terrorist use
of Iraqi WMD; of induced vulnerability of Iraq to Iran
Table 2.1: The Costs of Containment of Iraq and Their Trends
First, the military component of the costs of containment had increased over time,
though only modestly. The principal rise was in the exposure of US forces stationed
in the region to terrorist attack: the growth of Al-Qaeda raised the perceived risk,
21This might seem suspect, given that Pollack was a strong advocate for the war. However, the
actual measures of which the US strategy of containment toward Iraq was composed, as discussed in
the model setup, were a matter of public record and uncontroversial. Given a list of these measures,
most of the specic costs listed in the table would be familiar to, for instance, anyone who regularly
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especially after the Khobar Towers attack of 1996 and the bombing of the USS Cole
in 1998.
Second, the economic costs rose substantially over time. The sanctions imposed
on Iraq led to a long, deep depression that reduced its economy to a shadow of its
pre-Gulf War strength (Nordhaus, 2002, p. 58). The costs of lost access to Iraq's
economy, especially to its oil, increased dramatically from 1999 as the price of oil
rose quickly. Moreover, the costs increased for the US because its rms were made to
respect the sanctions, while their competitors in Russia, France, and China were given
leave to violate the sanctions in exchange for bribes from Iraq under the Oil-for-Food
Program.
Third, the root cause of much of the increase in the costs of containment lay
in the steadily increasing humanitarian costs of the sanctions. As Iraq's economy
contracted, much of the remaining surplus was appropriated by the regime to pay
for the military and for the kickbacks necessary to undermine the sanctions through
Oil-for-Food. As a result, the Iraqi people suered increasing deprivation throughout
the years of containment. This was universally viewed as undeserved and was widely
attributed to the sanctions.
Fourth, the diplomatic costs of containment increased substantially over time as
international support for containment declined. Especially as many countries began
to respond to concerns over the impoverishment of Iraq caused by sanctions, and as
some countries began to cheat on the sanctions, the diplomatic eort and political
capital that had to be spent on the part of the US to police and preserve the sanctions
and generate support for 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Fifth, and in part as a result of rising humanitarian concerns, the political costs of
containment rose dramatically over time. The sanctions, and especially US eorts to
preserve them, became increasingly unpopular abroad, and fueled perceptions that the
US was persecuting Muslims, especially after the Second Intifada and 9/11. Relations
between the US and the defectors from sanctions suered, especially in the cases of
Russia, France, and China. The UN bureaucracy was increasingly undermined and
corrupted by the dirty dealings of the Oil-for-Food program. Moreover, basing troops
in areas where they were subject to terrorist attack became increasingly unpopular
with the US public.
Sixth, and nally, the negative security externalities caused by containment also
grew. Iraq increased its support to Palestinian terrorism as a means of bolstering its
public image with the region's Muslims. In part because of this, the continued survival
of Saddam's regime was viewed by some as a major impediment to Middle East peace.
As the region's most domestically unpopular regime, its survival entailed foregoing the
best available opportunity to catalyze democratization and liberalization and, some
thought, a truly durable peace in the region. Last, after 9/11, prior beliefs about
the risk of extreme terrorist attacks were revised upward, and the possibility that
whatever WMD Iraq had might somehow fall into the hands of terrorists, whether
inadvertently or intentionally, received greater weight.
Overall, the costs of containment rose quite substantially over the period 1991{
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The Decreasing Anticipated Costs of War with Iraq
Now consider the anticipated costs of war with Iraq, and how these changed over
time. These are described in Table 2.2. The table is divided into the same six com-
ponents as were used for organizing the costs of containment. For each component,
the principal costs are listed; the general trend in each component from 1991 to 2003
appears on the left. The table condenses the highly detailed compilations of the
actual and anticipated costs of war collected in Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006); Davis,
Murphy and Topel (2006); Nordhaus (2002); Wallsten and Kosec (2005). As with the
costs of containment, some explanation of the posited trends in the components of
the anticipated costs of war is in order.
First, over the years of containment, the anticipated military costs of war had
declined very substantially. Sanctions had drastically constrained the funds available
to support Iraq's military, and its strength decayed rapidly. By contrast, the US mil-
itary became much more capable over the 1990s|the development of high-precision
bombing, dramatic improvements in inter-service coordination, and the introduction
of modern information technology all radically increased the US military's ability
to win wars. Moreover, the development of operational art featuring greater use of
special operations forces and much-reduced manpower also promised to greatly re-
duce the cost of war, as it had in Afghanistan. Finally, the US military's ability
to ght eectively under chemical and biological attack also improved substantially
(Cordesman, 2002).
Second, the economic costs of war also fell. The same sanctions that strangled
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Trend Component Specic Costs
  Military reduced availability of forces elsewhere; operations to support
invasion and occupation; casualties and equipment destroyed
in ghting; paid benets for veterans; more dicult recruit-
ment and retention; use of WMD
  Economic sharp rise in oil price; concomitant macroeconomic eects; de-
struction of civilian infrastructure in ghting; reconstruction
of Iraq; increased risk imposed by war
  Humanitarian civilian suering caused by war; potential for internal conict
after war
0 Diplomatic marshalling international support for war and assistance with
reconstruction; negotiating new US-Iraq relationship and sta-
tus of forces in Iraq
+ Political increased inuence of Iran over Iraq; alienation of supporters
of Iraq's regime; potential domestic unrest or punishment of
incumbents if war goes badly; perception of attack on Muslims
  Security risk of expansion of war to Israel; potential new training
ground for terrorists; externalities of post-invasion civil con-
ict, possibly including partition of Iraq, for surrounding
countries
Table 2.2: The Anticipated Costs of War with Iraq and Their TrendsChapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 46
period, even after the initiation of Oil-for-Food, was only around half of production
before the Gulf War. War would be less damaging to Iraq's economy because there
was less infrastructure to blow up, and less room for economic activity to drop due
to the disruption of war (Nordhaus, 2002).
Third, the humanitarian costs of war declined for the same reason as the economic
costs. As the Iraqi people become more impoverished due to the sanctions, the
room for further deprivation due to war was reduced. Additionally, the increasing
military superiority of the US implied a shorter, more surgical invasion which would
minimize civilian casualties. Finally, there is no obvious rationale for believing that
the potential for conict within Iraq after the war changed substantially over time.
Fourth, the diplomatic costs did not change much over the years of containment.
Those states that bore a larger share of the costs of containment|the UK and some of
Iraq's neighbors|became more sympathetic to the case for war and restoring Iraq to
working order after a war. However, the states that were making gains by defecting
from sanctions became increasingly accommodating toward Iraq and opposed war
(Pollack, 2002, Chapter 6 and pp. 352{365).
Fifth, there were competing trends within the political costs of war. First, the
growing superiority of US forces meant less chance of international and domestic back-
lash from a long, destructive invasion. But, after 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan,
the risk that a war with Iraq would be seen as further attacks on Muslim society, and
thereby bolster support for international terrorism, increased. Also, as Iran recov-
ered from the long, terrible war with Iraq of 1980{88, its ability to exert inuence in
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defectors from sanctions and Iraq grew stronger, the political costs of spurning these
states' desire for the peaceful continuation of these links also rose. Overall, it seems
plausible to assume that the political costs grew somewhat over time, but especially
after 9/11.
Sixth, and nally, there were also competing trends within the security compo-
nent. A better US military and weaker Iraqi military, especially with reduced missile
capabilities, meant less risk of a war expanding to include Israel, or other neighboring
countries. It also implied that the US would be more able to contain the externalities
of any post-war civil conict within Iraq. However, a war in Iraq, especially if it were
followed by civil conict, might provide a potential training ground for international
terrorists, and this risk grew with the rise of Al-Qaeda. Still, as many observers have
pointed out, this is potentially a net benet, if it occupies terrorists in a location dis-
tant from the US and its allies and provides opportunities for their killing or capture
by US forces.
Thus, most of the components of the anticipated costs of war with Iraq declined
considerably over the period 1991{2003. It seems plausible to assume that, even at
the end of this period, the combined fall of the military, economic, humanitarian, and
security costs of war overwhelmed the rise in political costs, especially given the Bush
(Jr.) administration's demonstrated insensitivity to international political costs.
Comparing the Costs of Containment and War
Immediately after the Gulf War, the Bush (Sr.) administration regarded war as
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of war decreased over the subsequent years of containment does not imply that they
ever crossed, so that containment became more expensive than war. So, here I will
review the available estimates of the absolute costs of containment and of war, to see
how they compare.
There are several potential pitfalls in this exercise. First, if the goal is to un-
derstand the US decision to go to war, then estimates based on information that
became available after the war began are essentially irrelevant. Whether the war and
subsequent occupation were competently managed, and whether this competence or
lack thereof, or the occurrence of sectarian conict in Iraq after the war, should have
been predicted beforehand, are important questions, but they are distinct from the
question of what was predicted. All that matters for this purpose are estimates of
the costs of war and containment based on information available before the war.
Second, and relatedly, it should be clear from the preceding tables that many of the
components, and indeed some of the most important components, of the costs of war
and containment are exceedingly hard to measure. Even those which are naturally
quantitative (e.g., economic costs) cannot be estimated with any precision. Thus, any
attempt to total up the costs of containment and war is fraught with \imponderables"
and \uncertainties" (Krueger, 2006).
Presumably for this reason, there is, to my knowledge, no publicly available es-
timate of the costs of war and containment that addresses all of the components
identied in the preceding discussion. The most comprehensive estimates, on which
I focus here, study only the military and economic costs in detail, and provide only
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matic and political costs are simply intangible|though no less real.
The restriction to reasonably comprehensive estimates based on ex ante informa-
tion leaves just two studies. First, Nordhaus (2002) combines existing estimates from
government sources and other economists with original calculations, based on infor-
mation available as of late 2002, to estimate the cost of war. This study has been
praised for the soundness of its predictions and its frank treatment of uncertainty
by the most comprehensive study of the war's actual (ex post) costs, and also by a
post-war review of the pre-war estimates (Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2006; Krueger, 2007).
It includes military and economic costs and, indirectly, some of the items listed as
security costs in Table 2.2.
Second, Davis, Murphy and Topel (2006) (DMT) compiles a wide range of pre-war
estimates of the costs of war and containment with original calculations, all based
solely on information available before the war, to estimate the costs of a range of
scenarios for both containment and war. It is the only study to estimate costs for
both war and containment, and its gures include military, economic, humanitarian,
and security costs.
The bottom line estimates are as follows. According to Nordhaus, the costs of war
are predicted to range from approximately $100 billion to $2 trillion. According to
DMT, the costs of war would be predicted to range from $100 to $870 billion, and the
costs of containment would be from $300 to $700 billion. Moreover, the latter study
also estimates that a war would improve the economic well-being of most Iraqis and
their survival chances relative to containment.
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though by focusing on the information available just before the war, they take account
of the decline in the costs of war over the years of containment, they do not account
for the trend in the costs of containment. That is, DMT assumes that the costs
of containment in the future will be as they were in the past, averaged over those
years, though their estimated range does include some low probabiity, unprecedented
events such as the internal overthrow of Saddam. Second, both studies ignore the
components of costs that are the most dicult to measure, and yet still produce
ranges that vary by an order of magnitude. Moreover, both freely admit that these
other components might well be of comparable magnitude to those they do estimate,
and hence would increase the uncertainty substantially.
In a review of these estimates and others, Krueger (2006) takes a nihilistic view,
observing that \all costs and benets can be contested as wildly inaccurate|in either
direction" and dismissing the exercise as \little more than educated guessing by other
means." But whether these studies should be taken seriously or not as estimates of the
true costs of war and containment doesn't matter for our purposes. The fact that the
costs of each option are so wildly uncertain could instead be taken as representative
of an underlying, diuse distribution of beliefs among the expert community about
the costs of war and containment.
Interpreted this way, something can be learned from these estimates: there was
a substantial overlap between the distribution of expert beliefs about the costs of
containment and that of beliefs about the costs of war, even if the potential dierence
in either direction was great. Under these conditions, the beliefs of those in power
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rational for those in power to use what means are available to convince the public to
support their favored option, even if this entails shouting down experts with diering
views or exaggerating aspects of their case.22
To separate the issue of why the war happened from how the case was made for
it, it is helpful to examine why the war happened when it did, which I turn to next.
Why did the War Happen in 2003?
Every administration since the Gulf War eventually concluded that Iraq's regime
had to be changed.23 So, why is it that this was not done until 2003? An easy answer
is that 9/11 happened, making the US public receptive to policy-makers' case for a
war with Iraq, and war occurred as soon thereafter as the US was militarily prepared
to invade. There are good reasons to believe that this was a necessary condition for
the war to occur, but I will argue here that it was not sucient. Two other conditions
also had to be met, and the models developed in this section and the next expose
the importance of these conditions. First, a third, cheaper option|inciting internal
regime change|had to have been exhausted. Second, a large enough portion of the
US policy community had to perceive that the costs of containment exceeded the
costs of war. I'll elaborate on each of these two conditions, before re-considering the
role of 9/11 in light of them.24
Containment was not originally designed to be a long-term strategy. At the end
22To be clear, by \rational" I do not mean to imply \moral" or \responsible." This essay is not
intended to address moral concerns with the preparation, conduct, or consequences of the Iraq War.
23This fact is documented in Section 4.
24The historical material here is drawn from Chapters 2, 3, and 7 of Pollack (2002).Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 52
of the Gulf War, the US expected that Saddam's weakened grip on power would lead
to his ouster by Iraq's generals and replacement with someone the US could tolerate.
When this didn't immediately happen, the US implemented a policy of containment,
which was intended to minimize the threat Iraq presented while the US waited for
a coup. As part of this strategy, the US continued most of the unprecedentedly
harsh sanctions from during the Gulf War and instituted a program of covert action,
both intended to encourage the Iraqi opposition to depose Saddam. Unfortunately,
Saddam proved rather talented at escaping a litany of coup and assassination attempts
and suppressing several popular revolts. By 1996, all of the CIA-supported Iraqi
opposition groups had been either broken or ejected from Iraq, and by 1999, further
attempts were regarded as highly unlikely to be successful. In Section 4, I will provide
a model that explains why, despite its failure, this strategy was reasonable, and
document how views on this third option evolved. But suce it to say that, by
2002, waiting for someone to depose Saddam was seen as a recipe for the indenite
continuation of containment.
While containment was highly eective at keeping Saddam in check, it came with
all of the costs described above. Most importantly, it enabled Saddam to paint the
sanctions, and their principal supporter the US, as the principal cause of the desti-
tution of the Iraqi people. When, in response to international concern about the hu-
manitarian externalities of containment, the Oil-for-Food program was implemented,
Iraq thereby gained an indirect source of hard currency, in the form of a xed but
large quantity of oil contracts that could be allocated to buyers at its discretion. It
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giving them privileged access to the Iraqi economy and threatening to end this access
if they did not support its campaign to end containment.
Once this strategy of driving a wedge between members of the Security Council
began to work, it became increasingly dicult for the US to enforce containment,
as Iraq's provocations were now met with divided opinion and prevarication on the
Council rather than rm consensus. With minor violations going unpunished, the
oodgates were opened and many of Iraq's neighbors now began to violate the UN
resolutions governing containment with abandon. The trend was clear by 1998, and in
late 1999 the US consented to expanding Oil-for-Food to encompass a much broader
array of goods that Iraq could now import, essentially recognizing what was already
taking place illicitly.
The Bush (Jr.) administration's rst major foreign policy review upon entering
oce centered on Iraq. It decided to pursue the revitalization of containment with
\smart sanctions." This policy oered to end the remaining economic sanctions on
Iraq in exchange for renewed agreement to enforce restrictions on what goods Iraq was
allowed to import, and oered incentives to the various defectors from containment
that were intended to restore international consensus on the matter. Two attempts
to move this initiative through the Security Council failed, because the incentives
the Bush administration oered were not nearly enough to make up for the highly
lucrative illicit trade in which many of Iraq's neighbors and supporters were already
engaged.25
25A form of smart sanctions was eventually adopted in May 2002, but it excluded the anti-
smuggling provisions, which were essential to the original design. Speculatively, if it is true that by
that point the Bush administration had decided on war, then there was little point in continuing to
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By 2002, it was clear that to continue eective containment, the US would have to
take on all of the associated costs. Iraq's neighbors would have to be compensated by
the US for the value of their illicit trade with Iraq. The US would have to unilaterally
compel Iraq's compliance with the elements of containment. Its relations with France,
China, Russia, and many of Iraq's neighbors, including US allies, would become
more combative. Of course, this would only increase the general unpopularity of
containment, as the US would no longer have international backing for its actions.
Overall, the military, economic, diplomatic, and political costs of containment would
rise dramatically.
Importantly, it is simply not true that it was impossible to restore containment, as
some advocates for the war argued. Of course, containment would never be perfect:
the US could never be certain that Iraq's WMD programs had been dismantled, any
more than it had been for the decade of containment up to 2002. And it would cost
much more, costs which, in the absence of a good prospect of inciting a successful
coup or revolt against Saddam, would potentially have to be borne for a very long
time. But it was still feasible. At the very least, the US possessed the military and
economic resources necessary to contain Iraq unilaterally. It's just that this course of
action would have been exorbitantly costly.
These two conditions|the exploding costs of preserving eective containment and
the collapse of the possibilities for inciting internal regime change|were perceived
to hold as early as 1999 in the Clinton administration. Why didn't the US invade
Iraq then? And if other challenges, such as the Kosovo War, the new round of Mid-
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administration's attention through the end of its term, why didn't the Bush (Jr.)
administration take up war when it entered oce?
Certainly, many believed the new administration would do just that. It included,
in substantial numbers and at very high levels, ocials who had publicly and vehe-
mently advocated a war to change Iraq's regime prior to entering government. And
as mentioned, Iraq was the very rst issue its foreign policy team considered. So why
didn't it invade in 2001? A related question, for which the proposed answer is the
same, is: why, in 2003, didn't the Bush administration just continue to kick the can
down the road? After all, the US had been putting o serious action on Iraq since at
least 1996, when the CIA's client groups in Iraq were defeated by the regime and the
institution of Oil-for-Food began the erosion of containment.
The answer is 9/11, or rather the willingness it instilled in the American public to
consider drastic action to improve US security. Since at least the years of US nuclear
monopoly, when the United States considered war to prevent the Soviet Union from
obtaining nuclear weapons, US policy-makers have perceived an unwillingness in the
American public to countenance aggressive, unprovoked war to improve US security
(Quester, 2000; Silverstone, 2007). According to Pollack, the Clinton administration's
consideration of a US invasion of Iraq was always stymied by the belief that the public
simply would not support such a war, at least not without grave provocation by Iraq.
And even the earliest reported date at which the Bush administration had set a policy
of invasion was still months after 9/11.
The Bush administration recognized the window of opportunity that the shock of
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had long regarded as necessary with respect to Iraq, it needed only to develop a
case for the war that would connect the two in the public's mind. There followed
the allegations about the possible \nexus" wherein Iraq might transfer WMD to a
terrorist organization for use against the US or its allies, the reported politicization of
intelligence estimates, the silencing of ocial voices pointing out the likely high cost
of a war and occupation, and the claims that restoring containment was impossible.
And, in time, the Iraq War.
Still, even if 9/11 was necessary for the Iraq War to occur, it does not fully explain
it. Why did so many members of the Bush administration (and also the former Clinton
administration, and Congress, and the independent policy community) see a war as
desirable? It was not a matter of the new appreciation of the dangers of international
terrorism, because these people had been advocating war well before 9/11. And why
was war, rather than revitalized containment (for which the US surely could expect
some generosity from the international community in the wake of 9/11) and a renewed
commitment to inciting revolt, the chosen solution?
This essay oers answers to these questions. Internal regime chance was no longer
regarded as a realistic option, and indenite containment had grown more expensive
than war. 9/11 simply provided the opportunity to overcome the public acceptance
of the (eroding) status quo and aversion to the costs and risks of war. I will conclude
this section by discussing the implications of this theory for other rationalist accounts
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Implications for Other Rationalist Accounts of the War
Every other rationalist explanation for the Iraq War of which I am aware has at its
core the same drivers of ineciency as the model I have presented here.26 First, there
is asymmetric information about Iraq's pursuit of WMD (or its possession of WMD,
or its intentions with respect to WMD). Second, there are commitment problems
in that Iraq cannot commit to not developing WMD or to not using them once
acquired. I have argued in this essay that, in general, such explanations for war are
not sucient unless analysts also demonstrate that measures other than war were
unavailable, ineective, or too costly.
This concern may seem superuous here: after all, I have also argued that in
the case of the Iraq War, these other measures (i.e., containment) were indeed too
costly. However, ignoring the availability of these measures leads to interpretations
of the Iraq War that do not do justice to the facts. Iraq's commitment problems and
asymmetric information about its pursuit of WMD were present from the beginning
of containment, and so cannot explain why the war did not happen in the 1990s.
One could use the argument of the previous section, that 9/11 created a window of
opportunity for war, to justify the occurrence of war a decade later, but there were
many more propitious windows earlier on. Iraq was caught red-handed with evidence
of hidden WMD|including nuclear weapons infrastructure|more than once in the
early 1990s. In the same period, the US repeatedly assembled broad international
support for strikes against Iraq to enforce its compliance with containment. Why,
when it had incontrovertible evidence of Iraq's perdy and broad international support
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for aggressive action, didn't the US invade Iraq then?
One answer for why the war did not occur until after 9/11 is the so-called \one
percent doctrine," promulgated by Vice President Cheney. This held that even a
miniscule probability that a terrorist organization might obtain a weapon of mass
destruction from Iraq and then use it against the US or its allies should be treated as
though it were a certainty, because the consequences would be so extreme. There are
a number of practical problems with this argument, including the lack of any reason
to believe Saddam would risk such a thing, with which many members of the Bush
administration would have been familiar. But there is also a deeper one: why is war
necessary to eliminate this possibility?
More generally, it is not clear how asymmetric information about Iraq's pursuit or
possession of WMD could lead to war. The development and stockpiling of biological,
chemical, or nuclear weapons is not like resolve or the precise balance of military
capability, parameters bargaining theorists often take to be asymmetrically known.
It might well be impossible for one side to credibly convey its strength or resolve
without ghting, because these things are inherently dicult to observe. But WMD
and the physical capital and scientists that produce them are physical objects. Given
the opportunity to look, it is always possible to see if they are present in a particular
place. And it is possible for Iraq to allow the US to look freely for them, anywhere
and anytime it likes, for as long as it likes, with as many inspectors and as much
equipment as it likes.
It was thus in no sense impossible for the US to become approximately certain
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In fact, it did just that in the aftermath of the war. The only thing preventing the
US from achieving this certainty was Iraq's refusal to comply with the inspections.
However, if there's one thing on which the historical record is clear, it is that Saddam
would do anything to preserve his regime. If he became convinced that unless total
cooperation with inspections was forthcoming, the US would invade, then he would
cooperate. Faced with the choice of a war he was almost certain to lose, and fully
revealing and losing his WMD but having a chance to survive, he would surely take
the latter.
Of course, Saddam never fully cooperated with the inspectors. He didn't need
to: he only needed to give the US sucient condence in the rudimentary state of
his programs to avoid an invasion. And, as we now know, even though he actually
had virtually nothing to hide, there were other values for him in maintaining some
ambiguity. Some have proposed this as an explanation for Saddam's refusal to do
what was necessary to convince the US that he had abandoned his programs. That
is, it is argued that Saddam was willing to run a risk of war in order to maintain the
WMD ambiguity necessary to deter Iran and his internal enemies. But risk of war
is not certainty of war. Faced with the choice between not cooperating and certainly
losing a war with the US, and cooperating and possibly having to ght a much weaker
enemy such as Iran or Iraqi rebels, Saddam's preference is still clear.
Thus, asymmetric information about the possession or pursuit of WMD could not
cause war, because it could and would be dispelled at Iraq's behest whenever it felt the
US threat of war was suciently credible. Asymmetric information about preferences
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more than a decade of constant bargaining and limited ghting, either the US or Iraq
had any substantial uncertainty about the other's preferences. Hardly anyone in the
US doubted that Iraq wanted to get WMD, or that it would accelerate its eorts if
containment ended. The evidence from after the war suggests this belief was correct
(Iraq Survey Group, 2004).
Instead, the US was perfectly capable of, if not veriably ending Iraq's WMD
programs, then at least assuring itself that they were like to be very small and, in
the case of nuclear weapons, unlikely to succeed any time soon. The problem was
that this assurance came at a cost: containment was not cheap. By 2002, after four
years of rapidly eroding sanctions and without inspections, the CIA was uncertain
about precisely what Iraq was up to. But the US rectied the situation by sending a
costly signal that it was serious about invading when it commenced a large buildup
of military forces in the region in preparation for the war. Naturally, Saddam reacted
by letting the inspectors back in, and Iraq cooperated more fully than it had in years.
The Bush administration was charged with ignoring the positive results of the
inspections, with making unreasonable demands of Iraq, and with pressuring the in-
telligence community to produce more threatening estimates. These behaviors are
all mysterious if the root of the problem was present uncertainty about Iraq's WMD
programs. If the problem is lack of information, why wouldn't the results on inspec-
tions and the unvarnished estimates of the CIA be ameliorative? The answer is that
both were actually irrelevant to the decision to go to war. In fact the problem was
not asymmetric information, it was that the administration had already decided to
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had reported with condence that Iraq had veriably disarmed, and the intelligence
had conrmed this, the true rationale for war would be unchallenged.
That said, every piece of evidence of Iraq's continued clandestine WMD programs
and support for terrorism, no matter how circumstantial or suspect, would help to
build support for the Iraq War among the public and the international community.
But this evidence was solely useful for the sales pitch|and this explains why the
administration would ignore the unfavorable (to its case for war) inspection reports
and try to exaggerate the CIA's estimates.
The bottom line is that the facts are not consistent with accounts based solely on
asymmetric information and shifting power (due to the future acquisition of nuclear
weapons). Under containment, the asymmetry in information was quite limited, and
the expected shift in power quite small, because the suspected small stock of chemical
and/or biological weapons would not seriously shift the balance of power, and nuclear
weapons were still a long ways o. Instead, the war occurred because maintaining
this status quo had become more expensive than war.
The evidence presented here is by no means conclusive. But it does strongly
suggest that an account of the Iraq War based on costly peace is more compelling than
the existing accounts based on asymmetric information and shifting power. Thus, the
costs of arming are demonstrably relevant to understanding the origins of at least one
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2.4 Imposition and Civil Conict in Post-Gulf War
Iraq
Before the US went to war against Iraq in 2003, it tried an alternative method
of avoiding the costs of containment: inciting a revolt to change Iraq's regime from
within. Its approach was to impose sanctions on Iraq that were implicitly, and later
explicitly, intended to encourage regime change. It is clear enough intuitively why the
US might want to incite civil conict to overthrow Saddam, but it is not immediately
obvious why imposing sanctions would accomplish this. Why can't Saddam and the
(potential) rebels come to a compromise that avoids the destruction of civil war or
a coup? The answer, as I will demonstrate in this section, is that sanctions make
internal peace between Saddam and the rebels costly; and if this peace is costlier
than revolt, then a revolt will occur.
More abstractly, the second empirically common source of costs in peace is im-
position: penalties imposed or rewards oered by outside actors that depend on the
outcome of an interaction between two \inside" actors. These outside actors may be
unwilling or unable to ght to aect this outcome, but they can still inuence the
choices made by the inside actors by making demands of them and oering incen-
tives to meet these demands. If meeting these demands favors one inside actor but
disfavors the other, the latter may refuse to do so, and peace will then entail the loss
of the incentives oered by the outside actor. If these incentives are large enough,
peace will be very expensive, and war will result as the disfavored side tries to hold
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I am aware of only one model of imposition in the existing literature. Powell
(2011) models a negotiation between two actors within a country over the balance
of power between them. State consolidation, dened as the achievement of a near-
monopoly of power, results in outside rewards that increase the value of the game.
Consolidation can be achieved peacefully, but takes time and so delays the receipt
of the rewards, making peace costly. If the rewards are large enough, then peaceful
consolidation is more costly than war (i.e., violent consolidation), and war occurs.
Empirically, the rewards are taken to be investment by foreign rms that is contingent
on a suciently secure state. However, these outside actors are not modeled, and it
is unclear why there is no deal they could work out with the inside actors that
would enable investment to be made and war to be avoided, even in the absence of
consolidation. Moreover, no empirical example of a war due to imposition is presented,
so it is unclear whether this explanation is actually relevant to explaining historical
conict.
Here, I will present a model of war due to the costs of imposition that is tailored to
the situation within Iraq between the two wars with the United States. For tractabil-
ity, this model ignores many of the aspects of the US-Iraq interaction considered in
the previous section, but it endogenizes the design of sanctions on Iraq and the inter-
action between Saddam Hussein and an organized opposition (the inside actors) over
how to respond to the sanctions. This approach has two advantages relative to that
taken in Powell (2011). First, it illuminates not only why sanctions might cause civil
conict, but also why the US (the outside actor) might choose to incite this conict,
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would avoid it. Second, the model provides an explanation for the civil conicts that
took place in Iraq between the two wars with the US and for the role the US played
in these conicts. It thus shows that war due to the costs of imposition is empirically
relevant.
After describing the setup of the model, I will state and provide intuition for the
two results that characterize equilibrium. The section closes with a discussion of the
aforementioned civil conicts in Iraq.
A Model of Imposition and Civil Conict
Suppose that Iraq is composed of two \internal" actors, labeled S for Saddam's
regime and R for the opposition (rebels), who must bargain over control of the polity.
The actors have opposed interests over, for example, whether Iraq is democratic or
not, the degree of state control of the economy, minority rights and autonomy, the
country's alignment with foreign nations, whether to pursue WMD, and perhaps other
issues. These issues are represented by the unit interval [0;1]; assume that Saddam
favors outcomes closer to 1, the opposition those closer to 0, and that both are risk-
neutral over outcomes in the interval, so that a settlement q 2 [0;1] yields payos
uS = q, uR = 1   q for the respective players.
The US also has an interest in these issues. Suppose the US is risk-neutral and
favors outcomes closer to 0, just like Iraq's opposition, so that a settlement q gives
the US a payo of uUS = 1   q. Note that the outcome 1 does not represent the
ideal set of policies for Saddam's regime|rather, it is the set of policies the regime
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of the need to appease the US. By contrast, 0 represents the policies the opposition
would implement in Saddam's absence, and I assume that these are also the policies
most favored by the US. Relaxing this assumption and allowing for there to be small
dierences between US and opposition preferences would not qualitatively alter the
results presented here. Moreover, it seems reasonable given that the US took care
to support only elements of the opposition that favored its interests (Pollack, 2002,
Chapter 3). This support is not modeled explicitly, but to the extent that it is costly
to the US and raises the rebels' chance of victory, incorporating it would strengthen
the results.
The game described here is assumed to take place with the US already engaging
in containment, having decided that this was preferable to a war with Iraq.27 The
game begins with the US choosing a demand to make and a sanction to impose if
the demand is not met. The choice species the severity of the sanction   0,
and a target outcome q 2 [0;1]. That is, if the internal actors do not implement a
settlement in [0;q], the US will impose sanctions that cost Iraq . Notice that this
is equivalent, from the point of view of the internal actors, to a reward of size  in
exchange for implementing an outcome no larger than q. Such a reward might include
ocial development assistance, private direct investment, a security guarantee, access
to foreign markets, diplomatic rehabilitation, and so on; the sanctions could entail
the denial of any of these.
Imposing sanctions is costly for the US. The cost depends only on the severity
of the sanction, and is given by the function s(). It is assumed that s() > 0,
27It would also suce for the results if the US instead preferred war to containment, but also
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s0() > 0, and s00() > 0 for  > 0, and that s(0) = 0, s0(0) = 0, and s0()  1 for
high enough . These ensure that: imposing non-zero sanctions is costly; the cost to
the US of sanctions rises in their severity; the US implements the most cost-eective
sanctions rst; the rst (tiny) measure of sanctions is eectively costless; and the
marginal cost to the US of more severe sanctions eventually exceeds the marginal
increase in their severity.28 These costs are described in more detail in the previous
section, but to remind, they include economic costs (e.g., reduced international access
to Iraq's economy), humanitarian costs (e.g., the impoverishment of Iraq's people),
and diplomatic/political costs (e.g., the costs of maintaining international support for
the sanctions, or of losing it and being regarded as acting illegitimately).
Since imposing sanctions is costly for the US, its threat to do so if its demand
goes unmet may not be credible. Because the internal actors will not suer the costs
of sanctions if they wait until sanctions are actually imposed but then immediately
agree to the US demand, they have no incentive to agree to it beforehand. Thus, if
the US wants to exert inuence over their choice of policies, it must actually impose
the sanctions and pay the cost of doing so up front, before the internal actors make
their decisions. So, I assume that upon making its demand and threat of sanctions,
the US immediately implements those sanctions and pays the cost of doing so.
Once the US has specied its demand and sanctions, Saddam can either start
an internal war or make an oer of a settlement of the contested policies to the
28The formulation given here says nothing about the possibility that there is a limit on the severity
of the sanctions the US is capable of imposing, regardless of cost. In principle, the most the US could
possibly do is to completely close Iraq to outside commerce of any kind. However, this possibility
can be incorporated by simply assuming that the costs of sanctions become exorbitant above some
upper bound, so that the formulation used here is completely general.Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 67
opposition, which the rebels can either accept, in which case it is implemented, or
reject, in which case there is war. War is a costly lottery that Saddam wins with
probability p, the opposition with probability 1   p, and which costs the internal
actors dS;dR > 0 respectively. The winner is assumed able to implement his choice
of policies within [0;1], while the loser gets nothing. It is important to note here that
the structure of the game rules out the possibility that Saddam's regime might start
a war with the US in order to stop the sanctions. This is consistent with the fourth
calibrating assumption given in the previous section, which ensures that Iraq's value
under containment is equal to its war value even given that the US is imposing quite
severe sanctions.
So long as Saddam's regime remains in power, the US pays a cost cUS, which
is the total cost of all the components of containment described in the previous
section, except the costs of the sanctions. If the rebels take over, the US no longer
needs to pay the cost of containment since the rebels share its interests, but a war
within Iraq imposes a cost of dUS > 0 on the US, taken to be the humanitarian and
diplomatic/political costs to the US of the suering and destruction of a war it had
induced.
All parameters of the game are assumed to be common knowledge, and the game
is solved for subgame-perfect equilibria.
Analysis of the Model
The analysis of the model is designed to answer two questions. First, under what
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within Iraq? Second, when would the US actually choose to do so? I will state
a lemma and a proposition that answer these questions and discuss the intuition
behind these answers; proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 2.1. If meeting the US demand is worse for Saddam than ghting an internal
war, and the cost of sanctions for Iraq, weighted by the chance of ending them in war,
exceeds the costs of war for Iraq, then war will occur. If meeting the US demand is
better for Saddam than ghting, or the weighted cost of sanctions is less than the cost
of war, there will be internal peace.
The lemma answers the rst question: the US would always be able to incite
a revolt. It need only make a stringent enough demand and impose severe enough
sanctions. If the demand is stringent enough, then Saddam would never voluntarily
choose to meet it: he would spurn the demand even if it meant suering a revolt.
This means that if Saddam is left in power, the US demand will not be met and Iraq
will have to endure the sanctions. Thus, the sanctions make peace between Saddam
and the rebels costly. War is also costly, but it oers the possibility of ending the
sanctions, should the rebels win, and so reduces the expected cost of peace. If the
sanctions are severe enough, so that the costs of peace are higher than those of war,
then the value left by the sanctions to divide up between Saddam and the rebels will
not suce to appease both, and war will occur.
Peace is costly because of a commitment problem identied by Powell (2006).
In theory, Saddam and the rebels could eliminate the costs of peace relative to war
by agreeing to set policies according to a coin ip weighted to reect the internal
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would endure the sanctions. If the rebels won the toss, they would set their ideal
policies and the sanctions would end, just as if they had successfully revolted. The
expected costs from sanctions would then be the same in peace as in war, and thus
there would be no need for war. Both Saddam and the rebels would commit to this
coin ip if they could. But they cannot so commit: if the coin ip came out against
Saddam, he could simply demand another toss, and the same is true for the rebels.
Proposition 2.2. The US will incite a war within Iraq if and only if the cost of
containment is high enough. Incitement becomes more tempting as the costs of war
decrease, the chance of rebel success increases, and sanctions get cheaper.
The proposition answers the second question: the US would choose to incite a
war within Iraq when the cost of containment is too high. This is the same reason
it would ght a war against Iraq in model of the previous section. There, the US
was willing to pay the costs of a war with Iraq whenever these were less than the
costs of containment. Here, the US is willing to pay the costs of inciting a war within
Iraq|the cost of imposing severe enough sanctions, and the costs for the US of an
Iraqi civil war|when these are suciently low relative to the cost of containment.
When the costs of a civil war are lower, it is cheaper for the US to incite one, and
when the rebels' chance of success is higher, an incited war is more likely to free the
US of the cost of containment: both these increase the incentives to incite a war.
With the analysis in hand, we can turn to explaining the historical instances of
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Sanctions and Revolt in Iraq
In what follows, I oer an analytic narrative of the civil conicts within Iraq
following the (rst) Gulf War, guided by the model presented in this section. This
model claries the origins of several, though not all, of these conicts, and explains
the US role in these conicts and how it evolved over time. It also substantiates the
claim made in Section 3, that the absence of a viable third option involving internal
overthrow of Saddam partly explains why the Iraq War happened in 2003 rather than
earlier. I rely heavily here on the more conventional historical narrative of the Gulf
War and period of containment given in chapters 2 and 3 of Pollack (2002).29
To begin, consider the problem faced by the United States at what became the end
of the Gulf War. The Bush (Sr.) administration believed that removing Saddam and
occupying Iraq would be extremely costly. Moreover, these costs might be avoided
if someone else removed Saddam instead. The widely-held perception that the Gulf
War defeat had seriously weakened Saddam's hold on power led the administration to
expect that Iraq's generals would overthrow Saddam and replace him with someone
more amenable to the US (Bush and Scowcroft, 1999, p. 488). If this happened, the
US could then negotiate a new and more favorable relationship with Iraq. So, the
administration actively encouraged it, with speeches broadcast and leaets dropped
into Iraq that encouraged the Iraqi military and people to rise up against Saddam (p.
48) and bring containment to a close.
Unfortunately, the post-war revolt against Saddam was launched not by the gen-
erals, but by the Shi'ites of southern Iraq, followed immediately by the Kurds of
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northern Iraq. The Bush administration feared that the success of this revolt would
lead to a breakup of Iraq, the same fear that contributed to its decision to halt the
Gulf War invasion short of Baghdad (Bush and Scowcroft, 1999, pp. 488{489). It
also worried that the revolt would cause the Sunni elites at the center of power in
Iraq to re-unite behind Saddam, as indeed it did, and thus reduce the chances of a
military coup (pp. 48{49).
In terms of the model, we can think of the immediate post-war revolt as involving
rebels whose preferences were perceived to dier substantially from those of the US.
Though this was not modeled explicitly, it is equivalent to assuming that, should
the rebels succeed, the policies they would then implement were distant from those
preferred by the US. So long as the US thought that another set of rebels with
interests more amenable to its own (e.g. a military conspiracy that would staunchly
favor Iraq's unity) would be more likely to succeed, the success of the current revolt
would make the US worse o. This explains why the US refrained from supporting
it, even to the point of allowing Saddam the use of helicopter gunships to crush it.
Pollack explains the lack of US support for this revolt in much the same way (p. 49).
When it became clear that Iraq's military had rallied behind Saddam to crush
the revolt, the Bush administration proceeded to implement containment, with all
its attendant costs. For all the reasons described in Section 3, containment would
protect US and allied interests from the threats Saddam posed while he remained in
power. Moreover, and most importantly, it was expected to do so at a lower cost
than full-on war to remove Saddam, the same reason the policy was rearmed later
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Importantly, the Bush administration's calculation of the cost of containment was
predicated on the assumption that containment would not be needed for long (pp.
47{49, 52{53, 55). Senior ocials still believed that it was only a short matter of
time before a coup was attempted, and that it would be likely to succeed (p. 53,
55). The higher the probability of a successful coup, the lower the expected costs of
containment, which need only be endured if the coup fails.
Why did the administration believe that another attempt at regime change was
imminent? After all, Saddam had united the military and successfully put down the
Shi'ite/Kurdish revolt, and was undoubtedly working to reduce the chances of such an
attempt. The model explains why: containment included very severe sanctions, along
with a stringent set of demands Iraq had to meet in order to end them. Obviously,
Saddam would never voluntarily meet those demands, which included making resti-
tution to countries harmed by the war (e.g., returning billions in stolen property to
Kuwait and paying reparations) and abandoning Iraq's WMD and missile programs
and support for terrorism. Thus, the sanctions gave any more amenable elites within
Iraq enormous incentives to remove Saddam by force. In this way, sanctions make
peace within Iraq costlier than revolt, and as Lemma 2.1 shows, revolt should follow.
The Bush administration well understood this, and did not even bother to uphold
the pretense that the sanctions were about changing Iraq's policies, rather than its
regime (p. 58). Moreover, the US was not about to sit back and hope to get lucky. As
early as May 1991, a covert action campaign to \create the conditions for the removal
of Saddam Hussein from power" was begun, and the CIA was given carte blanche to
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Iraqi groups that were favorable to the US and opposed Saddam. The rationale for
this support to the rebels is clear. If a revolt's success means no longer having to pay
the costs of containment or war, then it is entirely in the US interest to take measures
to increase its likelihood.
In terms of the model, the conditions were ideal for the US willingness to incite a
revolt. First, to the extent that undermining Saddam's military and WMD programs
is another benet of sanctions, the net price of applying sanctions severe enough
to incite revolt will be cheaper. Second, the costs of internal conict in Iraq were
declining over time, as Iraq's economy sank. And third, the US was doing its best to
raise the chances of success for those groups it supported. According to Proposition
2.2, these three factors should all have contributed to the US willingness to impose
sanctions and incite such revolts.
For its part, the rst Clinton administration was initially wary of the risks of covert
action to unseat Saddam, though it soon accepted them. But it never questioned the
value of the sanctions on Iraq. These played a crucial role in undermining Saddam's
military power and particularly his WMD programs, but they also provided the prin-
cipal incentives for revolt. The partial relaxation of the sanctions agreed in May 1996
under the Oil-for-Food program simply traded o some of the costs of containment|it
was necessary to counter growing international discontent with Iraq's impoverishment
(p. 74).
In fact, no less than eight serious attempts to unseat Saddam were made during
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them.30 Moreover, at least four episodes of open civil conict occurred, and these
were understood to be caused by Iraq's worsening economic situation.31
The problem is that all eight attempts failed. In each and every case, Saddam
managed to dodge the assassination attempt (though there were close calls), detect the
coup early on and foil it (though several involved remarkably high-level conspiracy),
and crush the revolt. Each time, the US had to revise downward its estimate of the
likelihood of a successful revolt in the foreseeable future.
However, after 1996, when the international consensus on containment was be-
ginning to show serious fractures, the steady-state costs of containment rose rapidly
(p. 82{91). Thus, as Proposition 2.2 predicts, the US continued to support the op-
position even as the evidence mounted that its chances of success were low (p. 96).
As late as September 1998, two years after Saddam had broken or ejected all of the
CIA-supported groups within Iraq, the US Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act
calling explicitly for Saddam's overthrow and providing the unprecedented sum of
almost $100 million for that purpose. And in 1999, the Clinton administration began
trying to resuscitate and re-organize the Iraqi opposition (p. 97).
In time, events such as the Kosovo War, a renewed attempt at Middle East peace
negotiations, and the upcoming US election intervened. Given the exceedingly low
chances of success, the outgoing Clinton administration shelved aggressive plans for
pursuing internal regime change, and the Iraqi opposition fell apart (p. 98{100, 102).
30There were coup, revolt, or assassination attempts in May 1991 (p. 59), June 1992 (p. 59),
December 1993 (p. 68), January 1994 (p. 68), March 1995 (p. 72), May 1995 (p. 75), June 1996
(p. 80), and January 1999 (p. 93). The CIA was involved with the associated groups in the cases
of March 1995 and June 1996.
31In 1993 (p. 68), 1994 (p. 68), 1995 (p. 75), and 1999 (p. 93).Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 75
After eight years spent trying to unseat Saddam, and little in the way of com-
petent opposition left to support, the US gave up on inciting regime change in Iraq.
Once it had done so, paying the costs of the still-high severity of sanctions no longer
made sense, so the US agreed to the further relaxation of economic sanctions known
informally as \Oil-for-Stu," though it was determined to maintain military sanctions
and to demand a new inspections regime in order to preserve the vise grip sanctions
had provided on Saddam's WMD programs.
Thus, by the time the Bush (Jr.) administration entered oce, there was no option
other than indenite containment or war. By 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence
reportedly estimated the chance of success of a new program to overthrow Saddam
at 10 to 20 percent (p. 290). Given the disarray of the opposition after 2000, and the
historical record of the CIA's attempts with well-organized, well-trained groups, is is
hard to believe that this was not a severe overestimate.
The model presented here thus explains why the US would maintain severe sanc-
tions over the course of containment, despite their costs, and why it was (at least
while a competent opposition existed) reasonable to expect that this would eventu-
ally lead to Saddam's overthrow. Indeed, many serious attempts were made, so in
some sense the policy was successful. Though its estimate of the chances of success
in this endeavor steadily ratcheted downward in the face of many failed attempts, as
the costs of containment rose, it became willing to bet on long shots. Eventually, the
plausible avenues for internal regime change were exhausted, and the costly sanctions
most essential to encouraging revolt were dropped. By the end of containment, the
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2.5 Predation and the American War of Indepen-
dence
The third and nal source of costs in peace that I will analyze is predation: the
expropriation of value from one actor by another. This expropriation may be costly
because it undermines the victim's incentive to produce value. This idea is a very
old one in economics, and is central to the economic analysis of taxation, growth,
and many other phenomena. And there is a long line of research following Hirshleifer
(1991) that explores the relationship among predation, ineciency, and conict. How-
ever, to my knowledge, the model presented below is the rst to make explicit the
connection between the costs of predation and the choice to ght a war, as opposed
to peaceful (but potentially coercive) bargaining.
Predation occurs when one actor (the \producer") has a comparative advantage in
production, while the other (the \predator") has a comparative advantage in coercion.
That is, the producer is good at creating wealth while the predator is good at ghting
wars. The predator can use his strength to expropriate, under threat of violence, some
of the producer's wealth. The problem with this taxation is that it lessens the value
the producer gets from his hard work, and so discourages production, or at least
production that the predator can steal. This reduces the value that is available for
either actor to consume, and so makes peace costly. If instead the two fought, then
the producer would have a chance to end the predator's taxation, and the predator
would have a chance to directly control the producer's eort. If the costs of peace
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I will explore this source of costly peace with a model that is tailored to the
interaction between the colonies that later became the United States (henceforth, the
\Colonists") and Britain, in the period following the Seven Years' War. This model
is dierent from most bargaining models of war in that it incorporates an economy
that is slightly more realistic than the usual \pie of size 1." Most importantly, what
the two actors bargain or ght over is endogenously determined, rather than being
xed by assumption. While this complicates the analysis somewhat, it does seem a
promising approach for developing more realistic bargaining models that can speak
to the vast literature on the relationship between economic phenomena and war.
I then use the model to provide an account of the American War of Independence
(henceforth, the \war" or \Revolution"). The Seven Years War, which eliminated
the common interest the Colonists and Britain had in cooperating to oppose France,
exposed conicting interests over the governance of the colonies that ultimately boiled
down to how to divide the fruit of the Colonists' labor. Britain attempted to impose
a series of unprecedented taxes, and when the Colonists resisted these taxes, Britain
responded by initiating eorts to increase its control over colonial governments. The
Colonists came to believe that peace would mean tolerating escalating taxation and
ceding more direct control to Britain. Because the colonial economy was particularly
responsive to taxation, peace would be very costly, and so the costs of peace came to
be viewed as exceeding those of war and the Revolution occurred.
This account draws very heavily on Rackove, Rutten and Weingast (2000) and
de Figueiredo Jr., Rackove and Weingast (2006), which to my knowledge constitute
the only other rationalist account of the Revolution. These companion papers (hence-Chapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 78
forth \FFRW") report the results of a study that did much of the hard work involved
in formulating a rationalist account of the Revolution, especially in developing a ratio-
nalist interpretation of the deep role that ideas about governance played in the conict
and in providing the evidence to support this interpretation. In fact, I have little to
add to their understanding of the issues in contention between the belligerents.
What I can explain, using the model analyzed here and the evidence FRRW
gathered, is why war happened rather than coercive bargaining over the future tax
treatment of the colonies. This is a question that cannot be answered with the model
in de Figueiredo Jr., Rackove and Weingast (2006), because that model does not allow
bargaining|the Colonists must either accede fully to Britain's demands or ght. This
formulation rules out the possibility that the Colonists and Britain could compromise
on some division of policy-setting power between the two. By contrast, the model I
present allows for such compromises but explains why they would be abandoned for
war.
I'll begin with the setup of the model, then state the results and discuss the
intuition, and then provide an account of the war.
A Model of Predation
Suppose we have two actors, Britain (indexed by B) and the Colonists (indexed by
C). These actors are embedded in an economy in which there are two kinds of activity.
\Transferable" activity produces things that are rivalrous in consumption and can be
transferred between the two actors. That is, each product can be consumed by either,
but not both, actors. Transferable products include most goods and services tradedChapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 79
in licit markets. In contrast, \non-transferable" activity produces things which are
rivalrous in consumption but which cannot be transferred between the two actors.
In particular, only the actor that made some non-transferable product can consume
it. For example, the standard non-transferable activity in economics is leisure: its
production requires some allotment of a worker's resources (e.g., time), and once
produced it cannot be moved to another actor. But goods produced and sold outside
of the reach of the tax authorities, such as those tracked locally on the black market,
or in foreign trade via smuggling, or outside of authority's remit on the frontier, are
also non-transferable.
The economy has a total endowment of resources R 2 R+, which can be allocated
to either transferable or non-transferable activity. Assume that the Colonists control
the entire endowment R; in other words, C is the producer. This means that whatever
Britain consumes must be transferred from the Colonists, and hence can only be
drawn from the Colonists' transferable activity. In other words, B is the predator. Of
course in reality Britain had productive resources of its own, but these were not under
contention historically, so I do not include them in the model. Note that it would make
no qualitative dierence to the results if we instead assumed that the endowment was
initially partitioned between the two players, but it would unnecessarily complicate
the exposition of the model.
While Britain derives utility solely from transferable activity, the Colonists derive
utility from both transferable and non-transferable products. For tractability we will
assume that the Colonists' utility function is additively separable: it is the sum of
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over the disposition of the transferable products, we assume for simplicity that their
utilities are risk-neutral over these. These assumptions allow us to write their utilities
as:
uC(r;)  (1   )(R   r) + l(r) (2.4)
uB(r;)  (R   r) (2.5)
Here,  2 [0;1] is the proportion of transferable products that the predator con-
sumes, r is the amount of resources devoted to non-transferable production, R   r is
the amount given to transferable production, and l() is the utility of consuming non-
transferable products. We assume that l(r) > 0, l0(r) > 0, l00(r) < 0, and l000(r) > 0,
for r 2 (0;R), and l(0) = 0, l0(0) = 1, and l0(R) = 0. These are standard assumptions
from economic theory that ensure that: C likes consuming non-transferable products;
more consumption is better than less, but there are diminishing returns; C has de-
creasing absolute risk aversion; and C's optimal allocation between transferable and
non-transferable production will always involve producing at least a little of both
whenever the tax rate is neither 0 nor 1.
The sequence of moves is as follows. First, the Colonists make an oer to Britain
or start a war.32 If C makes an oer, B either accepts this oer or starts a war. If an
oer is accepted, the producer chooses an allocation of resources between transferable
and non-transferable production, production occurs, the agreed transfer is made, all
products are consumed, and the game ends.
32It might be more realistic to assume that Britain was making oers to the Colonists, or that they
were exchanging oers. However, this bargaining protocol simplies the exposition, and the results
do not depend on it, as whether war occurs does not depend on the allocation of the bargaining
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The Colonists' oer is to transfer a certain fraction ( 2 [0;1]) of whatever trans-
ferable products are made to Britain. In economic terms, C has to choose a linear tax
on transferable products, the proceeds from which will be given to B. This is an im-
portant assumption. It rules out non-linear tax schemes, in which the marginal rate
of tax might depend on how much is produced. Allowing non-linear taxes that vary
in the amount produced would not change the qualitative results, which require only
that the tax scheme distorts C's allocation between transferable and non-transferable
products and hence introduces ineciency (i.e., costs) into peace, something that any
such scheme would do. I discard such taxes for mathematical convenience.
However, a non-linear tax scheme that does not vary in the amount produced|a
lump-sum tax|would not distort the producer's allocation and so would not make
peace costly. The problem with such taxes, as economists well know, is that they
create moral hazard. The tax collector (here, the predator) wants to assign taxes to
an activity that represent some fraction of its full realizable value, but it often will
not know what that value is, even in aggregate. If the participants in that activity
anticipate that a lump-sum tax will be assessed, they have an incentive to realize less
than its full value, so as to reduce the amount of tax that will be assigned. This creates
inecient distortion just as in the case of taxes that do vary in the amount produced.
In principle, the tax collector could permanently assign the tax at the beginning, and
promise not to alter it. If the participants believed this promise, there would be no
more distortions and the full value would be realized. The problem here is that if
this full value were above the tax collector's estimate, he would have an incentive to
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believe that promise and the distortions would continue. In other words, lump-sum
taxes would end up varying with the amount produced in practice. I discard them
and focus on linear taxes in favor of the simplicity of the latter, but the main result
derived from a model in which lump-sum taxes and moral hazard were included would
be qualitatively the same as the one given here. All that matters is how costly the
resulting distortions are.
War is modeled as a costly lottery, won by the Colonists with probability p and
Britain with 1   p, with costs dC;dB > 0 regardless of outcome. If the Colonists
win, then there will be no transfers of any kind to Britain. If Britain wins, then
it is assumed to take direct control over the Colonists, their resources, and the tax
rate, at some cost s  0, which is the cost of exercising this control. I assume that
s  R, so that control doesn't eliminate a large portion of the total value. In eect,
the Colonists ght to be free of Britain's predation, and Britain ghts to control the
colonial economy.
In this formulation, the only thing the two players bargain over is the tax rate.
We have presumed that it is not possible for Britain to take control over any portion
of the Colonists' allocation of resources, except by victory in war. In theory, rather
than imposing a tax, Britain could enslave some fraction of the colonial population,
expropriate a portion of their capital, and occupy part of their land. While it would
thereby eliminate the economic distortions that arise from a tax on products, this
predation on the factors of production generates other distortions, in decisions to
invest in and expand these factors over time. A one-time transfer of a portion of
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create new resources, Britain would also demand a share of these. But this is equiv-
alent to what I model here, in that Britain imposes a tax (now on factors instead of
products) which distorts incentives for creating value. Whether we are talking about
the disposition of transferable products or that of productive factors, the point is
that predation can distort incentives for production or investment and thereby make
peace costly. War solves this problem, because if the Colonists win, there is no further
predation and thus no distortion, and if Britain wins, it gains control of all of the
Colonists' economic activity and is able to direct both the creation and employment
of resources, at a cost.
Furthermore, we assume that the Colonists would not commit themselves to any
allocation of resources, other than the one that is optimal under the agreed tax rate.
Essentially, the only way the colonial governments can force their constituents to
choose an allocation other than the one that is best given the tax rate is to exert direct
control over them, just as Britain would if it won a war. However, doing so would
leave these constituents powerless and unable to secure any utility for themselves
in the face of predation by their own government. They would no more acquiesce
peacefully to their own government doing this than they would to Britain's attempt.
Finally, all parameters of the game are assumed to be common knowledge.
Analysis of the Model
The analysis of the model aims to answer just one question. Under what conditions
will the tax (predation) necessary to satisfy Britain make peace so costly that the
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discuss the intuition for it. The proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 2.3. War will occur if and only if the sensitivity of the Colonists' allo-
cation between transferable and non-transferable activity to taxation is high enough.
When the costs of war are lower, the threshold sensitivity that separates war and peace
is also lower.
In this model, the only way that peace is ecient is if Britain agrees to a tax rate
of zero. Any positive tax rate encourages the Colonists to shift resources into non-
transferable activity, which produces less value per unit of resource than transferable
activity. As the tax rises, Colonists shift more resources into even less productive
non-transferable activity, and the costs of these distortions grows at an accelerating
rate. Thus, given that a tax rate of zero would not satisfy Britain, peace will be
costly.
Given that there is a tax rate that would appease Britain, whether war or preda-
tion occurs depends only on which has the higher costs. If the destruction of war and
the cost of Britain exerting direct control over the colonial economy if it wins exceed
the distortionary costs of the lowest tax rate that would appease Britain, then the
Colonists will tolerate predation. But if the reverse is true, then the Colonists will
seek to throw o Britain's predation, violently if necessary, and Britain will ght to
take direct control of the economy.
Whether war or predation is more costly depends principally on how sensitive the
Colonists' allocation of resources between transferable and non-transferable activity
is to taxation. If even large tax rates would only lead to small shifts in allocation,
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to the full realizable value of their resources, and there is a tax that both Britain and
the Colonists prefer to war. If, on the other hand, even modest tax rates lead to large
shifts in the Colonists' allocation, then the distortion caused by taxation is large and
the Colonists will produce much less than the full realizable value of their resources.
Then, the tax that is necessary to satisfy Britain will have to be higher in order to
account for the faster reduction in total value, and even the least such tax will not
appease the Colonists.
Equilibrium here is inecient whether it involves predation or war. The funda-
mental drivers of this ineciency are an interlocking set of commitment problems and
(unmodeled) asymmetric information. First consider lump-sum taxes. As discussed
previously, in theory these would not create any distortions, because they don't alter
the value of a given allocation on the part of the Colonists relative to any other. If
Britain could commit to an initial assignment of these taxes, the Colonists would
have no reason to alter their allocation from the ecient one, and the surplus from
the lack of distortion makes possible a set of lump-sum taxes that both would strictly
prefer either to varying taxes or war.
However, Britain cannot commit not to adjust these taxes in response to unex-
pectedly high value creation by the Colonists. So, if in setting the initial lump-sum
taxes, Britain underestimates their productivity, then the Colonists will realize less
than the full value so as to avoid revealing higher productivity and being subjected
to a tax hike, and peace will be costly. This problem could be avoided if there
were not asymmetric information about the Colonists' productivity and incentives to
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Even if Britain acknowledged this problem and switched to using taxes that varied
in the amount produced (e.g., the linear taxes modeled here), this doesn't suce
to ensure that peace is costly. If the Colonists could commit themselves to the
ecient allocation, then even varying taxes would not create costly distortions and
both players could be made strictly better o than war or inecient predation. They
might be able to commit to this by having their government, or Britain, take direct
control of their allocation decision. However, they would only cede this control if their
government or Britain could commit not to take advantage of this control by taking
all their transferable products. If either could commit, they would, but of course they
cannot.
Thus, the presence of commitment problems and asymmetric information ensures
that equilibrium must be inecient, whether it involves distortionary predation or
war. I turn now to applying these results to the American Revolution.
Stylized Facts of British-Colonial Relations
Here, I will rst describe a set of stylized facts about the interaction between
Britain and the Colonists in the 18th century. The evidence and argumentation for
these facts is collected and presented in Rackove, Rutten and Weingast (2000) and
de Figueiredo Jr., Rackove and Weingast (2006) (\FRRW"). I then argue that the
model analyzed here explains why disputes over principles of taxation could lead to
a large, expensive war. This section closes with a consideration of the alternative
explanations for the war given by FFRW.
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enumerated and described below. All that I have added to their arguments is a
summary of the dispute between Ireland and Britain over the former's legal status,
which undoubtedly provided a recent historical analogy the Colonists could use to
develop expectations about the ramications of Britain's new policies toward them.33
Readers seeking fuller documentation of the facts given below are referred to FFRW.
For each, I also provide an interpretation of the fact in terms of the model presented
here.
1. Before 1763, disputes over imperial policy (and authority) arose, but were always
resolved peacefully, even though the underlying conict was already present. There
were three reasons for this. First, life for the Colonists was hard up to the early 18th
century, so that there was relatively little surplus for Britain to extract. Second, the
Colonists composed the vast majority of Britain's empire, and imperial policy-making
was therefore attuned to their needs. Third, and most importantly, France was also
powerful in North America, and formed an ever-present and very dangerous threat
to Britain's colonies there. In opposing France, the Colonists and Britain had a very
strong common interest, and the presence of the French in North America would have
made open conict between the Colonists and Britain very expensive because it would
have rendered them vulnerable.
In the various wars fought with France and its Native American allies, the Colonists
contributed substantially to their own defense, including quartering Britain's troops
and raising their own militias to ght alongside them. They also paid great costs
33This summary is drawn from the entry on \Declaratory Act, 1766" in the Gale Encyclopedia of
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through the Navigation Acts, intended to halt colonial trade with France, though
these also led to enormous smuggling.
Nonetheless, there were serious disputes over colonial policy during this era. In
particular, Britain's Board of Trade sought reforms that would allow it to assert
greater control over various colonies, in part to clamp down on rampant smuggling.
These were protested by the Colonists, and failed to pass Parliament, presumably in
order to maintain a unied front against France.
In the model, the restrictions of the Navigation Act can be thought of as implicit
taxes on the Colonists, because they eectively transferred value from the restricted
traders to Britain by undermining the traders' business but also hurting France.
However, as long as France remained powerful in North America, these restrictions
also improved the general well-being of the Colonists, because they too beneted from
the eort to contain France. In other words, these implicit taxes were eectively used
to provide public goods for Britain and the Colonists. Thus, both governments had
good reason to tolerate them, though individual colonists might not. The fact that
many traders nonetheless shifted resources into non-taxable activity|smuggling|in
such high volume indicates a high sensitivity on the part of the Colonists to taxation.
2. Trends in place before 1763 exacerbated the underlying conict of interests, and
laid the groundwork for its eventual exposure. First, the 1707 Acts of Union melded
Scotland and England into Great Britain by uniting their Parliaments, but left Ireland
out. Soon after, Britain passed the Declaratory Act of 1719, subordinating Ireland to
both the Crown and Parliament of Britain, which could freely revoke Ireland's own
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resulting abuse of Irish interests motivated Drapier's letters (written pseudonymously
by Jonathan Swift), which paralleled the later pamphleteering of American radicals
like Thomas Paine, and considerable unrest in Ireland.
Second, the Great Awakening of the 1730s and 40s greatly strengthened religious
observance and religious diversity among the Colonists, and increased their distance
from the Church of England, which at that time was reasserting itself in Britain. This
raised the value of the religious liberties entailed in the colonists' self-government,
liberties that were considerably greater than those enjoyed in Britain.
Third, the Colonists were rapidly getting richer. Their population expanded enor-
mously over the 18th century, and the Colonists swiftly expanded frontier settlements,
putting new lands into production and developing the continent's vast natural re-
sources. The net result was that both overall wealth, and income per capita, grew
substantially over this period.
Fourth, and most importantly, over the course of the 18th century, the long series
of wars among the major powers, fought both in Europe and in the areas of coloniza-
tion, resulted in radical increases in the power, extent, and indebtedness of Britain's
empire. Securing this empire was immensely expensive and would require a much
more capable and assertive imperial bureaucracy than had existed theretofore. In
particular, to maintain its dominance, Britain would have to draw on the wealth of
its colonies.
Of special import to the Colonists was Britain's victory in the Seven Years' War.
The settlement of the war included the expulsion of the French from the bulk of North
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was precisely for this reason that it was safe for the rebelling Colonists to seek France's
help during the war.) In doing so, it eliminated the strong interest the Colonists had
previously shared with Britain in opposing France, and greatly reduced the costs of
open conict between the Colonists and Britain, for both.
In the model, the trends toward religious diversity and increased wealth among the
Colonists can be thought of as increasing the value (R) that is potentially available
to be \taxed," while Britain's new indebtedness increased the value to it of obtaining
new sources of revenue. Britain might impose restrictions on religious practice, which
would harm (transfer value from) colonial practitioners but benet Britain in the
form of the Church of England, or it might imposes taxes on the Colonists' new
wealth. The treatment of Ireland after the Declaratory Act provided an example of
what might happen to the Colonists if they allowed Britain to exert direct control
over their aairs. But most importantly, the elimination of the French threat meant
that the implicit (and high) taxes of the Navigation Acts were no longer providing
public goods|they no longer benetted the Colonists.
3. Britain well understood the risk of a colonial rebellion following the Seven Years'
War, but it also needed money to pay for empire, had the power to demand it,
and might need much more in the future. It therefore set out to reform colonial
administration with an eye to its future needs. Thus began a series of attempts
to impose unprecedented taxes on the Colonists. These measures were explicitly
designed to accommodate the Colonists to new forms of taxation: the levies were very
small; the taxed activity was chosen to be less visible in order to minimize popular
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the intent was to prepare the Colonists for later increases in these taxes as Britain
required them.
However, each new attempt brought unrest, evasion, resistance, and boycotts of
British goods from the Colonists. Britain initially reacted by repealing one mea-
sure and passing a new one, hoping to nd something the Colonists would accept.
When this failed, it began to enforce compliance. Britain responded to resistance by
punishing those leading the resistance and asserting more direct control over colo-
nial governance. Its punitive responses included suspending the assemblies of New
York and Massachusetts, and closing the port of Boston and later blockading all of
Massachusetts. Its assertions of control included taking over payment of colonial of-
cials' salaries, and establishing a new customs board with British sta to enforce
trade restrictions and new courts ruled by British appointees without juries to try
smugglers.
In particular, the Declaratory Act of 1766, passed along with the repeal of the
Stamp Act, held ominous portents for the Colonists' future. It was patterned nearly
word-for-word after the earlier Declaratory Act for Ireland, discussed above. The
Colonists understood exactly where this might lead. Thomas Jeerson, for instance,
in response to the later Coercive Acts, argued that Britain's actions \too plainly
prove[d] a deliberate and systematical plan of reducing us to slavery," which is the
status the Colonists perceived Ireland to have.
Also, the Quebec Act of 1774 legally enshrined Catholicism in the newly acquired
French-Canadian territories and expanded the remit of those territories into areas
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liberty of the Colonists, and also showed that Britain was willing to impose substantial
harm on the Colonists' prospects for growth in order to satisfy its other interests of
placating the French-Canadians and the Native Americans.
In sum, the days of conciliation in order to preserve unity against France were
over.
In the model, Britain's gingerly attempts at increasing taxation can be thought
of as trying to nd ways to minimize the Colonists' subsequent transfer of resources
into non-taxable activity. Britain's eorts to enforce compliance were attuned to the
need to exert more direct control over the colonial economy, by clamping down on the
local assemblies and making colonial ocials directly responsible to Britain. These
were initial steps toward the more thorough-going solution Britain presumably would
have implemented had it won the war later on, and the new Declaratory Act made
this intention clear. Finally, the real wealth of the Colonists lay not in their current
prosperity, but in the vast opportunities for development represented by the territory
beyond the frontier. By curtailing these opportunities, the Quebec Act eectively
transferred a large amount of value from the Colonists to Britain (in the form of a
dierent province of the Empire). It thus made clear that Britain would not limit
itself to the small direct taxes (e.g., on sugar and tea) it tried to enact, but would
also impose much larger (though implicit) taxes.
4. The core of these disputes was not the actual taxes imposed, which were modest
overall, but the principle that legitimated them. Both sides' material interests were
inextricably entwined with the ideas of the Enlightenment and of the Imperial Era
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sovereignty. The Colonists supported a form of imperial federalism they viewed as
the earlier status quo, in which the Colonists had control over all internal aairs, po-
litical (including the selection of local legislatures), economic (including taxation and
expansion), and social (including religious freedoms), while Britain had control over
all foreign aairs, especially trade and security. In this view, freedom from tyranny
lay in local governance and the principle of no taxation without representation.
By contrast, Britain supported an absolute form of parliamentary sovereignty:
Parliament itself was the main bulwark against tyranny, and was therefore \unlim-
ited and unlimitable." The ancillary doctrine of virtual representation, developed
in part in response to colonial agitation, held that Parliament provided legitimate
representation even to those (such as the Colonists) who had no role in the selection
of its members.
Of course, each side's ideology was entirely consistent with its material interests.
Sovereign Parliament could freely and rightfully extract wealth from the Colonists to
pay the expenses of empire; self-governing Colonists could freely and rightfully enjoy
their own wealth. The real taxes contested by the two sides were not the piddling
measures Britain tried to enact, but the much larger taxes that might follow these
under whichever principle reined supreme.
The model provides only the crudest representation of the ideological debate be-
tween Britain and the Colonists, in the form of bargaining over the implemented tax.
However, this stylized fact makes clear that taxes|interpreted broadly to mean mea-
sures that transfer value from the Colonists to Britain and distort colonial aairs|
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concerned not with Britain's initial eorts at predation but with where the process
might end: in eect, the nal agreed tax.
||||||||||||
These stylized facts reveal how the conict of interests between Britain and the
Colonists took shape. They explain why relations between the two were relatively
pacic for most of the 18th century, and why these issues came explosively to the
fore after 1763. They also render a clear rationalist interpretation of the disputes
over principles of governance that connects these principles to implications for the
future prosperity of the Colonists and predation upon them, and thereby resolves
the mystery of why the Colonists would be provoked to the point of violence by the
present, small taxes Britain tried to impose. However, despite all this, they do not
make clear why the war happened.
Explaining the War Itself
Why couldn't the Colonists and Britain nd a suitable compromise? After all, it's
not as if Britain was unwilling to accomodate the principle of no taxation without
representation. Earlier in the century it had unied with Scotland by combining
the Scots Parliament with the English one. And it's not as though the Colonists
were unwilling to compromise on a strong central government: not long after the
Revolution, the weak Confederation was replaced with a much stronger United States
government. Britain could have added some colonial representatives to Parliament,
in accordance with the power and importance of the Colonists, in exchange for which
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have agreed to retain imperial federalism, with the Colonists governing their internal
aairs, but with a specied set of activities that Britain would be free to tax. Yet
neither of these, nor any other reasonable alternative, were given serious consideration
by either side.
The model presented here explains why. Any settlement Britain would agree to
would have to transfer enough value from the Colonists to at least equal the value
Britain would expect to get from a war to reassert its sovereignty. And any settlement
that appeased Britain would have to leave enough for the Colonists to meet the value
they would expect to get from a war of independence. But transferring enough to
satisfy Britain imposed costs on the colonial economy, in the form of resources shifted
out of transferable activity. These costs were high, and the anticipated costs of
war were low, so no mutually satisfactory compromises existed and the Revolution
occurred.
Obviously, the validity of this account turns on whether the costs of peace, in the
form of the distortionary costs of the taxation that Britain was expected to eventually
demand, actually exceeded the costs of war. There are two good reasons to believe
that they did.
First, the Colonists were adept at escaping the reach of authority. The colonial
governments had nothing like the sophisticated imperial bureaucracy that was then
coming into being in Britain. Settlers expanded the frontier, whether permission
was given or not. The frontier also provided a ready escape for anyone eeing the
authorities. Traders routinely disregarded customs law and smuggled in volume,
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behaviors implies that the Colonists could quite easily shift their productive eorts
into untaxed activity when needed. This in turn implies that they would respond
sensitively to more taxation, and thus that the costs of peace in the near term would
be high.
Second, and more importantly, the vast majority of colonial prosperity lay in the
future, something the Colonists well knew. The expansion of settlement, the clearing
of new land for agricultural and later industrial production, the extraction of natural
resources, and the development of canals and other infrastructure to support the
movement of goods, were the keys to the colonies' wealth. And yet at the time of the
Revolution, all of these had only just begun. This fact has important implications
for the costs of both war and peace.
With regard to the costs of war, it implied there was much less to be destroyed
in a war begun at the time. War might be expensive in the near term, and indeed it
was. But war posed no threat to the colonies' future wealth, as it was not even fought
in the territory that contained most of this wealth, and the settled areas had much
less capital and infrastructure in existence than they would later. Thus, at worst a
war could destroy a small fraction of the colonies' total value, meaning that the costs
of war for both Britain and the Colonists would be modest in the long view.
With regard to the costs of peace, it implied that the long-term sensitivity of the
colonial economy to taxation was very high. Realizing the wealth tied up in Amer-
ica's interior would require immense entrepreneurial eort that heavy taxation might
discourage. Since any negative impact on this growth would compound exponentially
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Indeed, this presumably explains the very low tax burden the Colonists imposed once
they had won their independence and maintained until at least the Civil War.
Certainly, the Colonists could anticipate that Britain's policies would aect the
growth rate. The Quebec Act demonstrated Britain's willingness to hand the Colonists'
future growth opportunities over to more acquiescent provinces. Moreover, Britain
continually hounded the colonial authorities to limit territorial expansion, largely be-
cause of its need to avoid a substantial, ongoing commitment of military resources
to ghting wars with Native Americans on the frontier. This suggested that, in the
future, colonial expansion would be delayed as necessary to bring peace to the frontier
and enable Britain to respond to urgent military needs elsewhere. Given the experi-
ence of Britain's many wars in the rst half of the 18th century, these delays could
occur regularly.
This is not to say that, had Britain retained the colonies of the future United
States, it would not have invested heavily in their development. This development
was in Britain's interest, too, and indeed it was partly why Britain had a policy
of \salutary neglect" toward the colonies in earlier times. However, if the colonies
remained in the Empire, this interest would sometimes be traded o against Britain's
other interests. In particular, the Colonists could expect to be regularly squeezed to
help pay for Britain's many wars. The problem was that, after the defeat of France
in the Seven Years' War, these wars were not relevant to the Colonists' well-being
and thus constituted a pure transfer that could only distort the colonial economy.
The bottom line is that, both now and in the future, the Colonists had good reason
to anticipate that the taxation that would be needed to satisfy Britain would imposeChapter 2: Costly Peace: A New Rationalist Explanation for War 98
great costs on their own prosperity. Greater even than the costs of a war, now, to
win independence and end future predation, which could only become more expensive
over time. So, they declared independence. For its part, Britain could anticipate that
the Colonists would resist its extraction of revenue, and had already begun to increase
its control over the colonies. Faced with a declaration of independence, Britain chose
to ght a war to take full control and end resistance to its taxes.
Alternative Explanations
FFRW give two subtly dierent explanations for the war in their two papers. I
will describe each in turn, and then discuss the fundamental aw that is common
to both. The problem is that the reasoning underlying these explanations rules out
bargaining between the Colonists and Britain. This leads to war, but for empirically
implausible reasons, as I will explain.
First, the explanation in Rackove, Rutten and Weingast (2000) relies on a com-
mitment problem. In this story, the stability of Britain's governance of the Colonists
is built on the continuation of a long-standing policy of benign neglect. This pol-
icy is interpreted by the Colonists as an endorsement of their philosophy of imperial
federalism, itself derived from the ideas developed in the time of Britain's internal
struggle over self-government, and so is satisfactory to them. However, changes in
Britain's interests, deriving mainly from its war victories and the concomitant expan-
sion of its empire, lead Britain to take steps that depart from tradition and violate
imperial federalism, though they are fully consistent with Britain's actual philosophy
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the Colonists' condence in Britain's commitment to imperial federalism. Thus, the
Colonists worry that Britain cannot commit not to intervene willy-nilly in their in-
ternal aairs, something they could not tolerate. They then initiate a war to secure
their independence.
The second explanation, in de Figueiredo Jr., Rackove and Weingast (2006), oers
a similar story, but is focused more on understanding how it could (rationally) be
true that both the Colonists and Britain were each surprised by the vehemence of
the other's reaction to what they viewed as rightful, uncontroversial behavior. In this
telling, the Colonists were unaware that Britain's philosophy had shifted from imperial
federalism to absolute parliamentary sovereignty over the course of the 18th century,
and remained so as long as the common interest of opposing France led Britain to
treat the Colonists lightly. The Colonists thus believed that they played a kind of
repeated prisoner's dilemma with Britain, in which mutual cooperation consisted of
the Colonists' loyalty to the empire and Britain's non-intervention in their internal
aairs. When the French threat was removed, Britain's interests changed and it
imposed modest, though novel, taxes that were in keeping with its philosophy and
that it thus still saw as cooperative. Because the Colonists incorrectly believe that
Britain still supports imperial federalism, they view this as (surprising) defection and
so respond with defection: a declaration of independence. And because Britain is
unaware that the Colonists have false beliefs, it is surprised by their defection and
also responds with defection: war.
Both of these explanations for the war are seriously awed, and for the same
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nance. In both explanations, the choice of this arrangement is binary. Britain either
intervenes or it doesn't. In the rst explanation, the commitment problem is not the
one to which Rackove, Rutten and Weingast (2000) refers. If the only two choices are
intervention or not, and the intervention is anticipated to be substantial, then Britain
would strictly prefer a war to no intervention, and the Colonists would strictly prefer
a war (the result of declaring independence, given Britain's preference) to interven-
tion. Neither would commit to an option other than the one it chose, because the
other option would leave it strictly worse o. War happens because the disputed issue
is completely indivisible. This is still war due to a commitment problem: the two
sides would prefer to ip a coin to determine the outcome, but they can't commit to
respect the result.
In the second explanation, war happens because of asymmetric information about
the game being played and about Britain's preferences. However, there is no incentive
to misrepresent this information on the part of either side. Thus, if they had the
opportunity to communicate their understandings in the course of bargaining over a
settlement, they would no longer have false beliefs about the other's interests, and
the only thing standing in the way of peace would be the binary choice of settlement.
It seems highly implausible to assume that only two settlements were available to
the Colonists and Britain. What would stop them from considering a compromise, in
which Britain would be given some authority over the Colonists (e.g., a specied set
of activity that could be taxed, or specied revenue or rates of tax), and the Colonists
would retain some autonomy (e.g., over religious aairs and frontier policy)? If an
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tially incorrect beliefs about the other's interests in the course of bargaining. They
would then be able to identify this agreement (or another like it), and its implemen-
tation would be stable (within the bargaining range) because each side could credibly
threaten war if the other violated it. Thus, FRRW cannot explain why the war itself
occurred.34
The model I have presented in this section can: no such agreement existed, not
because it was not physically implementable or because of incorrect beliefs, but be-
cause the anticipated distortionary costs of the taxation necessary to satisfy Britain
reduced the value of the peace to the point that war, which would eliminate these
costs, was preferred.
2.6 Developing the New Explanation
The principal intent of this essay was to convince the reader that costly peace is
an empirically relevant rationalist explanation for war. To that end, it analyzed three
sources of costly peace|arming, imposition, and predation|and showed how, in each
case, underlying commitment problems or asymmetric information forced actors into
inecient equilibria, and war occurred whenever its costs were lower than those of
peacefully coexisting with arming, imposition, and predation. It used these three
sources to provide analytic narratives of three dierent cases: the Iraq War, the civil
conict in Iraq between the wars with the United States, and the American War of
Independence. Thus, costly peace is empirically relevant: it explains at least one
34More generally, two-by-two models of conict such as the prisoner's dilemma are, by construc-
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inter-state war, one intra-state war, and one extra-state war better than the available
alternatives.
It is my hope that scholars of war will take from this the main implication: costly
peace should be added to the rationalist toolkit for explaining the origins of wars.
It is useful for understanding the wars studied here, and it might be useful for un-
derstanding many more. A second implication is that, even if there is some war for
which scholars have condently identied the presence of a commitment problem,
asymmetric information, or both, these do not suce to explain the occurrence of
the war. To have a complete account of its causes, it must also be established that
costly measures other than war, which the belligerents could have taken to address
the identied drivers of ineciency, either did not exist, were insuciently eective
to suppress the underlying driver, or were simply more costly than war.
For those interested in using the bargaining theory of war to make informed pre-
dictions about the war-proneness of some dyad, or to perform statistical analysis of
the historical record of wars, there is a third implication. Analysts must beware of
using only indicators of either commitment problems or asymmetric information as
predictors, without also taking account of the possible presence of measures avail-
able to the players that, while costly, might be cheaper than war and hence prevent
war from occurring. Ignoring these other measures will bias the resulting predictions
toward war.
Finally, for those who seek to advise policy-makers on how to respond to the threat,
initiation, or continuation of war around the world, there is a fourth implication. Wars
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peace|some interventions which would improve the lot of the (potential) belligerents
in the absence of costly peace will actually harm them in its presence. Preventing
or stopping such a war may simply force the belligerents to suer even greater costs
than those of the war. A decision to prevent war or impose peace should only be
made if there is some belief that the war is not being caused by costly peace.
For both scholars and practitioners, then, it is valuable to be able to distinguish
which wars occur due to costly peace. Unfortunately, and whatever the merits or aws
of the analytic narratives I presented in this essay, divining the principal cause of any
war is most certainly a black art. That said, its value is such that I believe scholars
ought to do more of it, and in the most rigorous and thorough fashion possible. To
that end, I will conclude this essay with a brief set of suggestions for how to go about
identifying other wars that are plausibly due to costly peace, and a speculative list of
some possible candidates for such wars.
How to Distinguish War due to Costly Peace Empirically
In practice, there are at least three criteria that should be met in order to distin-
guish whether a war can plausibly be explained with reference to the costs of peace.
These are not exhaustive, but they are in some sense minimal requirements, and each
corresponds to a potential pitfall for a scholar eager to attribute some war to costly
peace.
First, the participants had to have the means to overcome any commitment prob-
lems or asymmetric information without going to war. This is potentially a very
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least some movement in the balance of power and some asymmetry of information.
And, since most wars are preceded by substantial spending on arms, it is also dicult
to think of a war in which costly peace played no role in its causes. When more than
one of these explanations appears to contribute substantially to the occurrence of a
particular war, then it is very hard to identify one or another as being the dominant
cause. To have any condence in an attribution of a war to costly peace, there must
be a reasonable case that, had the participants not gone to war, peace would not
entail much shifting power or asymmetric information.
Second, peace must actually be substantially costly overall. It is not enough that
one actor sees peace as costly because he does not get his way, or because he suspected
the other actor was taking advantage of him, or because of any reason that he alone
expected to gain from war. Both actors must anticipate that peace between them
will yield substantially less than the total value it could, were it not for some source
of costs.
Third, and this is one is the most tricky, war must somehow, in expectation, reduce
the costs of peace. This criterion is much harder to meet than it might rst appear. A
story must be told for why there was no deal the actors could agree to, no mechanism
they could implement, that would mitigate the source of costs in peace, other than
war. In other words, how exactly does war solve the problem of these costs, and why
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Other Wars due to Costly Peace
I make no claim that the three sources of costly peace identied here|arming,
imposition, and predation|are exhaustive empirically. They are only the ones I have
thought of so far, and there are probably more. But, in addition to the particular
wars discussed in previous sections, there are a number of other wars that might be
attributed to these three sources. It seems likely that analyzing these wars through
the lens of costly peace would be a valuable exercise.
Arming: Wars of consolidation, secession, and succession might derive substantially
from arming costs. Fearon (1995) oered the possession of a given throne as a possible
example of an indivisible issue, but then noted that, while in principle a throne is
divisible|it can be shared or alternately held, or its concomitant territory divided,
by two potential occupants|in practice, the norms of monarchy make it appear
indivisible. An alternative explanation that either supplants norms or provides an
implicit explanation for where the norms come from is that splitting up territory
or sharing a throne requires that both occupants maintain the militaries necessary
to preserve their claims. If there are economies of scale in the maintenance of such
militaries or in the protection of one's territory from outside powers, then the added
costs of multiple, smaller armies may exceed the costs of war to retain a unied
throne. Thus the costs of arming prevents territory from being divided too far below
a certain ecient scale, and when this scale is reached, war will be preferred to further
division.
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been due to the imposition of penalties and rewards by the two superpowers? In the
global competition for states not solidly in either superpower's camp, each superpower
routinely supplied substantial military and other aid to its favored elements within
such states, which was intended to increase the leverage of this group relative to
the other favored by the opposing superpower. If the peaceful coexistence of the
two groups implies continuing costs for the superpowers of arming and support, then
both superpowers may try to incite their clients to ght a war to consolidate control
over the state and eliminate these costs. The same can be said more generally for
the desire of hegemonic states to avoid bearing the costs of war to eliminate some
nuisance by encouraging a local party to do it for them.
Predation: Wars over raiding and piracy|essentially, land- and sea-borne predation|
have occurred since antiquity, and continue in the rangelands of Africa and potentially
o the coast of Somalia. Do the costs of predation cause these wars? If the producers
ght to end the predation, do the predators ght to temporarily erode the producer's
defenses and so take full control over its resources while its strength recovers? Also,
many wars have been fought over prohibition, from the international opium wars of
the 19th century to more recent intra-state wars in Colombia and Mexico. Because
the social costs of (certain) drugs' use are thought to exceed the individual benets,
drug trackers eectively prey on productive society. Is this what causes these wars?Chapter 3
The Modern Economic Peace
Abstract:1 Rationalist theories of interstate conict do a poor job of explaining
some international relationships, especially those in which peace seems most compre-
hensive. I argue that this is because these theories have little to say about a factor
they nonetheless identify as central to war and peace: the presence and magnitude of
underlying conicts of interest. I begin to develop a theory of the origins of disputes
among nations, based on the idea that the economic conict of interests between two
states is determined by the benets and costs of transferring wealth (by whatever
means) from one state's economy to the other's. Whether such a transfer happens
in equilibrium depends not only on the military situation between the two states,
but also on the characteristics of their economies and governments. Nations that
have very sensitive, highly integrated economies|what are commonly referred to as
\modern" economies|of comparable size and that are ruled by highly representative
1Please do not cite or distribute without permission of author. Comments are welcome and
should be sent to andrew.j.coe@gmail.com. Thanks to the participants in the Political Economy
Workshop at Harvard University for comments on an earlier version.
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governments have little to ght or coerce one another over. If this theory is correct,
it could potentially explain not only the warmth of relations among such nations, but
also the very-long-run decline in organized violence and the rapid global economic
liberalization and political democratization of the past two centuries.
3.1 Introduction
If you ask an analyst or ocial in the US foreign policy community, \why do
the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the mem-
ber states of the European Union get along so well with each other?", their rst
answer is usually \they're allies." Upon pointing out that this reply simply begs the
question, their second answer is often \common interests." Asked to elaborate, the
subsequent list typically includes stemming the proliferation of advanced weapons,
suppressing terrorism and civil conict, preserving international peace, and encour-
aging the spread of political freedom and economic development.
Not a few academic political scientists would oer the same set of responses, and
yet they are hardly satisfactory as an explanation for the deep comity among these
nations. The rich states of the imperial era, including many of the same countries
included in the question above, shared a quite similar set of interests, with the excep-
tion that the ideology they sought to spread was not liberty but rather the superiority
of the colonizers. Yet these common interests did not suce to prevent these states
from engaging in wars, arms races, proxy conicts, and assorted other adversarial
behaviors with each other. In general, the phenomenon of a group of wealthy states
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is nothing new, but they usually still compete with each other, often intensely. But
unlike in previous eras, the members of today's group do not war with each other, do
not arm against each other, and rarely even have serious diplomatic disputes. Why
are today's states dierent?
When pressed, and especially after the question is more pointedly stated as \why
doesn't the United States use its superior military power to take advantage of the
others?", both policy types and academics will give a stronger answer. Namely, what's
good for Europe (say) is good for the United States, for the most part. This answer
certainly feels right. It accords with the warmth with which the governments of these
countries regard each other, and the durability of this warmth|disputes over strategy
(e.g., with regard to Iraq and climate change) do occur, but these are not taken as
the result of fundamental underlying dierences in interest, and any tension is quickly
dispelled.
That this answer is so intuitively satisfying should not distract us from the fact
that we have no precise idea why it might be correct. Why are the common interests
among these nations so deep that the suggestion that the US use its military might
to extract wealth from the others is almost universally regarded as absurd?
In this paper, I will argue that rationalist theories of international relations do not
answer this question. In particular, simply pointing to certain attributes of these na-
tions and noting the well-established correlation between these attributes and peace|
whether democracy, capitalism, or others|does not suce. It again simply begs the
question. Though there are available answers for how these attributes lead to peace
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planation for the depth of the peace these nations share. In fact, I will show that
these mechanisms cannot explain this kind of peace even in principle.
Instead, I propose that answering this question requires that we develop a theory
for why disputes occur at all. That is, we must nd explanations, not for war, but for
conicts of interest among nations. The absence of this understanding may be the
source of our inability to explain the deep comity among certain nations. It also raises
doubts about the completeness of our explanations for international relations, even
when our theoretical predictions do match observation, and renders suspect many of
the conclusions drawn from statistical studies of the historical record of conict.
To begin the development of a theory of the origins of conicts of interest, the
problem must be greatly simplied. This study deals only with economic conicts
of interest, between only two states, endowed with highly abstracted economies and
political regimes. A model constructed in accordance with these drastic simplica-
tions nonetheless leads to interesting results. The most important of these is that
two states endowed with democratic regimes and economies of comparable size that
are highly sensitive to taxation and thoroughly integrated with each other have very
little to gain from engaging in coercion, and thus little to no economic conict of in-
terest. They should therefore regard each other essentially without fear or malice. By
contrast, the absence of any of these characteristics generates incentives for coercion
and the possibility for war and other costly behaviors.
The model inspires conjectures about possible resolutions to other long-standing
puzzles in the study of international relations and of politics more generally. First,
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depth of global economic integration have gone up over time, especially in the last two
centuries, the theory predicts that the magnitude of interstate economic conicts of
interest has decreased, and so provides an explanation for the observed very-long-run
decline in the prevalence of interstate violence. Second, this general decline in eco-
nomic conicts of interests should also reduce the prevalence of other costly responses
to bargaining problems, such as the imposition of trade and investment barriers, and
so may also help to explain the advent of liberalization of the international economy
over the last two centuries. Finally, the sensitivity and integration of economies also
has implications for the stability of more egalitarian (e.g., democracy) versus more
monopolized (e.g., dictatorship) political regimes. Thus, the spread of democracy in
the last two centuries may itself have been encouraged by changes in the identied
economic factors.
The next section establishes some stylized facts about the warm relations among
certain countries in the last few decades and argues that these cannot be explained
by rationalist theories based on the bargaining framework. It suggests that this
explanatory hole may be related to the absence of any underlying theory of where
interstate conicts of interest come from. Section 3 then proposes and defends a highly
simplied model from which the development of a theory of the origins of conicts
of interest might proceed, based on the principle that coercion, even in the absence
of the use of force or preparation for it, isn't necessarily free. Section 4 analyzes the
model to determine how the economic and political structures of two states aect
the magnitude of their conict of interests, and then oers two empirical examples
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applications of this theory to several other empirical questions.
3.2 The Puzzle of Deep Interstate Comity
Here I will discuss the empirical phenomenon that is the central motivation for
this paper. Namely, some countries share a particularly deep friendship, as evidenced
by four properties of their relations that are described below. However familiar and
intuitive these properties seem, each confounds the expectations generated by the
available rationalist theories of international conict and is thus mysterious. In fact,
the problem is worse than that: I proceed to show that any rationalist theory based
on the extant bargaining framework and thereby reliant on international dierences
in bargaining failures or the costs of war will fail to dispel the mystery. I suggest
that a new avenue, based on dierences in the underlying conicts of interest, which
have heretofore not been explored in the rationalist literature, oers a way to solve
the puzzle.
Stylized Facts
1. The balance of military power sometimes diers radically from the distribution
of wealth between two nations.
The most obvious examples are between the United States and its closest friends:
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the members of the European Union, Ice-
land, and Norway. Even during the Cold War, most of these countries spent sub-
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terms the dierence was tremendous. Since the Cold War's end, most of these coun-
tries have greatly reduced their military spending relative to GDP, while the US has
maintained relatively high spending, despite occasional dips. In addition to the dif-
ference in raw spending, the US also gets considerably more military power out of
each dollar spent. First, US military technology is considerably more advanced than
that of its friends, and the technological gap has widened substantially since the Cold
War ended. Second, the US military is a fully professional (volunteer) force, whereas
much of the military manpower of its friends is composed of short-term conscripts.
Third, the US military has extensive, recent experience of intense combat; most of
its friends' do not. And fourth, the US maintains substantial military forces within
the territory of its friends, but they do not station forces in the US. The net result is
that the balance of military power greatly favors the United States.
At the same time, these US friends are among the richest countries in the world,
in both per capita and total terms. In fact, several of these countries are richer than
the United States, in per capita (Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway) and total (the
EU as a whole) terms. Even the poorest (Romania, Bulgaria) are among the richest
third of nations in total terms, and in per capita terms still have the same order of
magnitude of wealth as the US.
So, in every case, the balance of power is overwhelmingly weighted toward the
US, while the distribution of wealth is less lopsided, and in some cases is particularly
disjoint (e.g., Japan, Canada, Norway, Germany).
2. The most powerful state advocates for and materially contributes to the strength-
ening of the others, in political, economic, and military terms.Chapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 114
The military preponderance of the United States would be even greater if the US did
not share much of its technology and training with its friends. Although the most
advanced technologies (e.g., stealth) are usually not shared, this seems to be aimed
more at preserving the secrecy of the details of these technologies from outside enemies
than at preventing allied militaries from gaining the advantages associated with them.
Moreover, both during the Cold War and since, the US has constantly exhorted most
of its allies to increase their military spending, incorporate new technologies, and
enhance training to improve the ecacy of their militaries. It also encourages its
European friends to more deeply coordinate and integrate their militaries, so as to
improve overall military power. And it also encourages Japan to allow its military to
take a more active role in foreign conicts.
Economically, the US encourages its friends to undertake reforms that it believes
will increase the productivity and growth rate of their economies relative to its own.
It also allows many of the scientic and technological advances developed in the US
to be freely shared with its friends (and others).
Politically, the US encourages the integration and consolidation of its friends, as
well as their involvement in international aairs. The US has strongly supported
the political consolidation of Europe, and the expansion of institutions such as the
European Union to include Eastern European countries, and generally supports the
cooperation of European countries in participating in international institutions and
diplomacy. It also supports the \normalization", which is to say increased activism,
of Japan's foreign policy.
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3. Many states delegate the protection of their vital interests to the most powerful
state, but pay no tribute in exchange.
Beginning by World War II, and increasingly since, many of these friends have dele-
gated the protection of their interests|even vital interests|to the US. This, despite
the rising vehemence with which the US advocates that they strengthen their own
militaries. Perhaps most importantly, many of these friends have explicit guarantees
that, should they be attacked, the US will come to their aid with whatever force is
necessary, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed
adversary. Moreover, these friends seem to believe that these guarantees are credible.
Remarkably, these states appear to have no fear that the US will take advantage
of their decision to entrust their protection to it. Their own militaries, such as they
are, do not train a wary eye on the US forces stationed in their home territories. They
do not conceal their plans for territorial defense from the US, nor do they appear to
even plan for the possibility that the US might turn against them. What military
technology they develop is often shared with the US, and failures to do so seem to
be due to the desire to preserve commercial, rather than military, advantage. Their
forces, when they train for serious combat, often do so with US forces, enabling the
US to learn their strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, there appears to be little payment, implicit or explicit, in return for
US protection. Some friends do help the US to defray the location-based costs of
stationing forces in their territory, but this ignores the budgetary costs of hiring
and training the associated manpower and buying and maintaining the associated
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is an expectation that these friends will support the US in international diplomacy,
but this expectation appears based more on the perception that such support is
actually consistent with the friends' interests, even in the absence of the alliance,
than on the need to repay the US for its protection. Certainly, the US exacts no
recognizable tribute from these states; it is not running a protection racket. On the
occasions when the US has sought to redeploy its forces out of one friend's territory
and into one where those forces might be more useful, the rst friend often resists the
move and the US usually attempts to conciliate it for the move. Undoubtedly, this
has to do both with the perceived security benets of locally-stationed US forces, as
well as the positive stimulation of the local economy that comes with them. Indeed,
since the end of the Cold War the US has sought to bring more of its forces home,
not to rescind or lessen its provision of allied security, but to avoid the expense of
foreign basing.
4. The disputes in which these states engage are over stakes of triing value, rel-
ative to their total wealth.
The relations among these countries are, of course, not entirely without strife. Se-
rious disputes over how to respond to Iraq's suspected weapons programs, locations
for the foreign basing of US troops, appropriate climate change policies, commercial
openness to genetically modied foodstus, and the subsidization of civilian aircraft
manufacture, among others, have occurred. And, on any given day, there are many
disputes among these friends over commercial and other policies being tried at inter-
national institutions such as the World Trade Organization. However, it is important
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First, many of these disputes are over means, not ends. For example, these coun-
tries all sought to ensure Iraq's disarmament, but disagreed over whether war was
the best way to do so. All agree that open commerce and more productive agricul-
ture is best, but disagree about the safety of genetically modied organisms. This
latter example, and many other regulatory disputes, are based largely on epistemic
dierences|about whether the evidence for anthropogenic climate change is su-
ciently conclusive to undertake costly regulation, not about whether lessening the
extent of climate change, if possible, is desirable.
Second, and relatedly, these disputes are often waged and settled by persuasion
rather than by coercive threats. Precisely because many of the disputes are driven by
disagreements about facts rather than conicts of underlying interests, attempts by
each side to convince the other of the case for its desired policy are a common means
of negotiation. Even in the case of war with Iraq, perhaps the most serious recent
dispute, the US invested serious diplomatic resources in convincing its allies of the
case for war, but by and large refrained from issuing threats to coerce those that did
not support war.
Third, when threats are used, they are quite mild in nature and do not escalate.
Some commercial disputes among these friends involve threats to refer the case to the
WTO and to take any retaliatory measures the WTO sanctions, and these threats
are sometimes carried out. However, the adjudication of cases at the WTO, and
the retaliatory measures that sometimes follow it, are very low cost compared to the
wealth of the disputants, and these retaliations never escalate to anywhere near a
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either implicit or explicit, are never made and would be regarded as an egregious
overreaction.
Fourth, these disputes, even while ongoing, rarely aect the overall warmth of
relations among the involved nations. Most of these disputes do not even enter the
public consciousness in these countries. The most serious disputes, such as over the
war in Iraq, do lead to public tension, but this always quickly blows over, and the
general harmony of other aspects of relations is rarely undermined.
Fifth, and most importantly, the resolution of these disputes one way or another,
even all together, would represent quite modest alterations to the distribution of
prosperity. If all of the disputes ever lodged at the WTO involving a particular
country were decided in its favor, this would hardly tilt the scales of prosperity at all.
Even support for the Iraq War, whose total cost is liberally estimated to range into
the low trillions of dollars, would represent only one or two percent of the total US
economy in any year. These disputes are not all drops in the ocean, but most are no
more than drops in a puddle.
Overall, disagreements among these states tend to be well-mannered and over
modest interests.
Existing Explanations
It is very dicult to explain these stylized facts using the available rationalist
theories of interstate conict. I will argue that these theories oer no convincing
explanation of any single one of these four facts, though this is partly a matter of
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extant theories, none of them can explain all four facts together, even in principle.
The reason, as I will show, is that the abstract mechanisms drawn upon by these
theories place severe limits on just how friendly two nations could ever be.
As an explanation of these facts, many will quickly point to the democratic, com-
mercially open, nancially integrated, and culturally liberal nature of these countries,
as well as their numerous memberships in international institutions, as there is sub-
stantial evidence that these attributes are associated with peace. These empirical
observations are termed the democratic, commercial, capitalist, liberal, and Kantian
peaces, respectively. Denote this set of observations, and that of the empirical asso-
ciation of any other attribute with peace, as the attribute peaces. Of course, simply
noting that the countries in question share these attributes is not at all enlightening
unless we can specify how these attributes cause peace, and particularly how they
explain the four stylized facts.
There are some theories of various attribute peaces in the literature, which I will
refer to as attribute peace theories. The rationalist theories rely on the bargaining
framework for understanding international disputes put forward by Fearon and oth-
ers. This framework implies that war will occur only when two sides suer from a
bargaining problem (either a commitment problem or asymmetric information and
incentives for misrepresentation) that is severe enough relative to the cost of war. So,
one commercial peace theory holds that, since war disrupts trade, nations that trade
more face greater disruption should war occur, so that the cost of war among such na-
tions is higher and thus it should occur less often. One democratic peace theory holds
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credibly reveal what would otherwise be asymmetric information about resolve, thus
avoiding war. More generally, every rationalist attribute peace theory of which I am
aware postulates that the specied attributes lead to peace by increasing the cost of
war and/or avoiding or mitigating the occurrence of bargaining problems.
To see why these theories are inadequate to account for our stylized facts, we
need some elements of the bargaining framework. Suppose we have two states, A
and B, and that the set of stakes over which they might have conicting interests is
represented by the unit interval, [0;1]. If either state should use force to try to resolve
the dispute unilaterally, then A's expected value is p, minus a cost cA > 0 since the
attendant destruction reduces the value of the stakes; similarly, B's expected value
is (1   p)   cB. The parameter p represents the balance of power between the two
sides; the militarily stronger A is relative to B, the higher is p. At any given time,
the disposition of the stakes can be represented by q 2 [0;1], where A possesses the
subset [0;q] and B has [q;1].
Ordinarily, in a peaceful dyad we would expect to nd q in the neighborhood of
p: somewhere in [p   cA;p + cB]. If we take the set of stakes [0;1] to be the total
pool of wealth available to states A and B, then q represents the balance of wealth,
p represents the balance of power, and we expect the two to be similar to each other.
This presumes, of course, that A and B have similarly averse or neutral attitudes
toward risk, which seems reasonable in the case of rich, stable countries like those
discussed here. It also assumes that there is no expectation of a rapid shift in the
balance of power, as otherwise q should be shifted away from p in the direction favored
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too, seems reasonable to suppose.
One explanation for the rst stylized fact, that among the named countries and
particularly in dyads involving the United States, q is not near p, is that the relevant
strategic context may not be merely dyadic. That is, there might be an external
enemy or set of enemies so threatening that a dispute among the named countries
about the distribution of wealth would be too dangerous to be worthwhile. However,
since the end of the Cold War, it is very hard to see who this enemy might be. China
is rising; nuclear weapons are (slowly) proliferating; and terrorism has become a more
salient threat in recent years. But these threats are piddling compared to the threats
the more powerful of the named countries might pose to others within the group.
Moreover, what dispute might there be with the external threat that would be more
important than the wealth of the group, composed of some of the world's richest
states?
A seemingly much more promising explanation for a radical dierence between
dyadic balances of power and of wealth is in terms of the costs of war. If the costs
of a war to reduce or eliminate the mismatch between power and wealth are large
enough, they may overwhelm the expected benets of the war for the comparatively
wealth-deprived (and power-rich) side. Then, no war will occur, any threat of war
will not be credible, and the mismatch can be maintained.
There are at least four reasons to doubt this explanation. First, the cost of war is
not entirely exogenous. States that wish to resolve their conicts violently have some
(joint) control over how ugly the ghting gets. Nuclear weapons have only been used
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wars; similarly for chemical and biological weapons. The Geneva Conventions serve to
limit the costs of war among adherents; the so-called American way of war is dened
principally by its severe aversion to inicting non-military damage. The phenomenon
is not limited to the modern era: belligerents in the Middle Ages often took care to
avoid disrupting important trade routes. So it is not obvious why the costs of war
can simply be assumed to be large enough to account for the mismatch between p
and q.
Second, and related to the rst reason, if the two sides have some inuence over
how costly a war would be, then in equilibrium the costs must have something to
do with the value of what is at stake. Certainly, the two sides would not choose to
escalate a war to the point that the costs they suered exceeded the benets they
expected to win or defend. Moreover, the states under discussion are all very wealthy,
so that the expected benets for the comparatively wealth-poor side could be quite
large in absolute terms. Thus, even if the exogenous component of the (absolute) cost
of war is high, war might still be worthwhile on net given the size of the power-wealth
mismatch.
Third, even if the cost was anticipated to be very high, a belligerent needn't
threaten war, but only the chance of war. War between the United States and the
Soviet Union was anticipated to be extremely costly due to the large nuclear arsenals
each possessed, but this did not prevent the resolution of conicts of interests with
recourse to coercive threats. The threats employed were of the possibility that one or
the other government would lose positive control over its military forces, so that a war
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Because war only happens with some modest probability, the anticipated cost of
carrying through on a threat to create the risk of war is not prohibitively high, and
thus it is still possible for the participants to use threats to get their way.
Finally, would such a war really be so costly even if the cost is mostly exogenous?
Most of the named countries would fall rather quickly to a US attempt at conquest,
and this would be even more true had the US not shared much of its military tech-
nology with the other states (more on this momentarily). Moreover, the US needn't
even occupy a targeted state once the latter's military had been vanquished|it could
simply demand some of its wealth (in the form of a tribute, perhaps) and punish any
refusal, without fear of serious retaliation.
Thus, the explanation of the rst stylized fact based on a claim that the costs of
war among these states are high is not convincing. But we can push the argument even
further. Suppose, very generously for this candidate explanation, that it is somehow
true that the cost of war is large enough to overwhelm the observed mismatch between
power and wealth, though not larger than the total wealth of a particular dyad. Even
so, it still cannot explain the second and third stylized facts. A shift in the balance
of power moves the range [p   cA;p   cB] and thus potentially erodes the future
position of the weakened state if some exogenous factor (e.g., shocks or trends in
each country's economy) shifts the balance of wealth. Thus, we would never expect
to see both sides contributing to their own relative weakening, in the form of the
US exhorting the others to build stronger militaries and the others relying ever more
heavily on US power. These are the opposite of the behaviors we would expect to
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its eorts.
Finally, suppose we are so generous as to allow that the true cost of war is extreme
enough to overwhelm the total wealth of the dyad. Even so, these states obviously
have other means of unilaterally aecting the balance of wealth: they can threaten
to impose trade barriers, tax or conscate other states' investments in their home
territory, refuse to cooperate on other issues, and so on. Indeed, these measures are
sometimes used by these countries, but as we established with the fourth stylized fact,
the disputes to which these measures are applied are over stakes of quite small value.
They could instead use these cheaper, but still costly means of coercion, or threats
thereof, to settle larger disputes over the balance of wealth. Because these disputes
oer greater potential benets, it would be worthwhile to use these cheaper means, if
necessary, and thus the threats to do so would be credible. Instead, and contrary to
the implications of assuming even outlandish costs, we only observe them disputing
tries. Thus, the possibility that the costs of war among these states are large cannot
explain this set of facts, no matter how large these costs are.
We can more quickly dispatch the possible explanations based on lessened bar-
gaining problems. Even if the involved states were perfect bargainers, in the sense
that they could credibly reveal asymmetric information at will and/or avoid gener-
ating it and could costlessly commit, completely and forever, to agreements that are
mutually benecial at the moment, this would not explain our stylized facts. The
occurrence or absence of bargaining problems aects whether war or other inecient
resolution of disputes occurs, but they do not in and of themselves aect the settle-
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of bargaining prowess, the distribution of prosperity should still reect the balance of
power. If instead the costs are large, the second and third stylized facts would still
be the opposite of the expected behavior. And, if the costs are extreme, we would
still expect to see bargaining over large disputes backed by threats to resort to the
cheaper means of coercion.
The bottom line is that the existing theories of interstate conict, based on the
eects various national attributes have on bargaining problems and/or the costs of
war, don't give compelling explanations for any of the four stylized facts, and cannot
possibly explain the set of them. If the bargaining framework and the rationalist
theories derived from it to date were right, then the EU should not so wholeheartedly
trust the US to secure Europe's massive wealth, and the US should not be com-
plaining about but rather taking advantage of this incredible arrangement to extract
tribute from the EU. Many dyads among this group of nations should have vehement
arguments over the distribution of prosperity among them, and at various times issue
and perhaps make good on threats to redistribute prosperity involuntarily. Yet we
see none of these things. Plainly, something is missing from our theories that is very
important for understanding the behavior we observe among these states.
Diering Conicts of Interest?
If the usual mechanisms can't explain deep interstate comity, then we might prof-
itably ask whether there is some other mechanism|some relevant feature that varies
across countries|that could. The avenue explored in this paper is that the magni-
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sections, I will oer a theory for these dierences, but rst, it is instructive to consider
how the possibility of dierences in underlying interests have been dealt with by the
extant literature, and why it is important to develop a theory of these dierences.
Bluntly, there is no explicit rationalist theory of the origins of conicts of interest
among nations. Of course, the rationalist models all include a representation of the
conict of interests between two countries, typically in the form of the diametrically
opposed preferences over the division of a unit interval. And they even implicitly
allow the severity of the dispute to vary: though the interval is always of size 1, the
costs of war are dened relative to it, so that the parameter(s) for the costs actually
represent the ratio between the costs of war and the value of the disputed stakes.
If the cost parameter is higher, it could be because the value of the disputed stakes
is lower and thus there is a less severe conict of interest. But there is little in the
way of actual theorizing over what particular stakes that interval represents, why
preferences over it are opposed, or why the severity of the conict of interests might
vary from case to case.
Many empirical studies do attempt to include proxies for diering conicts of
interest in their regressions. These proxies include measures of the similarity in a
dyad's alliance portfolios or the sides' voting records in the United Nations, among
others. However, in the absence of an understanding of why there were or were not
serious opposed interests, how are we to know whether these actually are good proxies
for common interests? There are, after all, plausible reasons they might not be. Some
states may conspire to see to it that the issues which most severely divide them never
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of commonality in their interests. And some states that allied in order to fend o a
severe external threat might nonetheless be at each other's throats the moment that
threat recedes. Even if we somehow convince ourselves that these are good proxies,
we have simply moved the goalposts back one step, in much the same way as the
attribute peaces don't explain war and peace so much as expose the question of why
certain attributes are associated with peace or war. That is, why do some nations
ally, but not others? Why do some nations vote together at the UN, but not others?
The absence of theoretically-driven measures of conicts of interest from these
studies raises concerns about the validity of their conclusions. Suppose that there is
substantial variation in the magnitude of opposed interests (call this variable mag-
nitude) across dyads and over time. In tests of or predictions based on bargaining
theory, if magnitude is correlated with bargaining problems and anti-correlated with
the cost of war, then estimates of the eects of bargaining problems or costs of war
on the occurrence of war will be biased, though the sign of the estimates will remain
correct. But if magnitude is correlated with the absence of bargaining problems and
the cost of war, then estimated eects will be biased and even their signs may be
wrong. Even if magnitude is uncorrelated with the other two, the presence of dyads
with low magnitude but high bargaining problems and/or cost will lead to attenuation
of the estimated eects.
These concerns and the empirical puzzle discussed earlier suggest that the devel-
opment of a theory of the origins of conicts of interest is an important enterprise
for theorists. But this would be true even if these concerns were somehow assuaged
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theories. After all, there would still be a gaping hole in our theories, and we would
still have to suspect that these theories' predictions were right for the wrong rea-
sons. Since there are serious disconnects between the predictions of these theories
and empirical behavior, the value of developing a theory of the origins of conicts of
interest seems greater, but it would be an important task for students of international
relations regardless.
3.3 A Simple Model of Economic Conicts of In-
terest
In the remainder of this paper, I will oer a starting point for a rationalist theory of
conicts of interest, based on a model of interstate (and possibly intrastate) bargaining
over economic interests. This model is tailored to the problem of explaining why some
modern countries get along so well, and will be analyzed in the following section.
Here, I describe its elements and assumptions and defend the choices made in the
construction of the model.
There are two states, labeled A and B. Each state is composed of a government
(labeled GA and GB), a citizenry (CA and CB), and an associated domestic economy.
A government is a unitary actor that may be either of two types: a dictatorship or a
democracy, with dierences in interests to be dened below. Each citizenry is also a
unitary actor. The stake over which the actors must bargain is the aggregate wealth
of both states' citizens: they must divide among them the sum total of the private
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For concision, I will refer to these as the actors' \economic interests," but it is
important to note that this denition of the stake under dispute is broader than
it seems. A state's economy is composed of the production and consumption of all
utility-bearing things by the state's citizens. \Private goods" are simply those utility-
bearing things whose consumption is both excludable (one actor can prevent others
from consuming them) and rivalrous (if one actor consumes them, others cannot).
This category includes conventionally economic sources of value such as factors of
production and consumer goods and services. But it also includes less obviously
economic things such as religious adherence (e.g., whether certain people will be
forced to practice a certain faith) and government policy (e.g., whether members of
a certain ethnic group can be discriminated against).
Private goods are the natural candidates for economic conicts of interest. By
construction, actors would prefer to consume more goods rather than less, all else
equal, because goods bear utility. If the good in question is not rivalrous in consump-
tion (i.e., a public or club good), then the desires of all actors to have more are not
incompatible.2 If the good in question is rivalrous but not excludable in consumption
(i.e., a common good), then the actors' preferences for more are incompatible, but
no actual conict arises because nothing can be done about this incompatibility: no
actor can alter the degree to which it or another consumes the good. By contrast,
private goods are precisely those utility-bearing things that must be divided (because
2Of course, actors might argue over who is to provide public goods, if doing so requires some
private goods to be sacriced as payment for the provision, but the underlying issue is still the
division of private goods. Also, actors might bargain over inclusion into a good-providing club, but
the only reason to exclude anyone is in order to motivate the sacrice of private goods required to
create the club good in the 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they are rivalrous) and can be divided (because they are excludable). Thus, actors'
preferences for more private goods are both incompatible and actionable.
This is not so much a departure from the existing rationalist models as a spec-
ication of what exactly is meant by the \stakes" under dispute. In these models,
the stakes are typically represented as a unit interval that must be divided between
the two sides, who have opposed preferences over the division. This implies that the
stakes are private goods. Moreover, while the stakes in these models are not neces-
sarily dened to include all of the private goods available to the actors, the absence
from these models of the possibility of side payments is incompatible with assuming
that the actual stake is other than the sum total of all private goods available to the
actors. Thus, the stakes specied here are the same as the stakes assumed|usually
implicitly|by extant models.
Now, if the actors do not intervene to alter the division of private goods, then a
\natural" division arises, in which A's citizenry consumes goods of total value vA and
B's citizenry consumes goods of total value vB, and the two governments consume
nothing. The interval [0;vA + vB] thus represents all the private goods the states'
economies produce and consume, in the absence of intervention by any actor, and
so plays the role of the unit interval in this model. The division of private good
consumption between the two states is labeled q, with [0;q] consumed by A and the
rest consumed by B, so that the natural division is q = vA. The natural division plays
the role of the status quo disposition of the stake in this model. It can be thought
of as a function of the two states' economic fundamentals: their endowments, their
productivity, their commerce, and so on.Chapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 131
Actors have the power to alter the natural division of wealth via either of two
means. First, any actor may start a war, which ends the game with a costly lottery.
The value of this lottery to each player is non-negative and depends neither on who
started the war nor on what took place before the war occurred. For the governments
and citizenries of the two states, these values are labeled W G
A, W G
B, W C
A, and W C
B
respectively. War is costly, so W G
A +W G
B +W C
A +W C
B < vA +vB. If state i 2 fA;Bg
is ruled by a democracy, then it is assumed that W G
i = W C
i , for reasons that will be
obvious shortly.
Second, the actors may make use of transfer instruments. A transfer instrument
is a policy, together with an apparatus for its enforcement, that is mutually agreed
among the actors and that results in the transfer of private goods from one state's
economy to an actor. Transfers may be made within a given state and also between
states in either direction. For the economy of state i 2 fA;Bg and an actor j 2
fGA;GB;CA;CBg, a transfer from i to j is represented by i;j 2 [0;1], where i;j is
the fraction of state i's wealth that will be transferred to actor j.
These transfer instruments are most easily conceptualized as taxes that each gov-
ernment can impose on its own economy or that of the other state (if all actors agree
on this) and whose proceeds can then be consumed by the taxing government or dis-
tributed to other actors for their consumption. However, \taxes" is broadly dened
here. Empirically, governments have many instruments to choose from should they
seek to extract value from their own or another state's economy, not all of which are
conventionally labeled taxes: income taxes, poll tax, sales taxes, taris, land tax,
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scation of goods, cession of territory, enslavement of individual citizens. TheChapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 132
common feature of all these instruments is that they can be used to alter the division
of private goods. For simplicity, we will assume that for any permissible i;j, the
associated transfer instrument i;j is unique.
Once again, this is not really dierent from extant models. Instead, it is simply a
more detailed specication of what exactly is meant by agreed revision of the status
quo disposition of the contested stake. In previous models, such revisions are just
assumed to occur once agreed. Here, the actors must actually impose a policy designed
to implement a revision.
The real departure from previous models is to recognize that the utilization of any
plausible transfer instrument is itself costly. First, it is directly costly to implement
a transfer instrument. Taxes must be somehow assessed and collected, in whatever
form they come. Income must be reported and checked; the value of land must be
measured; imports must be inspected and cleared through customs; conscated goods
must be transported; ceded territory must be occupied.
Second, and often more importantly, transfer instruments generate side eects
that create indirect costs. Individuals subject to a particular tax generally seek to
avoid (by doing less of the taxed activity) or evade (by concealing the taxed activity)
it. Income taxes lead people to work less or to accept payment in-kind or \o the
books"; wealth taxes cause people to stockpile less of whatever forms of wealth are
taxed or to utilize oshore tax havens; taris lead to less trade or more smuggling;
conscation of land (or any other productive factor) discourages investment aimed
at increasing its productive potential. Because these phenomena involve individuals
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tax, they generally reduce the value of the taxed economy and so are costly.3 For the
purposes of this paper, we will term any such eects on the taxed state's economy
\distortions."
The use of transfer instruments can also impose indirect costs on the other (un-
taxed) state's economy, which we will call \externalities." A tax on one economy will
generally have eects on another if the two are at all integrated. People in one coun-
try who work less due to income taxes or trade less due to taris will produce less to
export and consume fewer imports, and thus will force people in another country to
deviate to consuming and producing other products. The conscation of productive
factors in one country leads not only domestic investors, but also foreign ones, to
invest less in improving these factors. Less work and/or less investment will lead to
less innovation in science, technology, and organization and thus less growth in both
economies. Because these phenomena also involve individuals (in the untaxed econ-
omy) deviating from the actions that would be most valuable to them in the absence
of a tax, they also reduce the value of the untaxed economy and so are costly.
We will assume for the sake of simplicity that the total costs borne by each econ-
omy depend only on the overall rate of tax levied on each, not on which actor im-
poses the tax or which receives the proceeds. That is, the costs depend only on
A 
P
j A;j and B 
P
j B;j. We can then represent these costs as functions of the
3Pigouvian taxes, which are designed to discourage individuals from generating public bads such
as pollution or congestion, generate distortions that actually increase the overall value of the taxed
economy. But they are still directly costly to implement, and the total revenue generated from such
taxes is typically only a very modest fraction of the economy, so we ignore them. Also, tax revenue
may be used to provide public or club goods, which may increase the value of the taxed economy
enough to make up for the costs of taxation and so be on net benecial. However, the revenues from
the taxes considered here are assumed to be consumed as private goods by the receiving actor, and
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tax rates, denoted cA(A;B) and cB(A;B). Then, the value of the two economies
under a given tax vector is given by the functions vA(A;B) = vA  [1   cA(A;B)]
and vB(A;B) = vB  [1   cB(A;B)]. We assume that cA(0;0) = cB(0;0) = 0, and
that ci(A;B) > 0,
@ci
@i
  
A;B
> 0, and
@2ci
@2
i
  
A;B
> 0 if i > 0. We say that the two
economies are not integrated if
@ci
@j
  
A;B
= 0 for all j 6= i and (A;B). Otherwise,
we say that the economies are integrated (to at least some degree) and assume that
ci(A;B) > 0,
@ci
@j
 

A;B
> 0, and
@2ci
@2
j
 

A;B
> 0 for all i, j, and (A;B) 6= (0;0). In
plain English: if no taxes are imposed then there are no costly distortions or exter-
nalities; if taxes are imposed on an economy, they are costly to that economy and
the cost increases, at an increasing rate, in the aggregate rate of tax; if the economies
aren't integrated at all, then taxes on one have no aect on the other, and if they
are at least a little integrated then any tax is costly to both economies and the cost
increases, at an increasing rate, in the aggregate rate of tax.
Each citizenry's utility is equal to its consumption of private goods. A govern-
ment's utility depends on its type. A dictatorship's utility is equal to its consumption
of private goods, but a democracy's utility is equal to its citizenry's consumption. In
other words, a dictatorship is greedy and seeks only to maximize its own self-interest,
whereas a democracy is completely devoted to its citizenry and seeks to maximize its
(aggregate) welfare. Obviously, real governments are not like this, but they do fall
on a spectrum of representativeness of which the two types considered here represent
the extremes. These extreme types are chosen so as to render starkly the dierences
among regimes, but the results presented in the next section can easily be extended
to more ne-grained representations of governance.Chapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 135
The order of moves is as follows. The game begins with the natural division of
wealth discussed above. The government of state A either starts a war, or oers
to the other actors a revision of the natural division based on a vector of transfer
instruments. If he makes an oer, each of the other actors must either accept it, or
reject it and start a war (the order of these moves is irrelevant). If all the actors
accept it, the vector of taxes is implemented, distortions and externalities result and
the attendant costs are borne, and each actor consumes his post-tax allocation of
private goods. Information is perfect.
This completes the description of the model; we now turn to its analysis.
3.4 The Political Economy of Coercion
We will now analyze the model to determine the actors' incentives to engage in
\coercion," dened for our purposes as the use of power (in the form of bargaining
power or the threat of war) to alter the natural division of wealth. The model does not
have closed-form solutions for the equilibrium use of transfer instruments, but we can
still compute comparative statics. We will focus on several parameters that aect the
equilibrium level of coercion: the military balance of power (the actors' war values);
the sensitivity of each economy (roughly, how quickly the cost of distortions in the
taxed economy rises in the rate of tax); the integration of each economy (roughly,
how quickly the cost of externalities in the untaxed economy rises in the rate of tax);
the size of each economy; and the type of government. These enable us to develop
a rudimentary theory of the political economy of coercion. We will see that under
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interests among actors. Finally, we will work through two empirical examples that
illustrate the conditions that maximize or minimize the incentives for coercion, or
equivalently the severity of the conict of economic interests, and discuss how these
might provide an explanation for the stylized facts of Section 2. The proofs for the
results below may be found in the appendix.
We will concern ourselves mainly with the taxes that the government of A (GA)
will impose on its domestic economy and the foreign (state B's) economy. To fa-
cilitate this, we will assume that state B is governed by a democracy, so that it is
eectively a unitary actor|the preferences of B's government are identical to those
of its citizenry|and thus we needn't worry about taxes internal to B.
Assumption 3.1. B is governed by a democracy.
Next we need to simplify the problem by isolating the types of tax vectors that
can actually occur in equilibrium. It turns out that it is enough to study only the
total rate of tax that ends up being levied on each economy, and that in equilibrium
there cannot be any \redundancy" in taxation.
Proposition 3.1. Any tax vector is equivalent in outcome to one in which the gov-
ernment of A imposes taxes A;B on the two economies, and then distributes xA  0
of the resulting revenue to the citizenry of state A, xB  0 of the revenue to state B,
and consumes the rest itself. Under this representation, in equilibrium, at least one
of i and xi is zero, for any i 2 fA;Bg.
The rst statement follows immediately from our assumption that the cost of
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economy. If it doesn't matter who imposes the tax or who receives the revenue, then
a particular tax vector that results in a particular nal allocation of private goods to
each actor can be represented by one in which the same overall tax rates are levied
entirely by GA, who then distributes the revenue so that the nal allocation is the
same. So, we can subsequently speak only of GA imposing domestic and foreign taxes
and allocating the revenue, without loss of generality.
The second statement has a simple intuition. If GA taxes an economy (meaning,
collects wealth from the citizenry of the associated state), and then disburses some of
the overall tax revenue to the associated citizenry, then the overall level of taxation
is higher than it needs to be to achieve the same nal allocation of private goods
among the actors. Because a higher tax entails a higher cost to the taxed economy,
GA would do better to lessen the redundancy|that is, to reduce both the tax and the
disbursement in a way that leaves all other actors equally well o|and then pocket
the surplus from the lower overall cost of taxation. This implies that a peaceful
equilibrium has one of three forms: positive taxes on both economies with all revenue
consumed by GA; a positive tax only on A's economy, with a possible disbursement
to B; or a positive tax only on B's economy, with a possible disbursement to the
citizenry of A.
We will make one other simplifying assumption. For the purposes of this paper,
we will exclude any consideration of whether war would occur. (It is easily shown that
war will occur whenever there is no tax/disbursement oer that will satisfy all actors,
or equivalently whenever any oer that would satisfy two of the actors would impose
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transfers are demanded in equilibrium, and how they are determined. The following
assumption removes the possibility of war in equilibrium, by simply restricting the
sum of the actors' war values to be lower than the total value of the economies,
even under the assumption that GA collects as much revenue as possible and thus
creates the highest plausible costs of taxation. Since these values are independent
parameters, no restrictions on other parameters are implied.
Assumption 3.2 (No-War Assumption). War is more costly than peace even under
any revenue-maximizing set of taxes on both economies.
Now we can discuss the main results. In what follows, the disbursement to state
B is zero unless otherwise stated, and the disbursement to the citizenry of A is zero
if GA is a dictatorship and all the tax revenue if GA is a democracy, unless otherwise
stated.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that A is governed by a democracy.
 If vB  WB, then A = 0 and B = minf
B;w
Bg, where:
vA
@cA
@B
   
~ =(0;
B)
+ 

BvB
@cB
@B
   
~ =(0;
B)
= vB [1   cB (0;

B)] ) 

B
(3.1)
WB = (1   
w
B)vB [1   cB (0;
w
B)] ) 
w
B
(3.2)
 If vB < WB, then A = B
A, B = 0, and xB = WB  vB

1   cB
 
B
A;0

, where:
WB   vB

1   cB
 

B
A;0

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B
AvA

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 

B
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To understand this result, rst consider what would be the ideal policy of the
democratic government of A. Since its utility is equal to that of its citizenry, it would
want to impose as little tax on its own economy as possible, since such a tax just
lessens the wealth available to its citizenry. By contrast, it would seek to collect
as much revenue as possible from the foreign economy, since it does not care about
the other state, although if the two economies were integrated, it would also have
to worry about the externalities its foreign tax imposed on the domestic economy.
How well it can achieve these goals depends on how powerful state A is relative to B.
If the natural division gives B more wealth than it would expect to retain in a war
(vB  WB), then state A is externally \strong," in the sense that it is comparatively
power-advantaged and wealth-deprived relative to B. If the opposite is true, then
state A is externally \weak."
If A is externally strong, then it can and will extract wealth from B's economy.
How much it can get depends on whether its ideal tax rate|the one that maximizes
the consumption of its citizenry|leaves B enough to avoid war. If it does, then A's
government will set this ideal rate (
B), and if it does not, then the tax will be just low
enough to leave B enough wealth to prefer acquiescence to war (w
B). In both cases,
the tax rate A imposes decreases as the cost thereby imposed on B's economy (cB (0;)
and @cB=@B) rises, as this decreases the revenue that is collected at any particular
tax and lowers the tax rate at which domestic consumption is maximized. If the two
economies are not integrated, then the way to maximize domestic consumption is
to simply maximize the revenue collected from the economy of B. However, if the
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also imposes externalities on A's economy (i.e., @cA=@B > 0), then A's ideal tax
will be lower than the revenue-maximizing one because the democratic government of
A fully internalizes the costs of the externalities to its own citizenry's consumption.
This eect is more pressing if the size of A's economy is large relative to B's, so that
the additional externalities of a higher tax quickly come to overwhelm the additional
revenue the tax brings. By contrast, if A's economy is very small relative to B's, then
the externalities will be negligible compared to additional tax revenue.
The tax A imposes decreases as B gets stronger relative to its wealth, and eventu-
ally B becomes the comparatively power-advantaged player, so that instead of taxing
B, GA must tax its own economy and transfer the proceeds to B (when vB < WB).
Since GA prefers to take away as little of its citizenry's wealth as possible, it col-
lects just enough tax to satisfy B and avoid war (B
A). The tax GA must levy on
its citizenry to satisfy B increases as B gets stronger relative to its wealth or the
externalities on B's economy of the tax on A's economy (cB (;0)) rise, because A
must do more to satisfy a more powerful B or one that suers bigger side eects from
A's eort to pay tribute. It also increases as the size of A's economy, relative to B's,
shrinks or the distortions imposed by taxes on A's economy (cA (;0)) rise, as GA has
a smaller pool from which to pay B and thus must levy a higher rate of tax.
The most important result here is that the costs of transferring wealth from one
state to another place limits on how large a transfer can actually occur, and thus on
the extent of coercion. That is, the equilibrium post-transfer balance of wealth will
reect the balance of power, but only within certain limits. For example, even if A
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wealth, because at a high enough rate of tax, any increase in the tax generates less
total consumption for A because it imposes such large costs on the two economies.
More generally, the more sensitive the two economies are to taxation (i.e., the faster
the taxed economy's costs ramp up as the tax on it increases) and the more integrated
they are (that is, the faster the untaxed economy's costs ramp up as the tax on the
other increases), the narrower these limits on equilibrium transfer will be, and the
larger the resulting mismatch between the balance of power and the equilibrium
balance of wealth might be. These costs thus narrow the scope for coercion to occur.
This is very dierent from the standard models, in which, so long as no shifts in
power are expected and information is symmetric, the equilibrium disposition of the
stake can dier from the balance of power only to the extent that war is costly. As
argued in Section 2, in the standard models, a large equilibrium mismatch between
power and wealth requires the costs of war to be implausibly high. In the model given
here, a large mismatch can result even if war is relatively cheap. We will return to
the empirical importance of this in the examples to be discussed later, but for now
we will study how things might change if A were instead governed by a dictatorship.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that A is governed by a dictatorship and the two economies
are not integrated.
 If vB  WB and vA  W C
A, then A = minf
A;w
Ag and B = minf
B;w
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w
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 If vB < WB, then A is the same as above but B = 0 and xB = WB   vB.
 If vA < W C
A, then A = 0, B is the same as in the rst case, and xA = W C
A  vA.
To explain this result, we will focus mainly on how the behavior of the government
of A changes when it is a dictatorship rather than a democracy. Consider what a
dictatorship's ideal policy would be. Because it cares neither for the other state nor
for its own citizenry, but only for its own consumption, it would seek to collect as much
revenue as possible from both its own economy and B's. When the two economies
are not integrated, GA's taxation of its own economy does not aect, and is not
aected by, its taxation of B's economy, so the problems of what tax or disbursement
to oer to the citizenry of A, and what tax or disbursement to oer to state B, are
completely independent. Because these two problems are independent, and because
both a dictatorship and a democracy have in common that they will try to get as
much revenue as possible from B (or oer B as little as possible in order to avoid war),
the external behavior of A does not depend on the type of its government. From B's
point of view, in the absence of integration, whether A is governed by a dictatorship
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Without integration, the only way the dictatorship and the democracy dier is in
their internal behavior: that is, with respect to their own citizenry. The democracy
never wishes to tax its own citizenry, as this reduces their consumption and thus its
own utility, and will not do so unless it is externally weak and so has to pay tribute
to B to avoid war. But the dictatorship would rather consume its citizenry's wealth
itself, and thus would always like to collect as much revenue as possible from the
domestic economy, whether it is externally weak or not. How much internal revenue
the dictatorship can get depends on how powerful it is relative to its own citizenry
(CA). If the natural division gives CA more wealth than it would expect to retain in
a war (vA  W C
A), then the dictatorship is internally strong in the sense that it is
comparatively power-advantaged and wealth-deprived relative to CA. If the opposite
is true, then the dictatorship is internally weak.
If the dictatorship is internally strong, then it will set the revenue-maximizing
internal tax rate (
A) unless this would be rejected by its citizenry in favor of war,
in which case it sets a tax rate that leaves the citizenry just enough wealth to cause
it to prefer peace (w
A). Either way, the tax rate the dictatorship levies decreases as
the cost imposed on its own economy (cA (;0) and @cA=@A) rises, as this decreases
the revenue collected at any particular rate and lowers the rate at which revenue is
maximized. The tax the dictatorship imposes on its own economy decreases as its
citizenry gets stronger relative to its wealth, and eventually the citizenry becomes the
power-advantaged player, so that the dictatorship must stop taxing its own economy,
and instead transfer some of the proceeds of its tax on B's economy to the citizenry
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Thus, when the government of A is a dictatorship, the costs of taxation place
limits not only on external transfers (between states) but also on internal transfers
(within A), and so on the extent of intra-state coercion. Even if the dictatorship
has untrammeled power within its own state, it will not transfer all of its citizenry's
wealth to itself, and the more sensitive to taxation his associated economy is, the
smaller the transfer will be. Even so, overall a dictatorship will always impose more
taxes|making the equilibrium more inecient|than would a democracy, because
the two tax B the same, but the dictatorship imposes higher internal taxes.
Next we explore the dierences between dictatorship and democracy when the
two economies are integrated.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that A is governed by a dictatorship and the two economies
are integrated.
 If vB  WB and vA  W C
A, then A = 
A and B = 
B, where:
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We will concentrate on the eects of integration on the dictatorship's behavior, as
well as the eect integration has on the dierences in behavior between democracy and
dictatorship. The rst thing to observe is that integration decreases both the internal
and the external tax rates levied by the dictatorship, relative to the case without
integration. The reason is that, in the presence of integration, both taxes entail higher
costs, because each creates externalities in the untaxed economy (@ci=@j), and this
lowers the revenue-maximizing rates (
i ;
+
i ) regardless of whether the dictatorship
is internally or externally strong or weak.
However, the lowering of equilibrium tax rates is more pronounced when the dic-
tatorship is internally or eternally weak. In either case, the dictatorship must tax oneChapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 146
actor in order to pay o the other and avoid war. If the tax on one actor negatively
aects the other actor through its externalities, then the dictatorship will have to
pay the latter actor enough to fully compensate it for these externalities if war is to
be avoided. For this reason, the dictatorship fully internalizes the externalities its
tax impose. By contrast, when the dictatorship is externally and internally strong, it
only cares about the eects (both distortions and externalities) its taxes have to the
extent that they reduce its overall revenue. Because it does not have to compensate
either other actor for these eects, it only partially internalizes them. This can be
seen in the equations above: when the dictatorship is internally and externally strong
(the rst bullet), the externalities of each tax are weighted only by the tax rate the
dictatorship imposes on the aected economy (e.g., 
AvA@cA=@B in the rst equa-
tion), whereas when the dictatorship is weak with respect to some actor and must
pay it tribute, the externalities on that actor are given full weight (e.g., vB@cB=@A
in the third equation).
Even so, when it is internally strong, the dictatorship still sets an internal tax
higher than the democracy would choose. Though the higher costs (due to exter-
nalities on B) lower the equilibrium rate of internal tax, there is still revenue to be
collected, and the dictatorship will do so in excess of whatever may be required to
pay tribute to B, just as in the case without integration.
However, unlike in the case without integration, the dictatorship's external be-
havior may now dier from that of the democracy. When either is externally weak,
their external behavior is the same|they simply pay the minimum tribute required to
satisfy B. There is also no di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the two types of government have dierent motives. Both are trying to extract as
much revenue as possible from the foreign economy, while taking full account of the
externalities this extraction imposes on their own economy. But the democracy does
so because it is trying to maximize its citizenry's consumption; the dictatorship does
so because it must fully compensate its citizenry for these externalities in order to
avoid war. Their behavior diers only when the dictatorship is both externally and
internally strong. Then it has the power to levy tax on B, and the power to consider
the externalities this imposes on its own economy only to the extent that they lessen
its revenue from its domestic taxation. Thus, unlike the democracy, the dictatorship
does not fully internalize the domestic externalities of foreign taxation, and so the
dictatorship will levy a higher foreign tax than the democracy.
Overall, integration strengthens the limits the costs of taxation place on the ex-
tent of inter- and intra-state transfers, and so on the degree of coercion, because it
raises these costs. However, its eects are more pronounced for democracies and weak
dictatorships than for strong dictatorships, because the latter do not fully internalize
the domestic externalities of foreign taxation. Regardless, internally strong dictator-
ships always impose higher internal taxes than do democracies, and thus dictatorships
generally impose more overall taxation and ineciency than do democracies. With
these results in hand, we will consider two empirical examples.
Empirical Examples
The theory's concepts of sensitivity and integration are necessarily quite abstract,
as are the propositions that ow from them. But this abstraction leaves open twoChapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 148
questions about the empirical applicability of the theory. First, what do sensitivity
and integration actually mean when applied to real economies? Second, and related,
even if the theory is correct as stated, are the eects it predicts large enough to
actually explain major dierences in international behavior? Here, we will discuss two
empirical examples that, according to the theory, should have substantial dierences
in the extent of coercion and so serve as a concrete illustration of the theory's concepts.
I will argue that the dierence in the theory's predicted eects is large enough to
explain the observed dierence in behavior between the two examples. The conjecture
advanced here is that the deep interstate comity discussed in Section 2 is substantially
explained by the high sensitivity, thorough integration, and democracy of those states.
The paper's title derives from this conjecture: it is among these states that the modern
economic peace has arisen.
Example 1:
Imagine a group of states, each of which has the following characteristics. The
bulk of the state's economy is composed of subsistence agriculture, because the pro-
ductivity of most of its citizens is not high enough to generate much of a surplus
above survival requirements. In part because of this, but also because of relatively
high costs of trade arising from poor shipping technology and imperfectly controlled
banditry on trade routes, the state engages in very little international commerce. It is
ruled by an autocratic leader, who has amassed considerable power over the citizenry
and is interested mainly in bolstering his own wealth and power.
This description ts most states around the world for most of human civilization.
Though it is still approximately true of some states today, these properties were moreChapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 149
common before the 19th century (when some economies shifted away from farming
and into manufacturing), and most common outside the realm of various empires that
could substantially lower the costs of trade (e.g., the Roman Empire via its control
of the Mediterranean Sea and its coasts, or the British Empire via its control of the
oceanic trade routes).
Under these conditions, both sensitivity and integration were very low. To see
why, consider what an autocrat might tax in such a state. He could \tax" (that is,
seize) land or labor, the principal factors of production. Given the absence of human
capital or any abundance of undeveloped arable land, this taxation would not lead to
a reduction in the supply of either factor because there are no investment decisions to
be distorted. The autocrat could also tax crops, the principal good produced in the
economy. These are easily requisitioned in-kind, so that the direct costs of collecting
the tax are not high. Moreover, farmers cannot aord to work less in response to the
tax, because their reliance on their own produce for subsistence implies that doing
so would put their survival at risk. Thus, given the necessary military power, an
autocrat would be able to raise substantial taxes, in the form of levies on crops or
direct seizure of land or labor, without much reduction in the total value of the taxed
economy.
What few costly eects such taxes would have would be unlikely to bleed over
to an untaxed economy. Since the state engages in very little commerce, the taxed
economy is largely independent of other economies, and thus these are likely to be
unaected by the autocrat's predation on the taxed economy. Thus, the autocrat's
taxation is unlikely to reduce the value of any untaxed economy.Chapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 150
When sensitivity and integration are very low, the theory predicts that the incen-
tives for coercion will be maximized. The exaction of tribute causes little in the way
of distortions or externalities, and thus the costs of taxation impose few limits on
what can happen in equilibrium. Moreover, since the states' governments are dicta-
torships, any costs to the domestic economy wouldn't be fully internalized by the tax
authority anyway. Coercion should be rife, and the balance of power should closely
match the balance of wealth.
More broadly, the theory has implications for the nature of relations among these
states. They exist in a rapacious world, in which autocrats view each other with
justied suspicion and engage in constant scheming to conquer more valuable terri-
tory. States give close attention to the balance of military capabilities, and jealously
guard their own security. Wars occur from time to time as commitment problems or
asymmetric information arise and become too severe. Alliances between states are
purely Machiavellian, in the sense that they are motivated by opportunity and greed
rather than comity. They are always subject to repudiation or betrayal as national
self-interest dictates. There is no real \friendship" among states, and certainly no
deep comity of the kind observed in Section 2.
Example 2:
Now imagine a very dierent group of states, sharing the following characteristics.
Each state's economy is composed mainly of manufacturing and services. Much of
the economy's total present value derives from investment and innovation in science,
technology, and organization that increase the future value of the economy. The
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engages in extensive international commerce, with trade in goods and services forming
a substantial percentage of the economy. Additionally, each receives large inows of
direct and portfolio investment from abroad, and its own citizens invest heavily in
foreign ventures. Many of the rms doing business in the state are multi-nationals.
Finally, its government is highly representative, with leadership selected by vote of
the majority of the citizenry.
Beginning at least by the Industrial Revolution, some states around the world
shifted away from the characteristics of the rst example and toward those listed here.
In recent decades, the latter apply most clearly to the United States, the states of
the European Union, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Iceland, and Norway.
And these characteristics are increasingly approximated by other states around the
world as their economies develop and their polities liberalize.
For these states, both sensitivity and integration are very high. Because their
economies are diversied and relatively free, it is relatively easy to avoid or evade
any specic tax. To constrain avoidance and evasion, any signicant level of taxation
must therefore be collected from a broad base. Because citizens' survival is generally
not at risk, they can respond to such broad taxes by working and/or investing less.
This decreases the value of the economy in any given period, but it also generally
reduces its growth rate, because citizens put less work eort or less investment into
generating innovation. Any reduction in the growth rate results in an exponentially
increasing loss of value to the economy over time, so that even a quite small decrease
in growth has very large costs. Thus, the costs of the distortions associated with any
signi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These eects are not likely to be contained within the taxed economy. Because
these states are heavily involved in international commerce, there are many channels
by which the eects of taxation can bleed into other, untaxed economies. Employees
and shareholders of rms that export goods to the taxed economy would be hurt by
reduced consumption of these goods due to reduced wealth in the taxed economy.
Consumers that buy products imported from the taxed economy would have to pay
higher prices or turn to alternative, next-best suppliers of these goods and services.
Investors would have a reduced set of opportunities in which to invest and reduced
capacity for diversication. Firms that own foreign aliates or purchase and sell
products abroad would share in the taxed economy's costs. Fewer innovations in the
taxed economy would be available to spread to and increase the value of the untaxed
economy. And all these externalities would compound over time due to the lower
growth rate of the taxed economy. Thus, the costs of the externalities suered by the
untaxed economy would also be substantial.
Both of these economic characteristics are widely recognized in these states. The
importance of property rights and free, uncoerced participation in markets to the
growth and well-being of society is fundamental to the prevailing understanding of
the origins of prosperity in the \West." Elites within these states argue over the
extent of public goods provision (and thus taxation to fund these goods) by the
government, but most agree that the eects of taxation on growth are central to the
debate. And it is conventional wisdom that economic downturns in one or several of
these states will negatively aect the others. Participation in all the institutions of
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coordination|is motivated in part by the perception that helping particular states
to accelerate growth and recover rapidly from economic crises is benecial to all the
other states.
When sensitivity and integration are higher, the theory predicts that the incentives
for coercion will be reduced, relative to the rst example. The levying of taxes on one
state's economy both substantially distorts that economy and also generates costly
externalities in the taxing state's economy. Moreover, because the states discussed
here are democracies, the costs of these externalities are more thoroughly internalized
by the governments of these states. These distortions and externalities thus place hard
limits on the size of transfers that can occur in equilibrium. Coercion should thus be
less prevalent, relative to the rst example, and the balance of power might deviate
from the balance of wealth among these states.
However, even if the direction of the theory's predicted eect is correct, it remains
to be seen just how large the eect might be for the states of this example. A thorough
examination of this is well beyond the scope of this paper, but a simple numerical
exercise is instructive about what magnitudes are plausible. Suppose that there are
just two states in the group discussed in this example, A and B, not unlike the United
States and the European Union (considered as a single state). State A is much more
militarily powerful than B, sucient to enforce the collection of any tax it chose to
levy on B's economy, and is considering imposing a broadly-based tax at a rate of 10%
on economic activity in B. The natural division of wealth gives equal value to the two
states' economies, with an initial GDP of $15 trillion, and the natural (i.e., untaxed)
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values for the US and EU. Each discounts the future at 3% per year. Then, in
the absence of any coercive taxation, the total present value of each economy is
P1
t=0(1 :03)t($15 trillion)(1+:03)t = $15 trillion=(1 :971:03)  $16:7 quadrillion.
If A levies the proposed tax, then B's economy will suer a static loss|a year-
on-year constant-fraction reduction in value|of just 1%, and the growth rate of
B's economy will decline by a certain fraction . For its part, A's economy will
suer costs equal to only one-fth of those borne by B's. So, under the tax, A's
economy will generate a total present value of
P1
t=0 :97t  ($15 trillion)  (1   :2 
:01)  [1:03  (1   :2)]t  $15 trillion  :998=(:0009 + :19982). A will get to consume
this value, but also the total present value of the revenue from the tax, which is
:1
P1
t=0 :97t($15 trillion)(1 :01)[1:03(1 )]t  $1:5 trillion:99=(:0009+:9991).
Should A impose the tax? Since A is a democracy, all that matters is whether the
wealth its citizenry receive in the natural (no tax) division exceeds what they would
get from the taxed division and the revenue from B. Obviously, that depends on . If
it were (implausibly) zero, then the tax would not alter either economy's growth rate
and would barely aect either's per-period value, and imposing the tax would simply
make A's citizenry almost 10% richer, leaving them with a value of $18.3 quadrillion.
If it were (implausibly) one, then the tax would completely preclude any growth in
B's economy, which would drastically reduce A's growth rate as well, and leave A's
citizenry vastly poorer in the long-run, with a value of only $76 trillion|less than
1=200th of the wealth they would have if A didn't tax B.
A little arithmetic leads to the remarkable result that, even if the proposed tax
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2.9988), A would be better o not imposing it. Under the tax, A's citizenry would
receive only $16.4 quadrillion. Because the costs of taxation ramp up as the tax rate
goes up, if it on net costly for A to impose a 10% tax, then a higher tax would be
even worse for A. And though a smaller tax might be protable, at some point the
amount being transferred is negligible.
The lesson here is that any signicant reduction in the taxed economy's growth
rate|even one so tiny that it would likely be undetectable by economists|renders
taxation undesirable, because the losses mount up so quickly over time that they
overwhelm the tax revenue. This, regardless of whether a state has the power to
impose the tax. In growth-based economies such as the ones discussed in this example,
it is plausible that any non-negliglible rate of tax would induce signicant, though
tiny, reductions in growth rates. Thus, it is also plausible that the levels of sensitivity
and integration seen in these states, together with their democratic governance, are
sucient to virtually eliminate the incentives for their governments to engage in
interstate coercion. In other words, the theory's predicted eects could be so large
empirically that coercion among these states never occurs.
If this is so, then the group of states discussed in this example should be relatively
harmonious. Their governments should trust one another, and generally believe in
and abide by the principle of \what's good for them is good for us." Mind you, the
economic interests of these states are still opposed in principle, because each citizenry
wants more wealth, and at any given time there is only so much wealth to go around.
But their interests are compatible in practice, because taxation to transfer wealth is
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through growth, and integration ensures that this enriches everyone. Thus, all states
can agree that each and every state should focus on its own, organic growth.
I conjecture that this theory of the \modern economic peace," so named because it
is theorized to derive mainly from the high sensitivity and integration common to what
are conventionally termed \modern" economies, explains the deep interstate comity
observed in Section 2. Among the United States, the European Union, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Iceland, and Norway, in particular, the balance of
power sometimes diers radically from the distribution of wealth because the former
is irrelevant to the latter. The US has no desire to revise the distribution of wealth in
line with its predominant power, because the taxation necessary to do so would on net
reduce the economic well-being of the US citizenry. Alterations in the distribution
of wealth are driven by underlying economic uctuations, not interstate coercion.
The US has nothing to lose if the other states get stronger, because they will not
use this power to revise the distribution of wealth, and it gains more powerful allies
against external threats. This is why it contributes to the empowerment of these
states. Just the same, these states rely heavily on the US for their security, because
they know it has no reason to take advantage of them. Quite the opposite: they
needn't even pay for protection, because the costs the US would suer if they were
coerced by an external power|deriving from the sensitivity of their economies and
their integration with the US economy|are enough to motivate it to defend them for
free. When these states argue, it is not over the balance of wealth, but instead to do
with the value of, and best way to provide, international public or club goods, such
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arguments, not force. In the rare cases when threats and punishment (e.g., referral
to the WTO) are used, they are always mild and do not disturb otherwise warm
relations, because both sides are mindful of the overwhelming commonality in their
general interests. In particular, wars among these states are unthinkable, because
they would not accomplish anything meaningful.
I will close this section with a brief summary of the theory. The incentives for
states to engage in coercion depend on three factors: rst, the degree to which tax-
ation will cause distortions in the taxed economy that lessen its value, called sensi-
tivity; second, the degree to which taxation will cause externalities in the untaxed
economy, called integration; and third, the degree to which the government imposing
the foreign tax internalizes its externalities on the the domestic economy. The costs
of taxation narrow the size of transfers that are protable to the taxing government,
and so constrain the transfers that can occur in equilibrium. Insensitive, unintegrated
dictatorships have the strongest incentives to engage in coercion when their power
permits, because the resulting taxation imposes few costs on the taxed or their own
economy, and the government partly ignores the costs to its own economy because
it does not care about its citizenry's prosperity. Sensitive, integrated democracies
have the least incentives to coerce each other, because the concomitant taxes are very
costly to both economies and are fully internalized by a government that will be held
accountable by its citizenry. Most countries for most of history were of the rst type,
and so coercion and war were rife and interstate relations watchful and marked by
greed. Since the Industrial Revolution, those countries that have come to rely on
growth and commerce to increase prosperity have few if any incentives to coerce eachChapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 158
other and so have harmonious relations. This explains why some nations get along so
well, the puzzle that served as the principal motivation for this paper, but it also has
the potential to answer other long-standing empirical questions. We turn to these
next.
3.5 Some Implications of the Theory
If the theory of the modern economic peace is correct, then it suggests new answers
for several standing empirical questions. First, it oers the potential for a new account
of the origins of dierent regime types and their frequencies in dierent historical
eras. It also promises an explanation for the observed long-run decline in organized
violence, as well as the rise of international economic liberalization in the industrial
era. Finally, it oers the possibility of a deep connection between rationalist and
constructivist theories of international relations.
We will discuss each of these in turn, but a disclaimer is merited. The point of this
discussion is not to argue for the correctness or even probability of the conjectures
described therein. Developing and testing these derivative theories would require
many more papers. Instead, the point is to show the versatility and potential power
of a well-developed theory of conicts of interest, such as this paper has endeavored
to begin. Disclaimer issued.
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Redux)
As modeled in this paper, regimes dier only in the extent to which they serve
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\democratic" regimes impose the least domestic taxes possible, and fully internalize
the domestic externalities caused by any foreign taxes they impose. Regime type
itself is taken to be exogenous and independent of the domestic economy's sensitivity
or integration with other economies. But what if these economic characteristics also
aected the viability of dictatorship versus democracy?
In the model developed here, the citizenry of a state is a unitary actor, and so it is
intuitive to think of a democracy as attempting to maximize the (single) citizenry's
well-being. More realistically, the citizenry can be broken down into groups|rich
and poor, dierent ethnicities, and so on. The situation among these groups is sim-
ilar to that among states: there is a distribution of political (and possibly military)
power, and a distribution of wealth, and the issue is whether comparatively power-
advantaged, wealth-deprived groups will use coercion to improve their lot. If, say,
two groups within a state had high incentives to engage in coercion, then a political
system with a relatively egalitarian distribution of power, such as democracy, would
be inherently unstable. Each group would look for an opportunity to seize power
and extract wealth from the other. This contest for supremacy could easily lead to a
coup or civil war, and the subsequent replacement of democracy with the elevation
of the victorious group into power over the other. Thus, in the presence of high in-
centives for coercion, there is no strong common interest between the groups for the
government to serve and any non-discriminatory government such as democracy is
unlikely to survive. Dictatorship, on the other hand, is more stable because it entails
a concentration of power in one group, which can more easily resist any attempt by
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By contrast, suppose that groups within a state had low or no incentives to en-
gage in coercion, because of high sensitivity and integration between their associated
economies. Much like the states discussed in the second example in the previous
section, these groups would have a strong common interest in preserving the natural
distribution of wealth, so that the surplus thereby created could be enjoyed by all. In
this environment, a dictatorship is inherently unstable. Because the dictatorship does
not fully internalize the domestic costs of taxation and so imposes higher taxes and
higher costs than would a democracy, the citizenry would have a common interest
in replacing the dictatorship with a less inecient democracy, freeing up the surplus
from reduced taxation. The democracy itself would be stabilized by the presence of
a strong common interest in preserving this surplus.
This answers a puzzle in the study of democracy and dictatorships that has been
made ever starker by the ood of empirical analyses suggesting that democracies
grow faster, become richer, and have a variety of other advantages over dictator-
ships. Namely, if democracies are so great, why are they so rare prior to the last
two centuries? It's not as though the ideas of direct and representative democracy
were discovered only with the writing of the US Constitution. And yet, since the
rise of agriculture and settled civilization, most states have been autocratic. The
answer suggested here is that, prior to the Industrial Revolution, the incentives for
states or intra-state groups to engage in coercion were high, so that democracy was
less stable than autocracy and so less prevalent. With the advent of industrialization
and growth-based economies, dictatorships grew more and more inecient relative to
democracies, and began to be replaced from within by democracy.Chapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 161
The Long-Run Prevalence of Violent Conict
If the origins of dictatorship and democracy are not independent of sensitivity
and integration, but rather consequences of them, then the theory described in this
paper has entirely economic foundations. In particular, the observed long-run decline
in organized violence, whether intra- or interstate, is only proximally explained by
political factors. Deep comity, whether intra- or inter-state, is at its roots driven
by the changing economic characteristics of sensitivity and integration that render
democracy more desirable as a system of governance, and as democratization spreads,
the full internalization of costly externalities that it brings only speeds the trend
toward comity.
As a side note, this is potentially a very broadly applicable theory. If individuals'
eorts to maximize their welfare leads to technological progress that increases pro-
ductivity, specialization, and trade, and this process reaches a \take-o" point where
productivity rises fast enough, then the spread of egalitarian political systems and po-
litical comity are not far behind. This description applies as well to micro-organisms
as it does to humans, and thus this is a theory, not of comity and conict among
states or groups, but of cooperation and conict among any population of evolving
entities. And it is an altogether dierent theory from those currently prevalent in
theoretical biology, based on populations playing prisoner's dilemmas where the issue
of how to divide the surplus from cooperation (peace, in the human context) does
not arise, and conict is never more than a eeting temptation to defect away.Chapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 162
The Liberalization of the International Economy
The prevailing treatment of many topics in international political economy is to
view costly barriers to trade, investment, currency exchange, and so on as responses
to intra-state dierences in economic interests. For example, import-competing rms
lobby for protectionist taris, even though these reduce the value of the domestic econ-
omy. From the point of view of the theory developed here, these are just non-military
instances of coercion, and their prevalence should respond to sensitivity, integration,
and democratization in the same way as the prevalence of the exaction of tribute or
the seizure of territory. This resolves a puzzle in the history of international economic
relations, similar to the one already discussed in the history of democratization. If in-
ternational economic openness is so benecial, then why are barriers to international
commerce so prevalent prior to Britain's liberalization in the 19th century? One an-
swer commonly given is that, as economic surplus and intra-state specialization grew
and the costs of trade fell, the potential gains from trade increased, and thus the
incentives to reduce barriers grew. But this is not fully convincing: if the gains from
commerce went up, but nothing else changed, the incentives to coercively alter the
natural distribution of these gains also should have increased, and we should see more
barriers, more trade wars, etc. But if sensitivity went up at the same time (as it did,
since the advent of liberalization coincided with the spread of the Industrial Revolu-
tion), then the incentives for coercion might have on net decreased. The subsequent
relaxing of trade barriers would result in increased integration, which would spur the
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Material Interests and Moral Sentiments
Finally, though this paper has focused on rationalist theories of international
behavior, there are non-rationalist explanations for deep interstate comity. In par-
ticular, constructivists argue that these nations simply hold dierent conceptions of
international politics, in which material interests and power politics give way to moral
sentiments guided by norms of cooperation and mutual assistance. These states have
constructed identities for themselves as moral actors, and thus coercion and war are
simply out of the bounds of appropriate behavior for them.
The question, as with the other empirical puzzles discussed in this section, is, if
we assume the constructivists are right, then why is it that cooperative conceptions
and moral identities did not arise earlier? After all, the behavior that appears to
result from these conceptions is, in the aggregate much less costly than the politics,
red in tooth and claw, that animated earlier states. Why was the social construction
of peaceful relations preceded by thousands of years of savagery?
The answer suggested here is that the essential moral sentiment of \what's good
for them is good for us" and the concomitant belief in the value of collective secu-
rity and mutual assistance did not win out|and could not have spread|until the
economic conditions of some states began to align their material interests with their
moral sentiments. Once sensitivity and integration rose in some states, the incentives
for coercion among them fell, and conditions became propitious for the rise of an in-
tellectual movement in support of moral governance and a more pacic international
community. In turn, the spread of these ideas would have further decreased the in-
centives for coercion, as this would now entail moral as well as material costs, andChapter 3: The Modern Economic Peace 164
accelerated the process.
Fleshing out the answers the theory of modern economic peace suggests for the
empirical puzzles discussed here would seem an important directions for future re-
search. Together, these extensions of the theory comprise a program for developing a
more general theory of the origins of conicts of interest, and the roles the presence
or absence of such conicts play in structuring domestic and international politics.Chapter 4
A Model of Arms Proliferation and
Prevention, with Muhammet Bas
Abstract:1 We develop a formal model of bargaining between two states, where
one can invest in developing nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its
eorts and progress over time, and use it to analyze the occurrence of proliferation
and war, the viability of non-proliferation agreements, and the role of intelligence-
gathering and estimates. We show that surprise proliferation, sporadic crises over
the uncertain progress of a proliferant's eorts, and \mistaken" preventive wars can
all arise endogenously in the model. We nd that much of the over-time variation in
behavior is driven, not by exogenous factors like the costs of war and the eects of
proliferation, but by stochastic elements such as when the proliferant's program will
make progress and when the other state will discover this. Moreover, while exoge-
1Please do not cite or distribute this paper without permission from the authors. Comments
are welcome and should be sent to mbas@gov.harvard.edu and andrew.j.coe@gmail.com. We are
grateful to Robert Powell for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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nous factors do inuence the probabilities of war, proliferation, and non-proliferation,
their eects are often counter-intuitive and non-monotonic. We also nd that non-
proliferation can be undermined by the possibility of a \better deal" once the prolif-
erant's program has made progress, suggesting that some states invest in a program
as much to secure a more favorable non-proliferation deal as to actually get nuclear
weapons.
4.1 Introduction
Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria are historical enemies of the United States
and have all pursued nuclear weapons, a technology that could radically shift the
balance of military power with the US in their favor. The US launched a decisive
war in 2003 in part to prevent Iraq from ever obtaining nuclear weapons. But the
US did not stop North Korea from doing so, despite long negotiations and at least
one crisis in which war was threatened, in 1993. And the US neither attacked nor
even threatened Libya and Syria with war as each pursued its own nuclear weapons
program. What explains the radically dierent outcomes across these cases?
Moreover, in the cases of Iraq and North Korea, there was also substantial vari-
ation in the relationship between each and the US over time. The nal outcomes of
war and successful proliferation occurred only after a long period of negotiations and
threats. During this period, the US intelligence community obsessively monitored
each state's nuclear weapons eorts, and sporadic crises arose in which the US pre-
pared itself for war, and sometimes even seemed on the verge of striking, only to end
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process and the occurrence and evanescence of crises?
Now the focus of many commentators on US foreign policy has shifted to Iran.2
Will the US (or its ally Israel) attack Iran in order to halt its nuclear progress? Or can
the two sides nd a non-proliferation deal that would satisfy both? Should the US
simply tolerate Iran's eorts? How will these decisions be inuenced by the progress
of Iran's nuclear eorts, and the estimates of this oered by the US intelligence
community?
Of course, these problems are not new (Gavin, 2004, 2009/10). They have recurred
since 1942, when the Soviet Union initiated a program to develop nuclear weapons
and the United States consider preventive strikes in response (Trachtenberg, 1988).
In fact, the questions for strategy posed here are general to any era in which a new
military technology is developed by one or several countries and begins to spread
to others. Nuclear weapons are a recent, consequential example, but the spread of
rearms to pre-colonial societies contacted by European explorers is also believed
to have caused or exacerbated numerous wars in the 19th century (Bas and Coe,
2012a). And this process may be ongoing|there is some evidence of a link between
arms transfers to developing countries and civil conicts there (Craft and Smaldone,
2003; Krause, 2004).
What explains the variation in the observed behavior of states during these episodes?
We try to answer this question by analyzing a formal model in which two states bar-
gain over disputed issues, while one potentially invests in and makes progress toward
acquiring a new technology (nuclear weapons, for concreteness) that, once deployed,
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would increase its bargaining power, and the other imperfectly observes its investment
and progress. Because weapons development and observation occur over time, the
model enables us to understand and make predictions about the sources of empirical
variation in behavior across both countries and time. It also allows us to study the
conditions under which agreements such as non-proliferation deals might be stable.
Surprisingly, we nd that much of the variation in behavior over time, and pos-
sibly also much of the variation across countries, is essentially due to chance. In
the absence of a non-proliferation deal, the specic instantiations of two stochastic
elements|a proliferant's halting progress toward acquiring nuclear weapons, and the
US's noisy observation of its eorts and current stage of development|can make the
dierence between a nal outcome of war or peace, prevention or proliferation, and
also determine whether the road to this outcome is quick and calm or long and tense.
These variables can lead to periods of slowly increasing apprehension about a prolif-
erant's nuclear progress, peaking in crises which may end in war or merely a repeat
of the cycle. Because, at an early stage of progress, there is little reason for the US to
worry about a proliferant's eorts, the random elements also make it possible for the
US to be surprised by a state's proliferation. In short, these variables can easily have
as large an impact on the outcome as more obvious factors such as the anticipated
costs of war and eects on the balance of power of a state's acquisition of nuclear
weapons.
War in the model is always preventive, but it can occur in two dierent situations.
First, the US might observe that the proliferant has reached a late stage of progress,
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for the US to prevent this. Second, even in the absence of any hard intelligence,
the US might become so suspicious that the proliferant has made it to a late stage
that it felt it could not wait for conrmation. This latter situation may lead to
\mistaken" wars, in the sense that US suspicions would turn out to be wrong after
the war, and the probability of a war being mistaken can be quite high for plausible
choices of the parameters. Although improvements in US monitoring lead the US
to bide its time and thus lower the probability of a mistaken war, they can increase
or decrease the overall probabilities of war or proliferation, depending on whether
they make possible an enforceable non-proliferation deal. In the absence of a deal, a
proliferant that is expected to more quickly master the technological prerequisites of
building nuclear weapons, whether by virtue of indigenous sophistication or outside
assistance, will lead the US to be more suspicious. This makes the US more willing to
attack even if it is less condent that intervention is required, and the probability of
war and mistaken war will rise. Thus, counterintuitively, the probability of eventual
proliferation is lower for a more sophisticated proliferant.
The existence of an enforceable deal strongly depends on the US ability to detect
cheating. More surprisingly, an increase in the expected speed at which a proliferant
will develop nuclear weapons can make a deal possible, because it may render the
US threat to go to war if the proliferant is caught cheating on the agreement more
credible. However, under other conditions it can undermine the existence of a deal
because it increases the proliferant's temptation to cheat. If an enforceable deal at
a late stage of progress exists, non-proliferation may be impossible to enforce at an
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and raise the overall probability of proliferation. Remarkably, a \proliferant" may
see securing a better non-proliferation deal, won by the progress it has made in its
nuclear program, as a possible benet that can motivate its early eorts as much as
the prospect of actually obtaining nuclear weapons.
Our work joins a spate of recent formal analyses of the strategic problems inherent
in states' arming and observation of one another's militaries, several of which are
focused on nuclear proliferation in particular. Our model is the rst to simultaneously
allow: bargaining over the disputed issues; the interaction to repeat indenitely over
time; the choice to arm to be endogenous; and the observation of these choices to
be imperfect. This combination of features is required to study over-time variation
in these interactions, and especially the role of intelligence gathering and estimates
therein. We also uniquely do not restrict equilibria to Markov strategies, which rule
out the possibility of arms control (e.g., non-proliferation deals) based on the threat of
future punishment, unlike other analyses of over-time arming, such as Fearon (2011a);
Jackson and Morelli (2009b); Powell (1993). With respect to nuclear weapons or any
other capability that requires substantial time for research and development before
deployment, ours is the rst to allow development to progress over time and to allow
observations to be made of both the choice to proliferate and the state of a proliferant's
program. Empirically, these features appear central to understanding the over-time
variation in the interaction between the US and particular proliferants, and we will
show that they may also be important to understanding the variation in nal outcomes
across proliferants.
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is that we must abstract away from other important aspects of this complicated
phenomenon. We ignore the possibility of costly, non-game-ending alternatives to
war, such as containment or limited preventive strikes; these are analyzed in Coe
(2012). We do not allow for asymmetric information about the preferences of the
actors, nor do we endogenize the decision to reveal or conceal weapons eorts, as
Baliga and Sj ostr om (2008) does. Asymmetric information in our model arises, not
from the use of mixed strategies of uncertain empirical plausibility, as in Debs and
Monteiro (2010); Fearon (2011a); Jackson and Morelli (2009b); Meirowitz and Sartori
(2008), but from the inherent stochasticity of mastering nuclear weapons technology.
We do not allow for private signals of the proliferant's weapons program, but assume
the signals are publicly, credibly revealed; Coe and Vaynman (2012) analyzes the
eect of public versus private signals on non-proliferation deals. Finally, we abstract
away from the issue of the direct (budgetary) cost of a nuclear weapons program,
taking these to be negligible; the cited studies all allow arming to be costly.3 Finally,
we eschew two other common features of these models due to their not being relevant,
in most cases, to the particular phenomenon of nuclear proliferation. First, we assume
that proliferation is one-sided, since the US already has nuclear weapons; Bas and
Coe (2012a) analyzes two-sided proliferation. Second, we assume the choice to invest
in nuclear weapons development is all or nothing: states do not try half-heartedly
3We have analyzed an extension of our model in which a weapons program is costly. The results
reported here are qualitatively unchanged, but some new results arise. The costs of a nuclear
program make it easier to enforce a non-proliferation deal since the proliferant would, all else equal,
like to avoid those costs. But they also increase the probability of war in the absence of a deal, since
a costly program eliminates some of the surplus of peace over war. These results are available from
the authors upon request; they are omitted here due to space constraints, as well as the desire to
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to proliferate. The cited studies that are not specic to nuclear weapons allow for a
choice of levels of arming, consistent with their principal goal of modeling conventional
military buildups.
The next section describes the elements of the model in more detail, as well as the
assumptions we make. Section 3 analyzes equilibria featuring proliferation and/or
war. Section 4 studies equilibria featuring a non-proliferation agreement. Section 5
concludes and oers implications for further theoretical and empirical research on pro-
liferation. Proofs of all the propositions, as well as specications for the simulations
we run for part of the analysis, appear in the appendix.
4.2 Setup of the Model
We model the interaction between two states, A and B, which we will sometimes
refer to as \the US" and \the proliferant," as they bargain over revisions to a prior
division of a composite of disputed issues, represented by the unit interval. In the
rst of innitely many discrete periods of time, A rst chooses whether or not to
start a war with B. If A attacks, the game ends with a costly lottery. The value of
this lottery to each player depends on the balance of military power between them,
represented by A's probability of victory in the war. The winner receives the entire
contested stake in this and all future rounds; the loser gets nothing. Regardless of
who wins, each player pays a positive cost of war, cA and cB respectively, in this and
all future periods.
If A chooses not to attack, then he must make a take-it-or-leave-it oer to B of
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war results, in which case the game ends with the same costly lottery. If he accepts
the proposal, the revision is implemented immediately and the associated payos are
realized.
Peaceful acceptance by B of A's oer is followed by an opportunity for B to
invest in developing a new military technology, \nuclear weapons" for concreteness,
which we assume A already possesses. To simplify the analysis, we assume that B's
development eort is all or nothing|the choice to pursue nuclear weapons is binary.
Our focus is on the choice of whether to develop the technology and the possibilities
for war or agreements to prevent this development; we are less concerned with a
state's optimum choice of the precise level of resources that should be invested.
B must master a series of technological prerequisites before he can actually de-
ploy nuclear weapons. These might include such hurdles as enriching uranium to a
sucient degree, re-processing plutonium from spent reactor fuel, building a viable
implosion device, and reducing a warhead to deliverable size. For simplicity of pre-
sentation, we assume there are only two prerequisites, so that there is a rst stage
of development labeled s1 where B has mastered neither, a second stage s2 where
B has mastered the rst prerequisite, and a third stage n where has mastered both
and is assumed to possess nuclear weapons. However, the results can be easily (but
tediously) extended to any nite number of stages. We assume that B begins the
game in s1, and that this is common knowledge.
The overcoming of these hurdles is partly a result of trial-and-error, so that the
time at which B will master one and then the next cannot be perfectly predicted by
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advances to s2 in that round with probability  2 (0;1), goes all the way to acquiring
nuclear weapons in that round with probability  2 (0;1), and remains at s1 with
probability 1   . If B begins a (later) round in s2 and invests, then he advances to
acquiring nuclear weapons in that round with probability  2 (0;1), and remains at
s2 with probability 1   .
This representation of the weapons development process is the central analytical
innovation of this paper; many of our results ow from it. It can be thought of as
the simplest possible representation of the empirical fact that the development of
any complex technology is both progressive and stochastic. Although B's chances
of advancing to a given stage depend only on his current stage and his decision to
continue trying, his probability of acquiring nuclear weapons will increase over time,
and in the absence of good intelligence, A's estimate of his time to acquiring nuclear
weapons will decrease over time.
If B's development eort is successful and he acquires nuclear weapons, then the
balance of power in the next period (A's probability of victory in war) shifts. Before
B has the weapons, the balance of power is p; after, the balance is pn. Naturally,
we assume that p > pn, so that having nuclear weapons in war is better than not.
We also assume that B's successful acquisition of nuclear weapons immediately be-
comes common knowledge (e.g., because of a successful and easily observable test
detonation).
The rst period ends after B's progress or lack thereof is determined. The next
period, and every subsequent period, diers in structure from the rst only in that
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knowledge. The rst signal indicates whether B invested in the last period or not;
the second indicates B's current stage of progress. If B did invest in the previous
period, then with probability  > 1=2 A receives a signal that he did, and with
probability 1    A receives a signal that he did not. If B did not invest, then A
receives a signal that he did not with probability 1. Thus, A's intelligence on B's
investment is noisy, but for simplicity there are no false positives. A will receive a true
signal of B's current stage with probability , and a \null," uninformative signal with
probability 1   . Thus, A's intelligence on B's progress is spotty, but accurate. We
will show later that allowing for false positive signals of investment, or false signals
of stage, would complicate the analysis but not qualitatively alter the results.
Each player's utility is assumed to be linear in his share of the value of the con-
tested issues. Settlements are labeled by the share going to A: the settlement in which
A receives q and B receives 1   q is called q. The players are assumed to discount
future consumption at a common rate of  < 1 per period. Players' preferences and
all the exogenous parameters of the game are common knowledge.
4.3 Proliferation and War
We use backward induction to nd the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the
model. We will rst show that the subgame in which B has acquired nuclear weapons
has a unique equilibrium outcome. We then consider earlier subgames, restricting
ourselves to equilibria in which there is no non-proliferation agreement, called \no-
deal" equilibria; these agreements will explored in Section 4. First we analzye the
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of an earlier signal that B was in the second stage). We then consider the \initial"
subgames in which B is not known to be at the second stage.
B Has Obtained Nuclear Weapons
We begin with the subgame where both players have nuclear weapons. Proposition
4.1 gives the unique equilibrium of this subgame:
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that B has acquired nuclear weapons. In every period, A
will oer q = pn + cB, and B will accept q  pn + cB. No war will occur.
The intuition here is that once B has acquired nuclear weapons, there will no
further shifts in the balance of power and no further cause for B to invest, and any
further intelligence signals will be irrelevant. Thus, A does best by giving B just
enough to cause him to prefer peace to war, and A keeps the rest for himself. Even
though A holds B to this minimum, B still benets from having the weapons. Because
they shift the balance of power in his favor and thus raise his value for war, then to
avoid war, A must give him a larger share than he would get if he didn't have the
weapons. Thus, the essence of the interactions in earlier subgames, before B has
nuclear weapons, is that B has an incentive to pursue them while A has an incentive
to prevent B from getting them.
B Is Known to Be in Second Stage
Now back up to earlier in the game, when B has not yet acquired nuclear weapons,
but is known with certainty by A to be in the second stage|because at some previous
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will show that, in the absence of a deal, B will always invest in a nuclear program.
We also analyze the conditions under which A will either tolerate this program or go
to war to stop it, and show that war can occur due to B's inability to commit either
to avoid taking advantage of weapons once he has them, or to pursuing them when
he does not.
A \no-deal" equilibrium is dened as one in which A's equilibrium strategy does
not depend directly on whether B invested in any previous period and the signals A
receives thereof. By contrast, a \deal" equilibrium is one in which A reacts directly
to whether (he observed) B investing in the past, as such investment can be thought
of as cheating on a (possibly implicit) deal. Proposition 4.2 characterizes the no-deal
equilibria when B has reached the second stage, and this is known to A.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that B is in the second stage and this is common knowl-
edge. If:
 p cA+ 
1 (p pn) < 1+ 
1 (cA+cB), the unique no-deal equilibrium outcome is
steady investment by B that is tolerated by A, resulting in eventual proliferation;
 p cA+ 
1 (p pn) > 1+ 
1 (cA+cB), the unique no-deal equilibrium outcome
is immediate war;
 p cA + 
1 (p pn) = 1+ 
1 (cA +cB), both types of no-deal equilibrium exist,
but no others.
To understand this result, consider B's perspective. In the absence of a deal, A
will not reward non-investment, or equivalently, penalize investment, so it makes sense
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we assumed away any direct costs of a nuclear program). As Proposition 4.1 shows,
once B is nuclear-armed, A will oer B just enough to make him indierent between
war and peace. Before B has nuclear weapons, he is weaker (that is, he expects to
do less well in a war), and A will concede even less, because B will still prefer this to
war and, in the absence of a deal, there is no reason for A to do otherwise. Thus, B
can expect that acquiring nuclear weapons will bring bigger concessions from A, and
so it always makes sense to invest in the absence of a deal.
Now consider A's perspective. In a hypothetical world without nuclear weapons,
A would oer B just enough of a compromise on their disputed issues to make B
indierent between accepting the oer and going to war|there is simply no reason
for A to be any more generous than that. From A's perspective, the problem with B
pursuing nuclear weapons is that, once B has acquired them, A will have to make a
more generous oer in order to avoid war. In the absence of a deal, A really only has
two choices for what to do. First, A could attack B in order to try to prevent the
latter from ever getting the weapons. Second, A could tolerate B's nuclear program.
If A chooses toleration, then until B gets nuclear weapons, A can oer B even less
than he would in the hypothetical non-nuclear world, because he can take advantage
of B's expectation that the nuclear program will eventually be successful and lead
to larger concessions from A. If instead A goes to war, there will be no proliferation
and subsequent concessions to B, but A will no longer have the chance to peacefully
exploit B's hopes, and will lose the surplus from peace (the avoided costs of war) he
would have enjoyed even once B became nuclear-armed.
Proposition 4.2 speci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represents the immediate payo of war for A (p   cA) and the gain from avoiding
the change in concessions A would have to make in perpetuity after B had obtained
nuclear weapons, weighted by the probability of B's program succeeding in the current
period ( 
1 (p pn)). The right-hand side represents, in its rst term, the immediate
payo of toleration: 1 is the most A could get in this period if B was willing to accept
zero concessions for now in order to avoid war. Its second term represents the surplus
A will enjoy from peace if B's investment this round is successful ( 
1 (cA + cB)). If
the left-hand side is larger, then A is better o tolerating B's program and taking
advantage of B's hopes in the meantime. If it is smaller, then A is better o going
to war to stop it before it is successful.
The root cause of war, when it occurs, is a set of linked commitment problems.
Because, in the absence of a deal, B always has something to gain from acquiring,
and therefore developing, nuclear weapons, B cannot commit either to not taking
advantage of the weapons once acquired to extract more concessions from A, or to
not pursuing them. Because this shift in power will be disadvantageous for A, B will
have to be willing to agree to less concessions while the nuclear program is ongoing
in order to satisfy A and avoid war. But B cannot accept anything less than zero
concessions; he cannot yield any more than the whole set of disputed issues at a given
point in time. If the shift resulting from B's proliferation is large enough, this will
not suce to avert war.
War is more like to occur when A is stronger (p is higher). Then there is less for
A to gain from taking advantage of B while his program is ongoing, and more to lose
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surplus to lose from war, and if cA is smaller there is also less for A to gain from taking
advantage of B prior to proliferation. More surprisingly, the eect of the probability
that B's program is successful in a given period () is not always to raise the likelihood
of war. One might think that, the more likely B's program is to succeed, the sooner
A will expect B to obtain the weapons and extract a better oer, thus making the
commitment problem more severe and war more likely. But this only happens if the
shift in power from proliferation exceeds the costs of war (p   pn > cA + cB). When
instead p   pn < cA + cB, the higher likelihood of proliferation is outweighed by the
increased advantage A can take of B's more optimistic hopes for success while the
program is ongoing, and thus the incentives for war relative to toleration decrease.
Next we turn to the previous subgames, in which B may or may not have reached
the second stage, but this is not known with certainty by A.
B Is not Known to Be in Second Stage
We divide the analysis of earlier periods in the game into two parts. First we
will consider what might happen, if once B has reached the second stage and A
knows this, there will be toleration rather than war. We will show that this means
that war will never happen in equilibrium, and in the absence of a deal, proliferation
is inevitable. Second, we will examine what might happen at earlier times if the
discovery by A that B is at the second stage would lead to immediate war. We will
show that, without a deal, A will tolerate B's investment initially, but in the absence
of contrary evidence will grow increasingly suspicious that B has covertly reached the
second stage. If A becomes suciently convinced B has done so, there will be war.Chapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 181
Whether this happens, whether the war is \mistaken," and the character of the road
to war or eventual proliferation will depend on the (stochastic) information that A's
eorts to monitor the progress of B's program produce.
Proposition 4.3 shows that, if A is willing to tolerate B's program when it is known
to have reached the second stage of development, then he will tolerate it earlier as
well. In this case, there is no chance of war occurring in equilibrium: B will pursue
nuclear weapons and eventually obtain them, without violent interference from A.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that war cannot happen in any equilibrium when B is in
the second stage and this is common knowledge. Then steady, tolerated investment is
the unique no-deal equilibrium of the game.
There is a simple intuition for this result. When A thinks B might still be in the
rst stage, then his estimate of the probability of proliferation in a given period is
lower than if he knew B to have reached the second stage, because if B is in the rst
stage he would have to master both stages to get nuclear weapons. The lower the per-
period probability of B obtaining nuclear weapons, the less severe is the commitment
problem, because A expects the disadvantageous shift in the balance of power to
occur later than it otherwise would. Thus A is more willing to tolerate B's program
as opposed to attacking it, relative to the situation where A is sure the program is in
the second stage. So, if A is willing to tolerate a known second-stage program, then
he will nd it even easier to tolerate a possibly less-advanced program. Given this, B
will certainly invest, knowing that this will lead not to war but to better concessions
from A. In the absence of a deal, eventual proliferation is inevitable.
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development would lead to an immediate attack by A? How will this aect behavior
earlier in the game? To answer these questions, we will assume that, should A detect
B at the second stage, there will be war in equilibrium. That is, from Proposition
4.2, we assume that p cA+ 
1 (p pn) < 1+ 
1 (cA+cB). Also, we will once again
exclude consideration of deal equilibria in which A's equilibrium strategy depends
directly on whether B invested in any previous period and the signals A receives
thereof. These will be studied in the following section.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose that when B is in the second stage and this is common
knowledge, immediate war is the equilibrium outcome. Then in the unique non-deal
equilibrium of the game, B always invests, given the chance. In this equilibrium, A
tolerates B's program until he receives either a signal that it has reached the second
stage, or some k 2 N0[1 consecutive null signals of its stage, and then goes to war.
Proposition 4.4 shows that this leaves only equilibria in which B always invests,
given the chance. Faced with B's steady investment, A bides his time so long as he
is suciently condent that B's program remains in the rst stage of development.
But when A detects that B's program has reached the second stage, or when A has
waited long enough without intelligence on B's stage, then A attacks rather than wait
any longer and bear further risk of proliferation.
To see how the latter can happen, consider A's perspective. If A receives a signal
that B remains in the rst stage, then he can assume that B's program is not going
well and safely wait and see (unless the probability that B jumps from the rst stage
to nuclear weapons, or , is so high that it makes sense for A to attack at the very
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he can immediately attack and suer no more risk of proliferation. But what if he
receives no (a \null") signal of B's stage? Then A will not know for sure what stage
B's program is in. Instead, he must estimate the probability that B has at some
point covertly advanced to the second stage.
Corollary 4.1. After receiving i 2 N consecutive null signals of B's stage since the
beginning of the game or the last signal that B is in the rst stage, A's estimate of the
probability that B's program has reached the second stage is
Pi
j=1(1 )i j(1 )j
(1 )i+
Pi
j=1(1 )i j(1 )j.
If   , then this probability converges to 1 as i ! 1. If  < , it converges to  
 .
Corollary 4.1 species A's estimate after a given time without a stage signal. To
understand this result, consider that in each period without a signal of B's stage, A
must weigh two contradictory pieces of evidence. On the one hand, B has not yet
gotten nuclear weapons, which suggests that in the last period his program was in
the rst stage rather than the second. On the other hand, time has passed and A
knows B has been trying, so it is possible his program has mastered the rst stage
and moved to the second. Which of these weighs most heavily depends on whether it
is easier for B to master the rst stage or the second (i.e., whether  is greater than
). If the rst stage is easier, then over time, in the absence of an informative signal
of B's stage, A will eventually become almost sure that B has reached the second
stage: intuitively, it is increasingly likely that B has mastered the easy stage but
gotten stuck in the hard one. Once A has waited long enough without intelligence,
and is condent enough that B has covertly reached the second stage, he attacks. If
instead the second stage is easier, then even after a great deal of time, A will still
not be sure which stage B's program is at: he could be stuck at either stage, and theChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 184
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Figure 4.1: A grows more suspicious over time, but may never be certain
harder it is to master the rst relative to the second, the more likely it is he remains
at the rst. Then it may be the case that although A is increasingly condent over
time that B has reached the second stage, he may never be sure enough to justify
attacking. Figure 1 illustrates the change in A's estimate as he waits without new
stage intelligence for several dierent combinations of  and .
The relatively simple description of this equilibrium conceals the variation in be-
havior that can occur as it unfolds. This variation is driven entirely by the chance
successes of both B's nuclear program and A's intelligence-gathering. As a result of
these stochastic elements, the game can end peacefully or violently, and with the oc-
currence of proliferation or its prevention. The nal outcome can be reached quicklyChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 185
or slowly, and relations in the meantime can be pacic or crisis-prone. There are four
generic kinds of paths along which the equilibrium might travel, described here and
illustrated in Figure 2.
1. A tolerates B's investment for the few few years as it is unlikely to be success-
ful soon. But B's program masters both stages of development unexpectedly
quickly, and B acquires nuclear weapons. The process is calm and ends quickly
in peaceful proliferation. This ts the pattern of the Soviet Union's nuclear
weapons program from 1945 to 1949.
2. A is content to tolerate B's program initially, but receives intelligence that the
program has advanced to the second stage and immediately attacks to stop the
program. The process is quick and seems calm, but ends violently. This ts the
period of Iraq's program in the late 70s and early 80s, and Syria's in the mid
2000s, when their completion of a reactor from which weapons-grade plutonium
might be derived led to attack by Israel.
3. Lacking recent intelligence on B's program, A grows increasingly apprehensive
about the prospect of its imminent success. A crisis arises and war occurs. The
process is potentially long and ends violently. This might correspond to the
period of Israel's program in the 60s, when Egypt attacked, perhaps because of
fears that Israel nearly had the bomb.
4. Lacking recent intelligence, A's suspicions become persuasive and a crisis arises.
War is threatened and appears imminent, but the arrival of intelligence that B's
program remains in the rst stage defuses the crisis, and the process continues.Chapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 186
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Figure 4.2: There are many possible paths through the equilibrium
The process is drawn-out, tense, and dangerous. This might t the pattern of
Iraq's suspected programs during the 1990s, when the US prepared for war until
inspectors revealed that these programs remained rudimentary.
Notice that when war occurs in this equilibrium, its purpose is always to prevent
proliferation, but there are two dierent situations in which it can happen. First, A
might receive denitive intelligence that B's program has reached the second stage of
development, leading A to attack. Second, A might lack reliable intelligence on B's
program, but estimate that its likely progress meant that B would soon go nuclear,
and attack based on this (uncertain) estimate. The common thread between the
two is that, whether by virtue of positive intelligence or the passage of time, A hasChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 187
become suciently condent that B's program has reached the second stage that
he feels compelled to strike. The dierence is that, in the rst situation, A can be
certain that it is better to attack now than to wait, whereas in the second, it might
turn out that B's program remained stuck in the rst stage so that, in retrospect,
it would have been better for A to wait and defer the costs of an unnecessary war.
Going to war based on an estimate, rather than reliable information, is rational for
A but poses the risk that the war was a \mistake." To be clear, if this happens A is
not mistaken about B's intentions or eorts|B is trying to obtain nuclear weapons,
after all|but is wrong about the progress he has made and thus the imminence of
his success. A might well regret such a war, even though it was rational.
Note also that the stochastic elements of the game (nuclear program progress
and intelligence-gathering) determine which kind of path is actually observed and
are therefore central to explaining the variation we see empirically. Because the
exogenous parameters (, , , p, pn, cA, cB, ) are relatively stable over time, and all
the other equilibria (as we shall see) display stable non-proliferation after some initial
period, the model suggests that much of the over-time variation in behavior observed
between the US and particular proliferants is driven by the stochastic elements. This
might also be true for variation in behavior across proliferants, but the exogenous
parameters do change substantially across cases and so may explain some of the cross-
country variation. These features of the equilibrium carry important implications for
the empirical study of proliferation, and the limitations thereof, to which we will
return in the concluding section.
The reader might worry that these claims are an artifact of our simpli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sentations of the development of nuclear weapons and the gathering of intelligence
about it, but this worry is unfounded. Recall rst that we assumed a program had
just two stages to master prior to obtaining nuclear weapons. In fact, allowing for
more than two stages would not alter our conclusions. All that matters is that there
is a stage in which B could be discovered that would (in some equilibrium) lead to
immediate attack by A, and a stage which, if observed, would lead A to wait and see.
The presence of stages occurring before, after, or between these two will certainly
complicate A's estimates and strategy. But the basic picture, of A waiting until his
concern that B has reached a threatening stage of development becomes persuasive
before attacking, remains unaltered.
Second, recall that we assumed that A's intelligence would suer neither from false
positive signals of investment nor from false signals of stage. Since, in the equilibria
studied in this section, B always invests given the opportunity, and A knows this,
the signals of investment A receives are actually irrelevant. If A receives a signal of
investment, it only conrms what he already knows; if instead he receives a signal
that B did not invest, he disregards it as erroneous. Obviously then, it does not
matter whether the signals are true or false. However, A does pay close attention to
signals of B's stage. If false negatives (A receives a rst-stage signal when in fact B
has reached the second) are possible, then the receipt of a rst-stage signal will still
decrease A's estimate of the probability that B has reached the second stage, but
not all the way to zero. Crises of the kind that occur in the third and fourth paths
listed above will still defuse if A receives one or more rst-stage signals, but more
gradually. And if false positives (A receives a second-stage signal when B remains inChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 189
the rst) are possible, A might need more than one second-stage signal to arouse his
suspicions to the point of attacking. Both types of false stage signal would increase
the likelihood of mistaken war, because they make attacks without surety that B is
in the second-stage more likely.
We will return to these generalizations of our model in the next section, but suce
it to say that all of them undermine the possibility of a non-proliferation deal because
they erode the quality of the information that A can use to enforce a deal. They thus
make it more likely that the non-deal equilibrium analyzed in this section is the only
equilibrium. With these worries laid to rest, we can turn to the role played by the
exogenous parameters of our model.
The Eects of the Exogenous Parameters
Although the stochastic elements of the game determine the particular path
through the game that occurs, the exogenous parameters determine the probabili-
ties of the dierent paths. Thus, these parameters can still have substantial eects on
the expected behavior, and knowledge of these eects can serve two purposes. First,
although it is hard to see how the US or a proliferant could aect the stochastic
elements of the game, the exogenous parameters are potentially manipulable, at least
over the longer term. So, as examples, the US might try to strengthen its intelligence-
gathering capabilities (increasing ), and a proliferant might attempt to secure outside
assistance for its nuclear program (increasing  and/or ). Knowledge of the eects
of the exogenous parameters would enable us to predict how changes in the relevant
policies might alter the likelihood of dierent outcomes such as war and proliferation.Chapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 190
Second, these parameters vary substantially from country to country. Some potential
proliferants are more technologically sophisticated than others, and the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by some would have a larger eect on the balance of power than
others, for example. Thus, if we wish to explain why the interaction between the US
and Iraq worked out one way, but that between the US and China during the latter's
nuclear program another way, then we need to know how dierences in exogenous
parameters might have contributed to dierent outcomes.
Unfortunately, the characterization of equilibrium given in Proposition 4.4 and
Corollary 4.1 is not precise enough to allow us to derive comparative statics on these
parameters. We require exact solutions for the equilibrium at each possible combina-
tion of parameter values, which in turn means solving for both the amount of time
A is willing to wait before attacking (k) and the set of oers he makes to B on their
disputed issues as he waits (labeled ~ qk), which itself depends on k. The solution for
k is governed by a trade-o. Waiting longer gives A more time to enjoy the surplus
from peace, as well as more time for intelligence on B's program to come in, possibly
revealing that B remains at the rst stage, so that A needn't go to war after all. But
it also exposes A to a greater risk that B's program will succeed, forcing A to oer
better concessions. The solution for ~ qk is determined by A's desire to give B just
enough concessions to avoid war while he waits, subject to the constraint that A can
do no better in a period than to concede nothing to B (even if B would accept even
less than this).
For technical reasons described in the appendix, there is no closed-form analytical
solution for k and ~ qk, and so we must instead nd numerical solutions for a chosen setChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 191
of parameter combinations. A detailed description of the algorithm we use, as well
as the statement and proof of some lemmas necessary to demonstrate the algorithm's
validity, can be found in the appendix.4 Here, we describe the particular set of
parameter combinations that we chose to study and the results we obtain.
Our algorithm is computationally intensive, so the large number of independent
parameters (eight: , , , p, pn, cA, cB, and ) forces us to confront the curse of
dimensionality. Our choice of the range of values these parameters could take on was
motivated by our judgments about what is empirically plausible, but our choice of the
size of the intervals into which each range is divided was driven by the time available
for computation. For each of the exogenous parameters listed below, we specify the
range that was used and the size of the intervals. We also describe our rationale for
the chosen range.
 : the players' discount rate, from 0.9 to 0.999 with an interval of 0.03 between
values. To know what discount rates are plausible, we need to establish the
length of a period in our game. In principle, B could be continuously making
decisions about whether to start or stop investment, the mastery of a particular
stage could come at any point in time, and A could be continuously negotiating
oers with B, monitoring its investment and progress, and deciding whether or
not to attack. In practice, there is bound to be some delay between A's receipt
of a new intelligence discovery, his decision to attack, and the execution of the
attack, even if the option under consideration is less than a full-on invasion.
Focusing on the case of the United States, it seems dicult to believe that,
4The R code for running the algorithm can be found on the authors' websites.Chapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 192
upon a reliable intelligence discovery that a proliferant's program had advanced
to a stage that would justify war, options could be considered, a decision made,
forces deployed, and an attack executed in less than a few months (in the case
of a more limited campaign) to a year (in the case of a full invasion). Given a
plausible range of discount rates for a year of 0.9 to 0.99, the range we chose
accommodates the possibility that a period could eectively be anywhere from
three months to a year in length.
 : the per-period probability that A receives a true signal of the stage of B's
program, from 0.1 to 0.5 with interval 0.2. Even if a period were a year long, it is
dicult to imagine that the US intelligence community would obtain denitive
information on the stage of a proliferant's program more than once every two
years. And it is also hard to see this happening less than once every ten years.
 : the per-period probability that B masters the rst stage of development,
from 0.1 to 0.5 with interval 0.05. If a period is a year, then  = 0:1 means that
the proliferant is expected to take 10 years to master the rst stage; it is hard
to imagine the US paying any attention if proliferation is more than 10 years
away. At the other end, it is implausible that a proliferant, once the US was
watching, could be expected to master the rst stage (say, uranium enrichment
or plutonium re-processing) in less than six months.
 : the per-period probability that B masters the second stage, given that he
has mastered the rst, and obtains nuclear weapons, from 0.1 to 0.5 with in-
terval 0.05. The same rationale as with the rst stage applies here; at theChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 193
lower end, the US would not even pay attention, while at the higher, successful
weapon design and manufacture would surely not take less than six months in
expectation.
 p: the balance of power before B gets nuclear weapons, from 0.7 to 0.999 with
interval 0.05. Consistent again with thinking of A as the US, or even any state
whose threat to a potential proliferant was sucient to cause the latter to seek
nuclear weapons, we limit the range so that A begins with military superiority
over B, whether overwhelming or merely substantial.
 pn: the balance of power after B gets nuclear weapons, from 0.5 to p with
interval 0.05. Given that we assumed A already had nuclear weapons and was
conventionally superior, it seems hard to believe that B's acquisition of nuclear
weapons would do more than even the odds. And the upper end is restricted
to be no more than p, since nuclear weapons won't hurt B's chances in war.
 cA, cB: the per-period cost of war for A and B, from 0.01 to 0.05 with interval
0.02. It is hard to see a conict costing more than 5% of the value of what's
at stake in perpetuity|at the highest chosen discount rate, this is equivalent
to destroying all of the stakes' value for ve years. By contrast, the lower end
of the cost range at the lowest discount rate is equivalent to ruining the stakes
under contention for a few days.
We focus the discussion on the eects of changes in intelligence-gathering, the
speed of weapons development, and the post-proliferation balance of power (i.e., ,
/, and pn, respectively) on the time A is willing to wait without new stage intelli-Chapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 194
gence (i.e., k) and the probabilities of eventual proliferation, war, and mistaken war.
These parameters seem the most easily manipulable or most variable across countries,
and thus the most useful for informing policy-making and empirical work. Figure 3
illustrates the results.
First suppose that  increases. If the change is small, k does not change, but if it
is larger, then k also increases. The intuition is that a modest increase in A's ability
to gather intelligence about B's stage isn't enough to motivate A to wait another
period before attacking, but a larger increase lessens the risk of proliferation enough
that A will be more patient. Generally, the probability of war increases and that of
proliferation decreases. This is because A simply becomes more likely to catch B in
the second stage. But for small values of , the opposite can happen (war is less
likely, proliferation more likely) because as  rises A waits longer before attacking,
hoping to get a new signal. The probability of mistaken war drops rapidly as  rises,
because the wars that happen are increasingly likely to result from a second-stage
signal rather than A's suspicions growing over time.
Next, suppose that  increases. This generally decreases k, although at high levels
of , bigger changes are necessary to alter k. The easier the rst stage is to master,
the more quickly A will come to believe that B has covertly reached the second stage
in the absence of denitive intelligence, and the less time A will wait before attacking.
This eect is less pronounced at high levels of  because A is already only willing to
wait a few periods. Counterintuitively, the probability of proliferation decreases, and
that of war increases, as A more than compensates for the higher sophistication of B's
early program by attacking earlier. If k decreases, then the probability of mistakenChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 195
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war increases substantially, but if k remains the same, this probability goes down.
The former is as expected (the less A waits, the more likely he is to be mistaken when
he attacks), but the latter is interesting. What happens is that as  rises, but k stays
the same, B is more likely to make it to the second stage and thus more likely to be
detected there, lessening the proportion of wars that are mistaken.
Now consider an increase in . The eect on k is the similar to that of : k gener-
ally decreases, but bigger changes are necessary once  is high because A is already
unwilling to wait more than a few periods. However, the eects on the probabilities
of dierent outcomes are dierent. If k does not change, then the probability of pro-
liferation increases and that of war decreases: if A is willing to wait just as long, but
B's program is speedier, then it is more likely to be successful and thereby avert war.
If instead k decreases, then the opposite happens, similar to the eect with : A more
than compensates for the increased speed of B's program by attacking earlier. As
expected, if k stays the same, then so does the probability of mistaken war, but the
latter rises whenever k decreases.
Finally, consider an increase in pn. This will generally increase k, though for
small levels of pn, large changes are required. Because larger pn means the downside
of allowing B to get away with proliferation is less severe (i.e., the resulting shift
in power is smaller), A is willing to wait longer to try to delay the costs of war.
Unsurprisingly, if k stays the same, then the probabilities of proliferation, war, and
mistaken war are also constant, but if k increases, then proliferation becomes more
likely, and war and mistaken war less likely.
Some surprising implications follow from these results. First, although better in-Chapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 197
telligence capabilities would lessen the likelihood of mistaken wars, they would not
actually decrease the probability of proliferation unless intelligence was already rea-
sonably procient, and if intelligence was poor to start, slight improvements could
actually increase the chance of proliferation. Second, greater technological sophisti-
cation or outside assistance is not necessarily advantageous for a proliferant, as they
may lead its enemy to attack sooner and lower the risk of proliferation, thus leaving
the proliferant worse o in expectation. On the other hand, if international eorts
to raise the diculty of the stages of weapons development (e.g., better oversight of
nuclear energy rms and tracking of scientists and engineers with relevant expertise)
have only modest success, they may have the unintended side eect of increasing the
probabilities of both proliferation and mistaken wars. Finally, eorts on the part of
the United States to improve its ability to win a war with a nuclear-armed opponent,
such as the development of missile defenses and eective preemptive strike capabil-
ities, if successful, may actually increase the risk of proliferation and lessen that of
war.
We conclude this section by summarizing the most important results. First, the
game is essentially over once B acquires nuclear weapons: A will have to live with
this by making bigger concessions, in recognition of the changed balance of power.
Second, in the absence of a deal that gives B incentives not to pursue nuclear weapons,
he will always invest in a program. Whether A tolerates this or attacks to stop it
depends on the anticipated eect of proliferation on the balance of power, the costs
of war, and, at the last observable stage of progress of B's program, the speed with
which the program is expected to succeed. If, having discovered B in the 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of development, A would not attack, then he would never attack and proliferation is
inevitable. If A would attack at the last stage, then the two sides play a waiting game
until A discovers B to be in this stage, in which B invests and A's suspicions that
he has made dangerous progress grow if reassuring intelligence is not forthcoming.
This can unfold in many dierent ways: early toleration can give rise to surprise
proliferation; sudden intelligence discoveries can lead to immediate war; mounting
apprehension can lead to crises and thence to war or be defused. The occurrence of
one path over another is entirely by chance, as B's program may or may not advance,
and A's intelligence may or may not detect this. However, deterministic factors like
the quality of A's intelligence service or the sophistication of B's program can aect
the relative probability of dierent paths, often in subtle and surprising ways. These
eects mean that sometimes policy interventions that seem sound can lead to serious
unintended consequences.
Still, in some sense we have told only half the story. When might the two sides be
able to avert both proliferation and war with an agreement? We turn to this question
next.
4.4 Non-Proliferation Agreements
In this section we will investigate the possibility that the two players could avoid
both proliferation and war by agreeing to non-proliferation. In the equilibria analyzed
here, B refrains from investment in exchange for incentives from A. The agreements
are enforced by the threat of the two sides reverting to the equilibria studied in the
previous section. These agreements are not always viable, because it may well beChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 199
that even given the most generous incentives A would be willing to oer, B would
still prefer to renege on a deal and try to acquire nuclear weapons covertly. Indeed,
we will see that the existence of non-proliferation equilibria depends very heavily
on what sort of equilibrium would obtain in the absence of an agreement. We rst
consider deals starting from when A knows that B's program has reached the second
stage, and then we will study the possibility of earlier deals that might prevent any
investment in a weapons program on B's part.
It is worth noting here that the conception of non-proliferation, itself a specic
type of arms control, used here is one of cooperation rather than coordination. That
is, with one special exception we will discuss, non-proliferation here is not a matter of
the players coordinating on an equilibrium (i.e., non-proliferation) that both would
prefer to some other equilibrium (i.e., proliferation and war). Instead, arms control
here is a matter of the two players cooperating to achieve higher values while one or
both face temptations to defect. Our own reading of the empirical record of nuclear
non-proliferation suggests that cooperation is the more applicable view.
B Is Known to Be in Second Stage
First we will show that the existence of an enforceable non-proliferation deal de-
pends on whether A can threaten B with war in the absence of a deal. Then we show
that, if A can threaten war, the viability of a deal depends on how the severity of this
threat compares with the temptation for B to renege on an agreement. We will see
that parameters such as the sophistication of B's program, the costs of war to stop
it, and the consequences of proliferation can have surprising eects on the viabilityChapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 200
of a deal.
Proposition 4.5. If there is no equilibrium of the overall game, or of the subgame in
which B is known to be in the second stage, that features a positive probability of war,
then there is also no equilibrium with a deal in either the whole game or the subgame.
To understand this result, notice that in any non-proliferation deal, two things
must be true. First, the value B gets from a deal must be at least a little higher
than what he would get without the deal, because otherwise he has no reason not to
cheat on the deal|that is, to invest in a weapons program|in the hopes of doing
even better once he has nuclear weapons. Second, the value A gets from a deal must
be no less than the value he would get without a deal, because otherwise A would
rather not accept the deal in the rst place. Now, the only way it can simultaneously
be true that A gets at least the same value, and B gets a higher value, with a deal
than without it, is if going without a deal means doing something that destroys part
of the game's total value. In our model, the only thing that destroys value is war; so
if no non-deal equilibrium features war, then there is no surplus value with which A
can encourage B not to invest while still leaving himself at least as well o.
Remarkably, this does not mean that A could not secure non-proliferation, even
while leaving himself better o than he would be if he attacked B to stop the latter's
program. In fact, there is a compromise A could oer, that would leave both sides
better o than war, and would suce to ensure B did not develop nuclear weapons.
The problem is that this compromise actually leaves A worse o than a lesser oer
that would lead to B's eventual proliferation. Thus, sometimes non-proliferation,
while feasible, is not worth the cost for A.Chapter 4: A Model of Arms Proliferation and Prevention, with Muhammet Bas 201
Proposition 4.6. Suppose that B is in the second stage and this is common knowl-
edge. Then there is a non-proliferation equilibrium of this subgame if and only if
p   cA + 
1 (p   pn)  1 + 
1 (cA + cB) and [ + (1   )](cA + cB)  (p   pn).
The rst condition in Proposition 4.6 is taken directly from Proposition 4.2, and
guarantees that once A knows B has reached the second stage, there is an equilibrium
where war occurs. This means that there is potentially something for both sides to
gain from agreeing on non-proliferation: they will not have to pay the costs of war.
Because there is a war equilibrium, A has a credible threat with which to try to
enforce a non-proliferation deal|to go to war if B is caught cheating|and so all
that matters is whether that threat is severe enough relative to the temptation for
B to cheat on the agreement. The second condition formalizes this requirement. If
A is to get at least as much value from a deal as from the non-deal equilibrium (i.e.,
war), then the most he could possibly give B in an attempt to encourage compliance
with the deal, and thus the most he could threaten to take away in the event that B
is caught cheating, is the surplus value that would be destroyed in the war (cA + cB,
per period). Since A can only punish B if the latter's investment is either detected or
successful (in which case A knows B has cheated because B has nuclear weapons), this
penalty is weighted by the chance that B's investment either succeeds or is detected
(+(1 )). For B the temptation to cheat is the shift in the balance of power that
proliferation would eect, weighted by the chance that his program would succeed
(or (p   pn)). If the maximum expected penalty outweighs the expected benet of
cheating, then the deal is viable; otherwise, one or the other side will not comply.
As one might expect, the quality of A's monitoring of B's compliance (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to the viability of a deal equilibrium, with better monitoring making a deal more likely
to exist. More interestingly, the eects of the other parameters are not monotonic.
If the sophistication of B's program () is too low, the costs of war (cA + cB) are
too high, and/or the eect of proliferation (p   pn) is too low, then B's program is
not threatening enough to A to cause war, and so A's threat to punish cheating with
war is not credible, and thus a deal cannot be enforced. For higher sophistication,
lower costs, and/or higher eects of proliferation, A's war threat becomes credible
and a deal is easily enforced. If sophistication gets any higher, war costs any lower,
or proliferation eects any higher, A's war threat remains credible, but the margin
by which the expected penalty exceeds the temptation to cheat will decline, and
eventually the temptation to cheat will overwhelm the penalty and the deal will
again be unenforceable. Thus program sophistication, war costs, and proliferation
eects have competing consequences for the viability of a deal.
This suggests some implications for various policy interventions. Clearly, eorts on
the part of the United States to improve the quality of monitoring of non-proliferation
agreements unambiguously raise the enforceability of these deals. Eorts to lower the
costs of preventive war can strengthen the viability of agreements if they make the
US willing to go to war where it previously wasn't, but can undermine agreements if
they simply decrease the cost of a war the US was already willing to wage. Eorts
to lessen the eects of proliferation, such as the development of missile defenses and
preemptive capabilities, and to raise the diculty of mastering the latter stages of
weapons development, have similarly ambiguous consequences.
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the rst stage of weapons development?
B Is not Known to Be in Second Stage
First we will investigate the viability of a non-proliferation deal from the begin-
ning, given that immediate war would result if A caught B in the second stage. In
the candidate deal, B would never invest in a program so long as A made suciently
high oers, and if A caught B cheating, the two sides would revert to the \watch and
wait" equilibrium of the previous section, in which B always invests and A waits until
he is suciently condent that B has reached the second stage to attack. Then we
will characterize what would happen if there was the possibility of a later deal once B
had been discovered to be in the second stage, and the special issues of coordination
and credibility this raises.5
To specify the condition under which this deal is viable, we need some additional
notation. Let V A
ww and V B
ww be the continuation values of A and B under the watch
and wait equilibrium, and Sww be the surplus value that is created by avoiding this
equilibrium with its concomitant risk of war (i.e., Sww  1
1   

V A
ww + V B
ww

). Let
V
B;s1
1 and V
B;s2
1 be B's continuation values from the subgame of the watch and wait
equilibrium in which A has gone one period since the receipt of the last signal that B
remained in the rst stage, if B is actually in the rst and second stages, respectively.
5Throughout this section, we ignore the possibility of deals based on separating equilibria, in
which non-proliferation becomes viable after an initial period of investment. In these equilibria,
once there is any uncertainty about B's stage, A oers a deal supported by the threat of immediate
war if B is discovered cheating. The deal is designed so that B would comply with it if he remained
in the rst stage, and cheat on it if he had advanced to the second. This makes A's threat of
immediate war credible, even though it would not be if A knew for sure that B remained in the rst
stage, because if A detects cheating he can infer with certainty that B is in the second stage. While
this is perfectly valid within the con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Recall from Proposition 4.1 that V B
n 
1 pn cB
1  is B's continuation value once he has
obtained nuclear weapons. Finally, let V B;s2
np be the continuation value B would obtain
in the subgame in which he had cheated once on the candidate deal and made it to
the second stage, all without being detected by A, and recall that B's continuation
value from war prior to proliferation is W B 
1 p cB
1  .
Proposition 4.7. There is a non-proliferation equilibrium of the game, based on the
threat of reverting to the \watch and wait" equilibrium of Proposition 4.4 if A catches
B investing, if and only if immediate war is an equilibrium outcome of the subgame
in which B is known to be in the second stage and:
V
B
ww + Sww  V
B
n + (1   )
h
W
B + (1   )V
B;s2
1 + (1   )(1   )V
B;s2
np
i
+ (1   )
h
V
B
ww + (1   )V
B;s1
1 + (1   )(V
B
ww + Sww)
i
The left-hand side of the condition in Proposition 4.7 is the highest value B could
possibly receive in any non-proliferation deal that A would be willing to oer. This
value is just whatever B would get in the watch and wait equilibrium, plus the entire
surplus that is created by avoiding that equilibrium and the possible costs of war it
entails. A wouldn't oer any more than this, because this the value of the deal for A
would be less than that of the watch and wait equilibrium.
The right-hand side is the value B would prospectively get by cheating on the
putative deal. If B's investment leads immediately to nuclear weapons (with proba-
bility ), then B gets the greater concessions from A that proliferation brings (V B
n ).
If B's investment leads to mastery of the rst stage but not the second (with prob-
ability (1   )), what happens depends on what A observes. If A detects that B
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W B), but if he detects only that B has cheated (with probability (1   )), then
the watch and wait equilibrium will begin with A having gone a period of investment
without receiving any signal of stage (giving B a value of V
B;s2
1 ). If A detects nothing
((1 )(1 )), then B has the opportunity to continue cheating on the deal without
A knowing (V B;s2
np ). And nally, if B's investment goes nowhere (1   ), and A sees
both stage and investment (), then the watch and wait equilibrium begins (giving
V B
ww). If instead A detects B's cheating but not his stage ((1   )), then the watch
and wait equilibrium begins with A having gone one period without a stage signal
(yielding V
B;s1
1 ), and if A does not see B's cheating ((1   )), then B can go back to
compliance with the deal with A none the wiser.
If the left-hand side exceeds the right, then there is a deal that A is willing to oer
and that is generous enough that B would rather comply with it than cheat on it. As
with the second-stage-known deal analyzed in the previous subsection, the viability
of a deal starting from the beginning of the game turns critically on the quality of
A's monitoring of B's investment and progress ( and ). Better monitoring makes
the relatively good possible outcomes of B cheating (such as making it to the second
stage and then continuing to cheat under A's nose) less likely and the relatively
bad outcomes (such as war) more likely. It also raises the surplus|as we saw in
the previous section, higher  means a higher risk of war in the watch and wait
equilibrium. And it also lowers the value of many of the cheating possibilities, and
leaves the rest the same. Thus, better intelligence means that the surplus with which
A can encourage compliance is higher, the chance of getting caught cheating is higher,
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It is also important to note the role that war in the watch and wait equilibrium
plays in the viability of a non-proliferation deal. When war is less likely (or happens
later) in the watch and wait equilibrium, the surplus to be gained from avoiding this
equilibrium in favor of a deal is smaller, and the punishment of switching to the
watch and wait equilibrium is equally or less severe for B. Thus, the less dangerous
the watch and wait equilibrium, the harder it will be to nd a viable non-proliferation
agreement. For some values of the exogenous parameters, there may be a viable non-
proliferation deal once B has reached the second stage and this is known, but no such
deal earlier in the game when A is pretty sure B remains in the rst stage and thus
cannot credibly threaten war.
More subtly, the existence of a viable deal once B is known to have reached the
second stage can itself undermine the viability of an earlier deal and increase the
probability of proliferation. To see why, recall from Proposition 4.6 that whenever
there is a second-stage deal, there is also an immediate war equilibrium of that sub-
game (it is the threat of reverting to this that supports the deal). Because the war
equilibrium is worse for B than the deal, it is easier to support an earlier deal if it
is backed by the threat of reverting to the war equilibrium, rather than the threat
of reverting to the later deal. The possibility of detected progress leading to a more
generous non-proliferation deal might even motivate B to invest in a covert program
in the rst place, in addition to the prospect of actually obtaining nuclear weapons.
This suggests the interesting possibility that some proliferants might pursue nuclear
weapons mainly out of the hope that it will eventually bring forth a more generous
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So suppose that a deal from the beginning exists under the war threat, but not
under the threat of the later deal, and imagine the following situation. The two sides
agree to non-proliferation at the beginning of the game, enforced by the threat of the
watch and wait equilibrium and eventual war if A estimates that B is likely enough
to have reached the second stage. At some point during the game, A receives a signal
that B has invested, and the two sides revert to the watch and wait equilibrium.
Then at some point A becomes condent enough that B has reached the second stage
that the equilibrium strategy calls for him to attack. However, the two players could
instead coordinate on the equilibrium of the second-stage deal. B would certainly go
along, as this equilibrium is strictly better for him than war, and it is also better for
A. Why would A go to war, given that there was an alternative that was better for
him and certain to be agreed to?
The problem occurs if B anticipates this scenario and A's failure to carry out his
war threat when the equilibrium calls for it. If he does, then it is rational for him to
cheat on the initial deal. If in turn A anticipates that B will reason in this way, then
the deal would not be viable after all. Thus, the existence of a later deal can fatally
undermine an earlier one, even when the earlier one is in equilibrium, unless A can
somehow coordinate the two sides' expectations so that both anticipate that A would
carry out the war threat, even though it is worse for both.
We can see how this might be done by considering whether a similar problem
undermines the later deal. In principle, A faces the same choice. Having caught B
cheating, two equilibria can be played: immediate war, or simply starting the deal
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B's cheating, then B will have good reason to cheat again and thus re-starting the
deal would only lead to more cheating. Thus, at the point at which the equilibrium
strategy calls for it, A will attack, because he expects that not doing so will guarantee
that a re-started deal is not viable. Thus, there is no reason for B to doubt the
credibility of the threat that underpins the later deal. The key here is that there is
reason for A to believe that whether he carries out the required threat now will aect
the viability of any future deals|this makes it rational to carry out the threat, and
anticipating this, B will comply with the deal.
Within the bounds of our model, this won't work for enforcing an earlier deal. By
the above reasoning, B knows that A would enforce a later non-proliferation deal,
regardless of whether A enforced an earlier one. Because A's decision on whether to
enforce an earlier deal with war does not aect B's expectations that a later deal
would be enforced, and thus the viability of a later deal, A has little reason to carry
through with a costly punishment now rather than agreeing to a later deal.
In reality, A (e.g., the United States) faces more than one potential proliferant
across the world's states. And even if the US goes to war with a proliferant to stop its
program, the interaction will not actually end, as our model assumes. The US might
lose the war, in which case it will have to continue interacting with the opposing state,
which might decide to continue or renew its program. And even if the US wins the
war, the defeated state will eventually regain its sovereignty and have to decide anew
whether to pursue nuclear weapons. In choosing whether to impose costly punishment
to enforce a particular early deal, the US must consider the eect its choice will have
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state. If the US fails to enforce an early deal with one state now, others present and
future might conclude that it will not enforce their own deals, with fatal consequences
for their viability.
These negative externalities can make it rational for the US to carry out a costly
punishment equilibrium, even if a later deal equilibrium that is not itself costly also
exists, and thus preserve the viability of the earlier deal. A full analysis of the
conditions under which these externalities are large enough to have this eect is
beyond the scope of the current paper, but it nonetheless suggests a precise mechanism
by which concerns over reputation may inuence non-proliferation.
To summarize the most important results of this section, we rst found that if
war never occurs in any equilibrium, then non-proliferation is never viable, because
there is no surplus with which to reward B's compliance. This can happen even when
there is a non-proliferation deal with which B would comply and which A would still
prefer to war|it's just that A would actually prefer the risk of proliferation and war
to oering this deal. As expected, we found that the viability of deals was strongly
dependent upon the quality of A's monitoring of B's compliance. However, other
factors such as the sophistication of B's program, the costs of war to stop it, and
the eects of proliferation on the balance of power can have counter-intuitive eects:
changes in these factors can either help or harm the goal of non-proliferation. We
further showed that deals starting with B known to be in the rst stage are easier
to support when the \watch and wait" equilibrium that would otherwise obtain, and
to which the players would revert in the event that A caught B cheating, is more
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the get-go if a viable second-stage deal exists, because this gives B another reason
to start a program (i.e., to seek a more generous non-proliferation deal) and raises
questions about whether A would actually carry out the threat of war given that a
less costly (for A) and less severe (for B) later deal exists. Ultimately, the viability of
an early-stage non-proliferation deal supported by the threat of eventual war, when
a later-stage deal is also viable, may depend on A's need to preserve the viability of
other such deals with other potential proliferants.
4.5 Conclusion and Implications
We conclude with a discussion of the implications our results suggest for the
empirical study of nuclear proliferation, the theoretical analysis of arming, and policy-
making on nuclear issues.
Perhaps our most important result for empirical scholars is the nding that much
of the over-time variation, and at least some of the across-country variation, in pro-
liferation interactions is driven by stochastic elements such as when a proliferant's
program will make progress and when this will be observed by its opponent. Together
with the small number of cases of nuclear weapons programs in the empirical record,
this suggests that there are fundamental limits to our ability to make inferences about
the role of exogenous factors, such as the eects of proliferation, the costs of war, and
the sophistication of a proliferant's program and its outside assistance. These factors
aect only the expected outcome in a given case; the actual outcome is still highly
variable because of the stochastic elements.
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programs by designating the country-year or dyad-year as the unit of analysis, a tech-
nique which greatly increases the number of observations and thereby the apparent
strength of any patterns in the data. These studies typically assume either that obser-
vations are independent over time, or that any dependence over time decays rapidly.
Our model implies that this approach is deeply awed: behavior in the model de-
pends heavily on what has happened in earlier time periods, and for some values of
the exogenous parameters, this dependence may be long-lasting. This suggests that
statistical analysts of the record must resort either to more detailed, theoretically-
informed modeling of the temporal dependence in these interactions, or to the more
conservative approach of treating a country or dyad, rather than a country-year or
dyad-year, as the modeled unit of analysis.
This does not mean that our model cannot be tested. Though it suggests the
exogenous factors that scholars have focused on to date only weakly aect the observed
outcomes, the stochastic elements have much stronger eects and are, at least in
principle, measurable. An eort to gather data on exactly when historical proliferants'
programs mastered various stages of nuclear weapons development, and exactly when
this progress was detected by their opponents, would be valuable for testing our theory
and for exploring the role of progressive development and intelligence estimates in
these interactions more generally. Of course, the diculties of securing this data
from governments with every incentive to conceal it should not be underestimated.
For theorists of arming, our analysis suggests that the neglect of arms control
(non-proliferation agreements in our case) in studies to date renders their results
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to choose from, if one is Pareto-superior to the other then they play the \better"
one. If that is so, then when arms control is viable the players would select it over
unconstrained arming, since the latter typically carries the risk of (costly) war. But
this selection can invalidate the comparative statics derived from the unconstrained
arming equilibrium. So, for example, in our analysis, lower costs of war make war
more likely in the non-deal equilibrium. But when the possibility of arms control
is taken into account, lowering the costs of war may render a deal viable and thus
decrease the likelihood of war. Determining which of the conclusions surfaced so
far in this literature are robust to the consideration of arms control equilibria is an
important subject for future research.
The absence of arms control in existing models goes hand-in-hand with the typical
restriction to either a nite-period game structure or Markov Perfect Equilibrium
in innite-period games. Though it is possible to consider forms of arms control
based on coordination on less-armed equilibria in these settings, they automatically
exclude arms control based on cooperation and the threat of future punishment. Each
restriction is chosen as a mathematical convenience, and while we do not dismiss the
diculties that are introduced in attempting to model something as complicated as
arming in a less restrictive setting, it bears acknowledging that there is simply no
substantive justication for either type of restriction. Because it is typically costly,
arming is mysterious for exactly the reason war is: why do rational actors employ
costly measures (whether war or arming) to manage their disputes? We cannot know
the answer if we do not understand why arms control sometimes fails to be viable.
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ceptions of arms control, as coordination onto better equilibria or as cooperation sup-
ported by the threat of reversion to a worse equilibrium. In particular, in our analysis
of non-proliferation agreements, we found that cooperation on a Pareto-superior deal
required coordination on a Pareto-inferior threat equilibrium that might well fail to
be credible, even though it was a perfect equilibrium. This turns the usual way of
posing the arms coordination problem on its head, and may well apply in arming
contexts other than nuclear proliferation.
In our model, we assumed that, with nuclear weapons, the eects on the balance
of power are more about whether a state has them than about how many it has. This
seems in keeping with much of the literature, but it may be true of other military
technologies as well. The focus so far on theoretical models of arming quantity, rather
than quality, is undoubtedly useful. But in the modern era with which scholars of
international conict are most concerned, the research and development of better
weapons may be as important as the conscription of more soldiers and the manufac-
ture of more guns, and raises dierent theoretical issues. The most salient of these is
the fact that development takes time, so that the eect of acquiring the weapons is
delayed, and subject to prevention, whether by war or by deal.
For policy-makers, the most important advice to follow from our work is that many
of the policy initiatives typically debated in the arena of nuclear issues may have
counter-intuitive and unintended consequences. Missile defense, preemptive strike
capabilities, and diplomatic eorts to cut o outside assistance to a proliferant's pro-
gram might well improve the expected outcome for the US, but not always in the way
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but they also sometimes undermine them.
One initiative that is unambiguously good is to improve intelligence-gathering.
Higher-quality intelligence on the existence and progress of a state's nuclear weapons
program unambiguously increases the likelihood that a non-proliferation deal becomes
and remains viable, but it also unambiguously increases the ability of the US to
successfully prosecute interactions with proliferants in the absence of a deal. As far
as our model can discern, it is an unalloyed good for the US.
Finally, our model suggests a tension between two goals that arises when the US
must respond to a potential proliferant's cheating on a non-proliferation deal. On
the one hand, responsibility and the need to preserve the responsible reputation of
the US internationally argue for giving a cheater every chance to nd a new viable
non-proliferation deal. On the other hand, allowing a proliferant to extract additional
concessions by virtue of progress in its illegal weapons program can undermine deals
with other potential proliferants. Going to war in response to the latter concern might
or might not be the right thing for the US to do, but even if it is, the US government is
still placed in the unenviable position of explaining to its domestic and international
audiences why it undertook a violent, costly resolution of the crisis, when one that
would avoid both violence and its costs was available.Bibliography
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